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Glossary 
ABS    Access and Benefit Sharing 
AIPP    Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact 
ALBA   Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra Américs 
ALTER-Net A Long- Term Biodiversity, Ecosystem and Awareness 
Research Network 
BD   Bernd Declaration 
BG   Bonn Guidelines 
BINGO  Business Non- Governmental Organisations 
BpB   Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung 
BS   Benefit Sharing 
BUKO Bundeskoordination Internationalismus/ Federal coordination 
of internationalism 
CBD    Convention on Biological Diversity 
CBD Alliance  A global network of NGOs focusing on the CBD 
CGG   Commission on Global Governance 
CI   Conservation International 
CSIR   South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
CGRFA  Commission on Genetic Resource for Food and Agriculture  
COP   Conference of the Parties 
CSO   Civil Society Organisation 
DNR   Deutsche Naturschutzring 
ECOSOC  UN Economic and Social Council 
EED   Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst 
ENB   Earth Negotiation Bulletin 
ETC-group   Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration 
FAO   UN Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FED German NGO Forum on Environment and Development/ 
Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung 
FPCI    Fundaciòn para la Promociòn del Conocimiento Indìgena 
F-PIC   Free Prior and Informed Consent  
FPP   Forrest Peoples Programme 
GEF   Global Environment Facility  
GTLE   Groups of Technical and Legal Experts  
ICTSD  International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 
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ICG   Informal Consultative Group  
IGO   International Governmental Organisations 
IIED   International Institute for Environment and Development 
IIFB    International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity 
IMF    International Monetary Fund 
INEF  Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden/ Institute for 
Development and Peace 
ING   Interregional Negotiation Group  
INGO   International Non Governmental Organisation  
IPBES Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services 
IPBN   Indigenous Peoples´ Biodiversity Network 
IPCB   Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism 
IPLC   Indigenous People and Local Communities 
IPO   Indigenous People Organisation 
IPRs   Intellectual Property Rights 
IUCN   International Union for the Conservation of Nature 
IU-PGR  International Undertaking of Plant Genetic Resources 
IWBN   Indigenous Women´s Biodiversity Network (IWBN). 
JCN-CBD  Japan Civil Network for Convention on Biological Diversity  
JUSCANZ  The group of Japan, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand  
LI-BIRD  Local Initiatives for Biodiversity Research and Development 
LMMC  Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries 
MarBEF  Marine Biodiversity and Ecosystem Functioning 
MAT   Mutually Agreed Terms 
MIA   Multilateral Agreement on Investments  
MOP   Meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
NAHO  National Aboriginal Health Organization 
NBSAP  National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plan 
NGO    Non- Governmental Organisations 
PIC   Prior Informed Consent 
PIPEC   Pacific Indigenous Peoples Environmental Coalition 
QUANGOS  Quasi Non- Governmental Organisations 
RAFI   Rural Rural Advancement Foundation International 
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SBSTTA  Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological 
Advice  
SEARICE  South East Asia Regional Institute for Community Education 
TEEB   The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
TEBTEBBA Indigenous Peoples' International Centre for Policy Research 
and Education 
TNC    Transnational Corporation 
TNC    The Nature Conservancy 
TRIPS   Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
TWN   Third World Network, 
UIA   Union of International Associations  
UN    United Nations 
UNCED  United Nations Conference on Environment and Development  
UNCHE  United Nations Conference on the Human Environment  
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
UNDRIP  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 
UNEP   United Nations Environmental Programme  
USPTO  United States Patent Office 
UPOV International Union for the Protection of new Varieties of 
Plants  
WG on ABS  Working Group on Access and Benefit Sharing 
WHO   World Health Organisation 
WSSD   World Summit on Sustainable Development  
WTO   World Trade Organisation  
WWF    World Wide Fund for Nature 
YPA   Yiaku People's Association 
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1. Introduction  
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity is an international legally binding treaty, 
which was adopted at the UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and has been 
in force since December 1993. With the Convention the contracting states addressed 
two main issues: on the one hand the worldwide advancing loss of biodiversity and 
on the other hand the resource and distribution conflict between northern and 
southern countries.  
Biodiversity is broadly understood as the diversity within species, between species 
and of ecosystems. All three levels are currently facing losses. According to 
scientists the current loss rate of species, for example, is 1000 times higher than the 
natural extinction rate (cf. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005: 3f). Similarly 
also the genetic diversity within species has declined worldwide, especially among 
domesticated plants and animals, which was a result of the “Green Revolution” of 
the 1960s. This reduction of genetic diversity of agricultural crops also raises the 
susceptibility to disease and undermines the adaptability of these plants (cf. ibid.: 4f). 
Beyond that almost all of the worldwide existing eco-systems have been influenced 
by and transformed through human actions. As was pointed out by Stephan, across 
virtually all continents more than fifty percent of the national territory has been 
transformed into industrial plantation forest, crop plantations or permanent grazing 
land (cf. Stephan 1999: 304, 308).  
Since biodiversity is the basis of our lives, the loss of biodiversity basically affects 
all of us. The worldwide existing eco-systems provide us with various valuable 
resources like food, medicines, fibres, building materials and offer many free 
services (i.e. eco-system services) like fresh air, water, flood and landslide protection 
etc. These are essential for human wellbeing and the quality of our lives. If the 
destruction of eco-systems and the extinction of species continue, this will have 
dramatic consequences especially for poor people in “developing countries”, since 
they are more directly dependent on biodiversity and eco-system services and 
therefore more vulnerable to their degradation. According to Silvia Ribeiro, 
approximately ninety percent of the rural population in “developing countries” cover 
their basic needs by the utilisation of components of biological diversity that are 
occurring in their region (cf. Ribeiro 2002: 120). In Asia and Africa, for example, 
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more than eighty percent of the population are dependent on medical herbs and 
traditional treatment methods (cf. WHO 2008).  
Now to the second problem that should be solved within the framework of the 
Convention on Biodiversity. Biodiversity is not equally distributed around the world. 
Most of the regions rich in wild and agricultural biological diversity are located in 
the geopolitical south. Countries like Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Madagascar, South 
Africa, India, China, Indonesia, Philippines and so on harbour more than two thirds 
of the world’s biodiversity. The genetic resources contained within these plants and 
animals form the basis for the breeding of agricultural plants and animals, as well as 
for the development of new drugs, food supplements, cosmetics, pesticides etc. That 
is why especially northern agribusinesses and big pharmaceutical trusts have an 
interest in the genetic resources of these countries, since they dispose over the 
necessary technology in order to extract relevant active ingredients to develop new 
products. In 2008, the worldwide sale of botanical or plant-derived drugs reached 
approximately 19.5 billion dollars and is estimated to reach 32.9 billion dollars in 
2013 (cf. Kim Larson 2009). However until today the countries, where the plants 
originated from as well as the indigenous and local communities, which have been 
using and improving these medical herbs and on whose traditional knowledge a not 
inconsiderable part of natural drugs are based on, are only in the fewest cases given a 
share in the company’s profits. The theft of plants and animals, including their 
components and genes, the traditional knowledge associated with them, and the 
subsequent patenting of these resources through intellectual property rights (IPRs), is 
generally referred to as biopiracy and should have been counteracted through the 
establishment of the CBD. The Convention tries to limit the exploitation without 
compensation of biological material and associated knowledge through northern 
companies and private research institutes by recognising the sovereign rights of 
States over their natural resources, including their right to determine access to these 
resources, and by defining general provisions for its appropriation (prior informed 
consent, mutually agreed terms and benefit sharing). Over the years these provisions 
have been further concretised at the biennial Conferences of the Parties (COP). The 
negotiations on access and benefit sharing which lasted nearly two decades finally 
resulted in the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing, which was adopted 
at the last COP 10 in October 2010.  
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The issue of biodiversity loss and biopiracy has not only been addressed to by states 
but also by the scientific community and NGOs. In fact, it was due to the 
engagement of NGOs that the states drew attention to the problem of biodiversity 
loss and biopiracy at all.  
Since the establishment of CBD in the early nineties the number of NGOs 
participating in the negotiations on the further development of the CBD has 
increased (cf. Brühl 2001: 140; 2003: 118f.). Such an increased participation of 
NGOs in international negotiations cannot only be observed in biodiversity policy 
but also in other soft policy areas. The UN world summits of the nineties were so to 
say the kick-off for a greater involvement and participation of NGOs within formerly 
intergovernmental negotiations.  
This involvement of NGOs in intergovernmental negotiations raised the hopes for a 
democratisation of the international political system. These positive expectations 
towards NGOs were also taken up within the concept of global governance. The 
main assumption of the global governance concept is that worldwide occurring 
problems, like the loss of biodiversity, cannot be effectively solved by a state alone 
on the national level but need to be addressed to at the international level in 
cooperation with other states and non state actors (e.g. NGOs, local groups, private 
companies etc.). Since these actors are, even though to different degrees either 
contributing to or affected by the problems.  
According to the concept the involvement of NGOs, as main representatives of civil 
society interests, will lead to a democratisation of international negotiations as these 
actors bring a variety of interests into the political process, which would have 
otherwise been ignored, and also enhance the transparency of the process to non 
participants (input legitimacy). Furthermore, NGOs are ascribed to contribute 
through their expertise and problem solving competence to ameliorate the quality of 
international decisions, in the sense that the taken decisions also effectively reduce or 
solve the given problem (output legitimacy) (cf. Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 39f; 
Beisheim 2001: 121; Brühl 2003: 202).  
 
At the core this thesis asks the question, whether the basic assumption of the global 
governance concept that NGOs can contribute to the democratisation of international 
policy processes, by enhancing input and output legitimacy, holds true when looking 
at the CBD, more specifically at the negotiations on access and benefit sharing and 
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the resulting Nagoya Protocol, as an example. As the political terrain of the CBD is 
comparatively open toward participation of civil society organisations, it is suited as 
case study to evaluate the contribution of NGOs to enhance the input and output 
quality of international decisions.   
 
The case study draws upon a range of empirical material, including official policy 
documents, position papers, press releases and interviews. First, a range of existing 
studies on NGOs in biodiversity politics, among others the works of Ulrich Brand 
and Tanja Brühl, have been reviewed in order to determine the general position and 
interests of the different NGOs, that are active within the CBD. The interviews, 
which had been taken at the penultimate Conference of Parties of the CBD in Bonn 
2008, were subject to a secondary content analysis, aiming to identify activities of 
NGOs that potentially lead to an amelioration of the input and output legitimacy of 
international decisions. The interviews in question were guided expert interviews 
which had been carried out with representatives of governments, the CBD secretariat, 
members of international organisations and different NGO representatives (i.e. 
environmental, development and critical NGOs, as well as indigenous peoples 
organisations (IPOs). They were conducted by a couple of university students, 
among others myself, as part of a research project under the guidance of Professor 
Dr. Ulrich Brand. The results of our study can be read about in detail in the book 
“Globale Umweltpolitik und die Internationalisierung des Staates. 
Biodiversitätspolitik aus strategisch- relationaler Perspektive”, edited by Ulrich 
Brand. From the available range of interviews, all in all 15, mainly conducted with 
representatives of NGOs and IPOs, were used in the thesis.   
In order to evaluate whether NGOs and IPOs could successfully bring their demands 
and expertise into the final outcome of the ABS negotiation, the position papers of 
the NGO and IPO community (i.e. the CBD Alliance and the International 
Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity (IIFB) were compared to the Nagoya Protocol on 
Access and Benefit Sharing.  
 
After clarifying what is actually meant by the abbreviation NGOs, their meteoric rise 
especially during the nineties and reasons will be discussed. Furthermore, the second 
chapter gives a review of the relationship between the UN and (international) NGOs.  
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The global governance concept is introduced in the third chapter. The focus is put on 
the normative variant of the concept and its main elements. In addition, the 
democratising function of NGOs within international negotiations is described in 
more detail. The chapter concludes with a brief depiction of the main points of 
criticism of the global governance concept.  
The background of the biodiversity agreement as well as the CBD itself is then 
portrayed in chapter four. This is followed by a detailed depiction of the article on 
access and benefit sharing and the further development of this provision. 
Chapter five then describes the general position of the, within the CBD active, NGOs 
and IPOs, their demands regarding the ABS Protocol and the different activities of 
these actors, that could potentially enhance the input and/or output quality of 
international governance.   
Subsequently, chapter six shows whether, respectively to what extent, the demands 
and expertise of NGOs and IPOs were considered in the final outcome of the ABS 
negotiations.  
The conclusion finally discusses to what extent these actors could contribute to a 
democratisation of the CBD process. Beyond that, the concluding chapter also points 
out which institutional changes would be needed in order to effectively improve the 
legitimacy of international policy through the involvement of NGOs and IPOs. Last 
but not least some proposals are made on how investigations on the legitimatising 
potential of NGOs and IPOs could be improved in future studies. 
 
As mentioned, the main purpose of the present thesis is to make a, albeit small, 
contribution to the exploration of the democratising effect of NGOs within one of the 
approximately 300 presently existing international regimes. In this respect, the thesis 
is first of all relevant for those social science communities who address the question 
of the democratising potential of NGOs. These are communities from the field of 
development studies, political ecology and global governance.  
Beyond that, it is relevant for those scientific communities that are concerned with 
environmental conservation issues, like the Intergovernmental Platform on 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), the Long-Term Biodiversity, 
Ecosystem and Awareness Research Network (ALTER-Net), the Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity  (TEEB) or the Marine Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Functioning (MarBEF).The main purpose of these biodiversity networks is to 
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integrate the within the network generated expertise and scientific results into 
political decisions. In order to feed their scientific knowledge effectively into the 
negotiation process it is of course necessary to be well informed on the dynamics and 
power relation within the CBD process. So, the present thesis might be interesting for 
these networks as it illustrates the structure and pitfalls of the process and the 
chances for these scientific communities to bring their proposals into the final 
outcome. 
 
2. Non-Governmental Organisations in Global Politics 
 
During the last decade of the twentieth century NGOs advanced to important actors 
in national and international politics. They are especially active and of high influence 
in so-called “soft policy areas” like human rights-, development-, and environmental-
policy. Due to their brisk participation at the UN world summits of the nineties, they 
increasingly gained popularity in the public and scientific discussion. This is the 
reason why the nineties are often called the decade of NGOs. 
While the presence of NGOs in national and international politics is not necessarily 
new, it takes on modified forms and dimensions (cf. Hirsch 1999: 2).  
Before discussing them, I want to clarify what is actually meant by the abbreviation 
NGO. 
 
2.1. What are NGOs? - Definition problems 
 
Depending on time context “civil society” is understood in quite different ways. 1 In 
development studies “civil society” is usually understood as arena of association 
between the state and the market (and the family), also referred to as “third sector” 
(cf. Bebbington/Hickey 2006: 418; Van Rooy 2002: 490; Frantz/Martens 2006: 18; 
Nohlen 2007: 358). In order to not restrict the term to a specific set of organisations, 
civil society can also be understood as a sphere or arena where individuals and 
 
                                                 
1 A brief summary on different understandings of “civil society” is given among others by Van Rooy 
(cf. 2002: 489ff) and Edwards (cf.2005) 
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groups voluntarily associate in order to advance common interest (cf. 
Fioramonti/Heinrich 2008: 378). The institutional core of this sphere is constituted 
by a variety of non-governmental and non-economic associations, ranging: 
“from churches, cultural associations, and academies to independent media, sport and 
leisure clubs, debating societies, groups of concerned citizens, and grass-roots 
petitioning drives, all the way to occupational associations, political parties, labour 
unions, and ´alternative institutions´” (Habermas 1992: 453f).  
 
These organisations may on the one hand provide specific services, which are 
neglected by state and market, and on the other hand act as a counterweight to both 
spheres, exercising some degree of control over them, and promoting processes of 
democratisation (cf. Bebbington/Hickey 2006: 418). The relationship between civil 
society, the state, and market sector ranges from opposition, or rather confrontation, 
to close cooperation.  
As indicated by Habermas´ enumeration, the actors of these spheres cannot be 
completely separated from one another. In reality civil society is touched and shaped 
by the other two spheres. Professions associations and labour unions, for example, 
are part of both civil society and the market. Political parties otherwise may not be 
counted as part of civil society, as they seek to attain governmental office (cf. Van 
Rooy 2002: 490). Beyond that it should be kept in mind that civil society does not 
only consist of “morally good” actors but also of criminal organisations and violent 
groups.  
Non- Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are indeed an important part of civil 
society but they are not synonymous or congruent with civil society respectively civil 
society organisations (CSO). 
 
Unfortunately, until today there is no generally accepted definition of the term 
NGOs. The problem is that, on the one hand, there is no coherent official definition 
of the term, meaning that the UN has another understanding of NGOs than the World 
Bank or the Union of International Associations (UIA) do. On the other hand, even 
within the scientific discussion, there is no agreement on what kind of organisations 
should be subsumed under the term NGO.  
In general, one can distinguish between a broad and a narrow understanding, or 
rather application, of the term NGO. Although the term is used quite differently 
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within literature there are at least four characteristics, which are constantly addressed 
to in order to clarify the term.  
As the name already suggests NGOs are not part of government. They are formally 
private institutions neither founded nor under the direct control of states, and 
therefore considered independent from it. Beyond that they are not interested in 
making profits (non- profit orientation) like commercial organisations (e.g. TNC), 
and do not peruse criminal activities or engage in violence. Last but not least they are 
not constituted as a political party and are not interested in achieving government 
office As pointed out by Peter Willetts, these characteristics apply in general usage 
particularly because they match the fundamental features for recognition by the 
United Nations (cf. Willetts 2001; Nalinakumari/MacLean 2005: 2). 
However, none of these characteristics should be considered to be absolute. NGOs 
cannot be considered as completely independent from the state2 since most of them 
are financed predominantly through governmental funding and sometimes have state 
representatives as members. It is also possible that NGOs are established by states 
and instrumental to their interests. In order to distinguish “genuine” NGOs with no 
governmental affiliation or support from those, that are either predominantly 
financed by, or a creation of, governments, acronyms like QUANGOS (quasi non 
governmental organisations) or GONGOS (governmental organized non 
governmental organisations) have been established (cf. Hirsch 1999: 2; 
Frantz/Martens 2006: 40ff; Furtak 1997: 25; Nalinakumari/MacLean 2005: 4). A 
prominent QUANGO in the environmental field is the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN).  
Of course there are “genuine” NGOs like Green Peace or Amnesty International, that 
are completely independent from state funding, but this is rather the exception than 
the rule (cf. Frantz/Martens 2006: 28). In reality NGOs fall into a certain dependence 
to the government if they receive state funding and a governmental co-determination 
or control cannot be excluded when using the funds. A lot of NGOs are reliant on 
voluntary contributions and a not inconsiderable number on public funding in order 
to actually be able to accomplish their job.  
 
 
                                                 
2 See among others Ian Smillie 1999: At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and Issues in the Relationship 
between Northern and NGOs and Northern Governments, or Michael Edwards and David 
Hulme1998: Too close for Comport? The Impact of Official Aid on NGOs 
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On the international level NGOs have become partners of states and International 
Governmental Organisations (IGO). As actors on the international political arena, 
NGOs cannot only be met outside official conferences, where they try to influence 
the negotiations through loud and spectacular protests, but also inside where they 
have advanced to negotiating partners and consultants of governments (cf. 
Frantz/Martens 2006:17; Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 16f) Therefore critical observers, 
like Joachim Hirsch, raise the not entirely unfounded question, whether these actors 
actually are what their name alleges, namely Non Governmental Organisation or 
rather part of a political government and regulation complex, what Gramsci called 
the integral state (cf. Hirsch 1999:2).  
 
Just like their independence towards governments, also their “non-profit orientation” 
may be questioned. Non-profit orientation does not mean that that the organisation is 
not allowed to generate any surplus. However any gains must remain with the 
organisation, and be used to further the purposes of the organisation. The earnings 
may be used for example to finance projects, campaigns, equipment, research, 
publications and of course to pay the staff (cf. Frantz/Martens 2006: 26). The 
charitable, non- profit orientation of NGOs does not necessarily mean that these 
organisations are operating through volunteers or spare time activists. On the 
contrary, NGOs mostly dispose of a permanent staff of paid and qualified employees 
and are therefore considered as professionalized or professional organisations (cf. 
ibid. 26; also Hirsch 1999: 3). In order to keep the organisational infrastructure alive, 
pay the full-time staff, and continue their work, NGOs need to acquire money. 
Therefore NGOs definitely have an interest in generating income. The traditional 
sources of income in the form of annual membership fee and/or donations are often 
expanded through commercial activities, like professional sponsoring, merchandising 
or eco-labelling (cf. Brunnengräber/Walk 2001: 102). However if NGOs cooperate 
too close to business companies (as with governments), they risk to lose their 
credibility vis à vis the general public.  
 
Although reasonable doubts can be raised regarding all four mentioned 
characteristics, they may be helpful in order to get a first idea of the term NGO.  
However the definition of NGO as any non-profit oriented and non-violent 
organisation, which is not seeking governmental office, is still quite unspecific and 
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subsumes a variety of actors ranging from churches, research institutes, professional 
associations, labour unions and industrial interests groups to one issue organisations 
such as human rights, development and environmental ones. Although all these 
different actors can be assigned to civil society and denominated as civil society 
organisations, not all of them should be referred to as NGOs in this paper. 
In this thesis the term NGOs is primarily used for those organisations or networks of 
organisations which were established by individuals, with a common conviction, on a 
voluntary basis. They are not profit oriented, not violent, and financially as well as 
organisationally relatively independent towards state and market actors. In addition, 
they also have a certain degree of professionalism and organisational durability and 
they try to influence directly, or indirectly, international policy (cf. Hirsch 1999: 3). 
Beyond that they do neither promote special or profit interest of their members nor 
the particular interests of certain economic sectors, as professional associations, 
labour unions, and industrial interests groups do. But they claim to represent general 
or universal interests of humanity (e.g. climate or biodiversity protection, food 
security, peace preservation etc.) or interest of marginalised groups, such as poor 
people, women, indigenous people and so on (Frantz/Martens 2006: 24). In this 
paper the term basically denotes organisations such as human- and women's rights 
groups, environmental and development organisations as well as indigenous people 
organisations (IPO). Strictly speaking IPOs just like community based or grass roots 
organisations would not belong to the group of NGOs, as they directly persue the 
interest of their members (cf. Hirsch 1999:3). Indeed CBOs and IPOs are established, 
first of all, to pursue their own interests and needs, but they are promoting likewise 
the interests of other people affected, who are not members of the organisation. 
Therefore they belong definitively to the group of NGOs. 
NGOs and social movements often work on the same thematic areas and pursue 
similar goals. However, the main difference between them is that NGOs develop 
organizational structures (cf. Nohle 2007: 358; Hirsch 1999: 4).  
With regard to the NGO´ s scope of actions, one can distinguish between NGOs with 
a local, national, regional or international perspective. In this paper this distinction is 
not made. The term NGO is used rather as a generic term including, local (as far as 
they participate in international negotiations), national and international NGOs.  
 
 19 
 
2.2. The Emergence of NGOs 
 
From a historical point of view NGOs have already existed for a long time. The first 
precursors of NGOs, which intended to influence international issues, were mainly 
religious, humanitarian or social associations. Thich can be dated back to the end of 
the 18th century. The Pennsylvanian Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery 
founded in 1775 is often named to be the first single issue NGO (Brühl 2003: 46). 
Also the Foreign Anti Slavery Society established in 1839, was among the first 
precursors of NGOs as well as the World Evangelic Alliance (1846), the Order of 
Good Templars (1851), the Salvation Army (1865), and the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (1863) (Furtak 1997: 27).  
It is quite difficult to make any clear statement on the exact amount of world wide 
existing NGOs since there are different interpretations of the term, as mentioned 
above.According to that, different criteria must be taken into account in order to 
asses the number of NGOs.  
 
While, with regard to international NGOs, Nalinakumari and MacLean estimate the 
number of INGOs to 12500 during the 1980s and more than 45000 in 2000 (cf. 
Nalinakumari/ 2005: 4). Frantz and Martens as well as the Federal Centre for 
political Education 3 only count 7306 international NGOs by 2004 (cf. BpB 2009: 
25; Frantz/Martens 2006: 85). Although they all used the data set from the Union of 
International Associations (UIA).  
The UIA was established in 1907 in order to register and document all international 
organisations, and provides today the worlds´ largest data set on intergovernmental 
as well as on international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). 
According to the degree of “internationality” the UIA distinguishes between three 
groups of international NGOs: “Conventional International Bodies”, “Other 
International Bodies” and “Special Types”, whereby each group is composed of 
different types of organisations (cf. UIA 2012 a.). In order to be counted to the group 
of “Conventional International Bodies”, NGOs must show the following 
characteristics: Beside of being privately initiated and independent towards the 
 
                                                 
3 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (BpB) 
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governments, the aim of the NGO needs to be genuinely international in character, 
meaning that the organisations are active in at least three different countries. 
Members must be equipped with full voting rights and from at least three different 
countries. Likewise the financial resources must be received from three countries. 
Beyond that the organisations must have a formal structure, which gives members 
the right to periodically elect a governing body and officers, as well as a permanent 
headquarter and staff (cf. UIA 2012 b.; BpB 2009: 26; Franz/Martens 2006: 38f). 
Other organisations, which have a lesser degree of internationality or less developed 
structure etc., are either assigned to the group of “Other International Bodies” or 
“Special Types”. Depending on the groups considered the amount of world wide 
existing international NGOs varies. So in case of Franz and Martens the number of 
international NGOs only referes to the group of “conventional international bodies”, 
while Nalinakumari and MacLean take all three groups of bodies, along with their 
various types, into account.  
 
The following graphic illustrates the growth of international NGO from 1907 to 2004 
(see Fig. 1). On the one hand it shows the growing number of non- governmental 
“Conventional International Bodies” (Type A to D) 4 alone, and on the other hand the 
total number of conventional international NGOs plus “other international bodies” 
(Type E to G) 5 and “Special Types” (Type H to S and U).6 
 
 
                                                 
4: Including: (A) federations of international organisations, (B) universal membership organisations, 
(C) intercontinental membership organisations and (D) regionally oriented membership organisations. 
 
5 Including: (E) Organizations emanating from places, persons or other bodies, (F) Organizations of 
special form and (G) internationally oriented national organisations.  
 
6 Including: (H) Dissolved or apparently inactive organisations, (J) recently reported bodies- not yet 
confirmed, (K) subsidiary and internal bodies, (N) national organisations which’s title or activities 
make it appear to be international, (R) religious and secular institutes, (S) autonomous conference 
series, (U) Currently inactive non-conventional bodies. The Type (T) multilateral treaties, 
intergovernmental agreement is only important for intergovernmental organisations. For a detailed 
description of the differ types (A- U) (see UIA 2012 b.: Types of organisations Type I)  
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Fig. 1 Growth of International NGOs 1909-2004. Source: UIA-Union of International 
Association 2012 a.  
 
Regardless of the groups one refers the result is the same, namely that there has been 
a constant increase in the number of international NGOs during the last century.  
While in 1909 only 176 international NGOs were counted by the UIA, by 1978 there 
were 2.420 conventional international NGOs, or 9.521 when counting all types. The 
number of international NGOs doubled in the mid–eighties up to 4.676 organisations 
respectively 20.634, before it stagnated temporally. 
The end of the cold war and the beginning of the UN world conferences marathon of 
the nineties again quickened the development of international NGOs (cf. BpB 2009: 
26). Since 1991 the number of NGOs has again increased continuously from 4.620 
(or 23.635) to 7.306 (or 51.509) by 2004. Even if one deduces the number of 
dissolved or apparently inactive organisations (H) as well as of currently inactive 
non-conventional bodies (U) an impressive number of more than 29 thousand 
international NGOs remains (cf. UIA 2012 a.). 
 
Excurse: The UN and NGOs 
 
The UN Charta adopted in 1945 stipulates in Chapter X Article 71 the possibility for 
NGOs to participate at the official meetings of the UN Economic and Social Council.  
According to Article 71: 
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“[t]he Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for 
consultation with non- governmental organisations which are concerned with matter 
within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international 
organisations and where appropriate, with national organisations after consultations 
with the Members of the United nations concerned” (United Nations 1985).  
 
Hence, NGOs got the opportunity to officially take part in intergovernmental 
negotiations for the first time. Nevertheless, the installation of Article 71 can be just 
assessed, according to, as a partial success. First of all the article restricted the 
relationship between the UN and NGOs to the activities of ECOSOC; the 
participation of NGOs in other UN bodies was not intended. In comparison to the 
League of Nations, where NGOs had participated only unofficially but therefore in 
all areas, the installation of Article 71 de facto meant a restriction for the NGO 
participation. Furthermore the article just enabled the consultation of NGOs, while 
participation or observer rights were not mentioned. The third reason why Article 71 
was just a partial success lies in the fact that it referred only to international NGO, 
national organisation should only be included in exceptional cases (cf. Brühl 2003: 
50f). 
Initially, the ad hoc provision on the consultation of NGOs was concretized by the 
ECOSOC within resolution 2/3. This first arrangement provided that NGOs were 
only allowed to participate in official meetings with explicit permission of the 
ECOSOC.  
Depending on the NGOs´ objectives and working fields, they were classified to one 
of three categories (A- C) with graduated participation rights and different privileges, 
which basically meant a hierarchisation of NGOs (cf. ibid: 52; Frantz/Martens 2006: 
89ff.). Moreover a standing committee on NGOs (Council Committee on Non- 
Governmental Organizations, later renamed to Standing Committee on NGOs) was 
established with the function to decide on the NGO´ classification and the allocation 
of participation rights (cf. Brühl 2003: 54).  
This first regulation was later replaced by Resolution 288(X) from 1950, which 
limited slightly the participation rights of NGOs. However, the hierarchy among 
those remained unchanged. NGOs belonging to category A, for example, were still 
allowed to make proposals for the agenda, but with the restriction to coordinate the 
proposals with the Standing Council Committee on NGOs. Written statements were 
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also limited to 2000 words and no longer distributed to all ECOSOC members (cf. 
Brühl 2003: 55). By 1968 the participation rights were once again subject to new 
regulation. Besides the renaming of the three categories from A, B and Register into 
I, II and Roster, Resolution 1296 (XLIV) incorporated a new passage on the financial 
disclosure of NGOs. Additionally they were pledged to submit a working report 
every forth year. (cf. ibid: 57)  
 
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), which took 
place in Stockholm in 1972, is deemed to be the starting point of a global 
environmental policy. Beside states also a great number of national and international 
NGOs attended the conference. Officially a record number of 255 NGOs were 
admitted to the conference and another hundred participated in the parallel held 
environmental forum .Due to the good will of the general secretary of the conference 
Maurice Strong, not only NGOs that were accredited by ECOSOC but also NGOs 
that only had an observer status for UNCHE were allowed to participate and rais 
their voice in the plenary as well as the working group sessions (cf. Brühl 2003: 95). 
 
Twenty years later at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) the number of NGO reached again a record high of 1420 
officially participating NGOs (cf. ibid.: 60) and about 17000 people that attended the 
parallel Global Forum (cf. UN 1997a.). This trend of increased NGO participation 
was not only limited to the UNCED. The explosive participation of NGOs could also 
be observed during the fourth Women´s Conference in Beijing from 1995.  The 
number of NGOs which officially participated in the Beijing conference as well as 
the number of NGOs which got involved in the parallel held “shadow conference” 
even exceeded the number of participants in Rio. The Women´s Conference was 
attended officially by more that 5000 representatives from 2100 different NGOs; in 
addition another 30,000 individuals participated in the independent NGO Forum (cf. 
UN 1997b.).  
 
Due to the increased participation of national and international NGOs within the 
world conferences of the nineties the ECOSOC once again discussed on a possible 
extension of the participation rights of NGOs. Admittedly the new Resolution 
1996/31 which is in force until today remained below the expectations, because it 
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basically proceeded the requirements formulated already in Resolution 1296 (XLIV). 
The consultation right still remained limited formally to the ECOSOC and its 
subsidiary bodies, and NGOs were furthermore classified in three renamed groups 
with different rights and privileges (cf. Brühl 2003: 63). The application of NGOs for 
consultative status is generally tied to certain criteria: the organisation, for example, 
has to be concerned with matters falling within the competence of the ECOSOC and 
its subsidiary bodies and its aims shall be in conformity with the purposes and 
principles of the UN Charta.  
Furthermore they have to fulfil certain organisational criteria to be accredited by the 
UN. The organisation must have a head-quarter, with an executive officer and a 
democratically adopted constitution, which shall provide for the determination of 
policy by a representative body. The NGO must also have the authority to speak for 
its members through its authorized representatives, and it has to be financially 
independent from the government (cf. UN ECOSOC 1996).  
Depending on the expected support, the radius of action and the NGO´s 
representativeness, the organisations are allocated either to the group with general or 
special consultative status or they are listed on the roster (cf. Brühl 2003: 63; 
Frantz/Martens 2006: 35).  
NGOs belonging to the group with general consultative status have the most rights 
and privileges. Besides the possibility to participate in official ECOSOC meetings 
they are also allowed to orally express their views and to submit written comments 
up to 2000 words. Furthermore they are also allowed to make proposals for the 
agenda in cooperation with the Committee on NGOs. The general status is reserved 
for those organisations, whose working areas are widely congruent with those of the 
ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies (Brühl 2003: 63f, Klein/Walk/Brunnengräber 
2005: 44, Frantz/Martens 2006: 35).  
The special status is granted to those NGOs that have a smaller radius of activities 
than the organisations with general status. They are neither allowed to add certain 
issues on the agenda nor to give an oral comment. Their written statements are 
confined to a maximum of 1500 words (Klein/Walk/Brunnengräber 2005: 44). Other 
organisations, which are neither fulfilling the criteria of the general nor of the special 
consultative status, are listed to the roster if the Council considers that the respective 
organisation makes useful contributions. They are allowed to attend solely meetings, 
which are related to their working areas and they have to be invited to make a 
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statement. However, the statement should not exceed 500 words (cf. Brühl 2003: 64; 
Klein/Walk/Brunnengräber 2005: 44; Frantz/Martens 2006: 35).  
The major alteration was that the new resolution granted apart from international also 
national, sub-regional and regional NGOs participation rights. Besides this the 
resolution also specified precisely the participation rights of NGOs within 
international conferences. NGOs which wanted to participate at international 
conferences had to apply for participation at the respective secretariat. Subsequently 
the secretariat recommends the preparatory committee to either admit the NGO to the 
conference or to refuse its request. If the organisation is accepted, it has the right to 
participate and to speak as well as to submit written statements (cf. Brühl 2003: 65). 
 
As mentioned above, international NGOs already supported and accompanied the 
establishment of the United Nations in 1945. While in 1948 only 40 international 
NGOs were granted consultation rights by the council, twenty years later their 
number increased up to 377 organisations. By 1997, their number nearly quadruped 
to 1200 organisations, which were in consultative statuse with the ECOSOC (cf. 
Klein/Walk/Brunnengräber 2005: 44). This trend was continuing in the subsequent 
years. Due to the general NGO boom after the Earth Summit in Rio and especially 
because of the new Resolution 1996/31, which enhanced the possibilities for NGOs 
to participate at the ECOSOC, the number of NGOs accredited at ECOSOC almost 
doubled to 2350 organisations in 2003 compared to 1997(cf. ibid).  
Currently a total of 3452 NGOs are accredited at the ECOSOC. Most of them belong 
to the group with special consultative status all in all 2329 organisations, only 139 
NGOs have general consultative status and the remaining 984 are listed on the roster 
(cf. United Nations 
Department of 
Economic and Social 
Affairs n.d.).  
It is conspicuous that 
most of the NGOs with 
consultative status at 
ECOSOC originated in 
Europe or North 
America (Fig. 2.)  
Fig. 2 NGOs accredited at UN ECOSOC by Region. Source: 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
(n.d.)  
 26 
 
Even thought this overbalance of European and North American NGOs has reduced 
slowly over the last two decades, the proportion of them is still higher than average. 
If we take only those NGOs into account which are assigned to a certain region (in 
total 3039 organisation), the European and North American organisations together 
make up around two- thirds (63%), while only approximately one third (37%) is 
allotted to Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and Oceania.  
The comparatively low level of southern NGO participants is due to the fact that 
these organisations have mostly marginal funds at their disposal (cf. Frantz/Martens 
2006: 35, Klein/Walk/Brunnengräber 2005: 45).  
 
NGOs are not only participating in ECOSOC meetings and UN world summits, but 
they are also involved in the climate, biodiversity, human rights, and development 
policy. As NGOs usually want to exert influence on all policy areas, they do not limit 
themselves only to “low politics”. Nevertheless, they have the most far-reaching 
participation rights exactly in these fields.  
With regard to WTO meeting, the participation of NGOs is quite restricted. However 
most of the NGOs do not even want to actively participate in WTO negotiations sine 
they would only lend additional legitimacy to the negotiation outcomes, without 
really being able to influence or modify these decisions. NGOs rather try to influence 
world trade policy from “outside”, through protest, campaigns, lobbying etc. 
 
2.3. Explanations for the explosive number of international NGO 
 
In literature there are different explanations for the cumulative foundation and the 
significant increase in the number of international NGOs (see fig. 1). In fact the 
presence of INGOs in the international system and the cooperation among 
themselves is not a new phenomenon. International NGOs have been active within 
the UN system since the end of the forties. The massive participation of NGOs in 
international conferences is seen as a clear proof of their political relevancy. The rise 
of these actors is often equated with the beginning of the global environmental policy 
in 1972, starting with the the United Nations Conference on Human Environment in 
Stockholm. Their latest conjuncture started with the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which was also the starting point of the 
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longstanding UN conference marathon during the nineties (i.e. World Conference on 
Human Rights in Vienna 1993; International Conference on Population and 
Development in Cairo 1994; World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen 
1995; World Conference on Women in Beijing 1995; Global Conference on Human 
Settlements in Istanbul 1996; World Food Summit in Rome 1996, and the Climate 
Change Conference in Kyoto 1997 etc.).  
 
There is some dissent among experts regarding the factors which actually led to the 
rise of NGOs as political “new comers”. Scholars mention, among others the end of 
the cold war as cause for the increase of NGO activities (cf. Curbach 2003: 26; Brüh 
2003: 155; Zumft Cortines 2001: 34; Frantz/Martens 2006: 86). While before the fall 
of the Iron Curtain economical and security policy themes (“hard issues”) had had a 
great importance in international politics, the end of the Bloc Confrontation brought 
“soft issues”, like environmental protection, human rights, and development, on the 
international political agenda. It may not be surprising that this shift towards political 
“soft issues” has also promoted the political importance of NGOs, as these actors are 
mainly active in these fields. The end of the Cold War also winged the collaboration 
between eastern and western NGOs, their contact was facilitated without mutual 
accusation of espionage (cf. Curbach 2003: 26). 
 
The rapid increase of INGOs in the last decade of the 20th century is also explained 
to be a result of developments especially in communication- and transport-
technology (cf. Curbach 2003: 25; Brühl 2003: 154f.). It seems logical, that the 
recent developments in information and communication technology, first of all the 
mobile telephone, internet-based video conferences, e-mail traffic, fax and the 
internet in general, make it easier for NGOs to connect with one another. The broad 
use of the internet allows also resource-scarce NGOs to better influence international 
politics. As the communication processes are getting faster and cheaper, NGOs can 
better and internationally organise their statements and campaigns. The often cited 
internet based campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investments (MIA) is 
a good example for the world wide coalition of different NGOs, which could 
successfully hinder the conclusion of the agreement. (cf. Brühl 2003: 155) 
Indeed the technological advance in the field of communication enables NGOs to 
transmit quickly information and to network in an affordable and flexible way over 
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long distances. Admittedly not all NGOs have the same chances to participate in the 
global communication and information processes. The networking and sharing of 
information through the internet is disproportionately more difficult for southern 
NGOs than for northern NGOs, which is due to the existent “digital divide”. 7  
Looking at the statistics on world wide internet users one can observe that out of 
2.267.233.742 internet users estimated in 2011, which represent 32. 7 % of the total 
world population (6.930. 055.154), 1016.8 millions of users (44.8%) are allotted to 
the Asian countries, 500.7 millions (22.1%) to Europe, 273.1 millions (12.0%) to 
North America, 235.8 millions (10.4%) to Latin America and the Caribbean, 139.9 
millions (6.2%) to Africa, 77.0 millions (3.4%) to Middle East, and 23. 9 millions 
(1.1%) to Australia and Oceania (cf. Internet World States 2012). This on the first 
glance impressive and relative high percentage of Asian internet user has to be 
reviewed critically. If we compare the total population number of the Asian region 
3,879,740,877 to the total number of internet users (vide supra) in this region, only 
26.2% of Asians are actually using the internet. It may not be surprising that the 
percentage of North American, Australian and European internet users are, compared 
to their total population number, markedly higher. Up to 78.6% of the Americans, 
67.5% of the Australians and 61.3 % of the Europeans make use of the internet (cf. 
Internet World States 2012). 
 
Besides the technical progress in information and communication technology, from 
which, as already stated, not every NGO benefits equally, also the advancement in 
traffic technology enables NGOs to network and to be present at world summits 
and/or international negotiation processes.  
By virtue of the technical progress in traffic it was not only possible to transcend 
territorial borders more easily and quickly but also costs were reduced due to 
routinisation in personal air traffic (cf. Curbach 2003:25). 
 
During the last decades of the 20th century, another mega trend was observable 
which characterized the international system and provided further explanations for 
 
                                                 
7 For a more comprehensive description of the digital divide see Cullen 2001as well as Fuchs,/Horak 
2008.  
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the explosive emergence of NGOs. This process is commonly known as 
globalization8 
Usually we can distinguish between a narrow and a wide understanding of 
globalisation. In the first sense globalization is understood as the increasing 
interlacing and consolidation of economical activities, which expresses itself among 
others in the “world wide” increase in goods traffic and capital transactions. More 
generally globalisation can be understood as: 
“intensification of world wide social relations through which distant places are 
connected with each other in such a way, that occurrences in one place are shaped by 
processes that happened in an other place, many miles away and vice versa” 
(Giddens 1997 cited in Messner 1998 : 1). 
 
As subliminally indicated by Gidden´s definition, globalization also implies that 
political, social, economical and ecological problems can no longer, or just 
insufficiently, be handled on the local or regional level (cf. Furtak 1997: 9). 
 
Meanwhile it is highly visible that the economical globalization process has created 
new respectively aggravated existing global social and ecological problems. As these 
problems, due to their global character, transcend the national territory where 
political regulations apply, governments are facing a control deficit. In order to 
handle global problems, such as climate chance or the loss of biodiversity, states are 
formulating in common (more or less) binding regulations within international 
institutions. Such International institutions, including international organisations and 
international regimes (cf. Zürn 2010: 15), evolved as a direct consequence of 
globalisation processes. Today, there are more than 300 regimes existing that are 
dealing with transnational issues and problems. NGOs are integrated in these regimes 
or excluded from them, nevertheless these regimes constitute overall their essential 
and fast-growing sphere of activity (cf. Roth 2005: 108). 
A large number of NGO are also concentrating their work on criticising the actual 
neoliberal economic globalisation and its social and ecological impact as well as the 
 
                                                 
8 The technical advance, within the communication- and transport technologies (see above), as well as 
the political decision to liberalize world trade are named to be the major causes for globalisation (cf. 
Weizsäcker n.d.) 
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international institutions (first and foremost WTO, IMF and WB) which are 
promoting this process.  
As the activities of NGOs either refer to ameliorate the globalisation related problem 
areas or to criticise the economical, social, cultural and ecological impacts of 
globalisation, they can be considered as the“(unwanted) children of globalisation” 
(Roth 2005: 107). 
 
3. The Concept of Global Governance  
 
The impact and importance of non state actors like NGOs in international politics is 
assessed very differently within the theories of international politics or international 
relations. While according to present well- established fundamental theories of 
international politics, in particular the realist and neo-realist school, non-state actors 
do not play any role in international relations, the regime theory and even more the 
very heterogeneous global governance school accentuate the relevance of social 
actors in international politics (cf. Kohout/Mayer-Tasch 2002: 15f).  
Almost every scientific paper, which deals with the role of non state actors in 
international politics, refer s to the term “global governance”. Since the 1990´s it has 
advanced to a fashionable term, which is often used as an ambiguous catchword in 
many different ways.  Generally one can distinguish between two different 
applications of the term global governance. On the one hand the term is used in an 
empirical- analytical way to describe the ascertainable changed constellation within 
international politics. This can be summarised as a change from international 
governance, where states and intergovernmental institutions have been the makers 
and addresses of norms and rules, for global governance, where also non- state actors 
are partners in the governance system (cf. Brühl 2002: 371).  
 
On the other hand the term “global governance” is used in a more normative-
prescriptive sense encompassing proposals on how governance at the international 
level should be. Interpreters of the global governance discourse tend to subdivide the 
normative view into two further variants namely an emphatic one, where global 
governance is understood as a guiding principle that promises possible solutions for 
globalisation crises; and a political- strategic one, where global governance is 
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constituted as a politico-strategic reform approach. The essential difference between 
both is that the political strategic variant focuses on political guidelines for actions 
and identifies the restructuring of statehood as central objective (cf. 
Brunnengräber/Stock 1999: 445f; Messner/Nuscheler 2003:12).  
 
In this paper global governance is understood as a normative concept that wants to 
show up ways and possibilities how globalisation and its subsequent problems can be 
steered politically. The aims of global governance strategies are to enhance their 
control capability towards globally occurring economic, ecologic and social 
problems, and furthermore to reduce democratic deficits on the international level. 
Thereby NGOs are attributed an important role.  
3.1. Precursors of the global governance concept 
 
The global governance concept has many originators and protagonists, among others 
James Rosenau and Ernst- Otto Czempiel, the Commission on Global Governance 
(CGG), the Institute for Development and Peace (INEF), the Group of Lisbon etc. In 
the international discussion global governance gained prominence through the final 
report of the Commission on Global Governance (CGG) “Our Global 
Neighbourhood”, published in 1995.  
 
Several reports of the different UN commissions provided important contributions to 
the development of the commission’s global governance concept. The final report of 
the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, known as the 
Brandt Report (1980), for example, already contained main arguments for the 
necessity of global governance. Also the Brundtland Report (1987) “Our Common 
Future”, elaborated by the World Commission on Environment and Development, 
developed, in order to cope with the intensifying global environmental crisis, the 
concept of sustainable development and stressed the importance of global and 
cooperative problem solving (cf. Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 4). Two more reports are 
worthy of mention in this gallery of forefathers of global governance: on the one 
hand the report of the Council of the Club of Rome “The first global revolution” 
(1991) and on the other hand the “Stockholm Initiative on global Security and 
Governance” (1991). Both reports as well as the journal “Global Governance a 
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review of Multilateralism and International Organisations”, released by the United 
Nations University, equated global governance with state-organised multilateralism. 
This basically meant the consolidation of international collaboration within 
international organisations and regimes. In their understanding the UN forms the hub 
of the world and of global governance (cf. ibdi:5; Nuscheler 2007: 197).  
The reform of the UN system takes also the central stage within the strategic 
considerations of the CGG. Admittedly the strengthening of state organised 
multilateralism does not conform to the full essence of the concept.  In the 
understanding of the CGG, global governance denotes a new political model, which  
had been developed by James Rosenau and Ernst- Otto Czepiel in their reference 
work “Governance without Government”, published in 1992 (cf. Nuscheler 2007: 
197). Within their work they made an important distinction between government that 
relies on the legally defined and with the monopoly of power equipped authority and 
governance which is understood as a “system of rules” in the absence of a central 
authority (cf. Rosenau 1992: 4ff). Rosenau and Czepiel - who are the most noted 
representatives of an empiric-analytical understanding of global governance - 
dedicated their work to analyse the ongoing processes of change within the 
international system and to identify new actors, that exert influence on political 
processes in a multilevel-system. Their analysis, terms and statements also 
penetrated the report of the CGG. But in contrast to the CGG, Rosenau and Czepiel 
renounced to work out visions how a new global order could or should look like and 
to give political- strategic recommendations for action (cf. Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 
12).   
 
The CGG was established on the suggestion of Willy Brandt, under the umbrella of 
the UN, in 1991. The year before, Brandt had invited notable politicians as well as 
members of the Palme- Commission, Brundtland- Comission and the North- South – 
Comission to Königswinter. In the light of the end of the block confrontation and 
with regard to (new) global problems, they were asked to elaborate visions on the 
world’s governability. After their first results were presented in the already 
mentioned “Stockholm Initiative on global Security and Governance” (1991), the 
CGG was formally established (cf. Brand 2000: 28; Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 5) 
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In its final report the CGG introduced the concept of global governance as an 
adequate answer to solve the current and future transnational problems. It defines 
governance as: 
“[…] the sum of the many ways individual and institutions, public and private, 
manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or 
diverse interests may be accommodated and co- operative actions may be taken. It 
includes formal Institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well 
as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or 
perceive to be in their interest” (CGG 1995: 2). 
 
Following the CGG view, global governance basically means more cooperation and 
coordination of state and non-state actors at all political levels and a revaluation of 
civil society, among others through more participation and the primacy of human 
rights over the rights of states (Messner/Nuscheler 2003:12). 
In the German-speaking area the commission’s concept was sophisticated among 
others by Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler. Shortly afterwards the political science 
sized the concept, but they treated it initially with reserve and used partially alternate 
terms like “international governance” (e.g. Rittberger) or “governance beyond the 
national state” (e.g. Zürn). 
 
3.2. Key elements of the global governance concept 
 
The starting point of the considerations for the necessity of “global governance” is 
simply the experience that an increasing number of problems could not be single-
handedly tackled by national states. Due to globalisation processes governments have 
lost room for manoeuvring in a couple of policy areas.  
Globalisation or “social denationalization” (Beisheim 2004; Zürn 2010: 15) is 
understood as a process in which an increased part of social and economical 
activities take place across national borders. As more and more activities of social 
actors transcend the national territory, though the political formulation of rules 
remains territorially anchored, national states lose their control capability and 
partially their ability to act in many policy areas. The environmental policy is a good 
example for this problem. As in reality the range of environmental problems, such as 
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climatic change or the loss of biodiversity, exceed the range of validity of national 
regulation, national policies are less and less in the position to bring about socially 
and politically desired conditions (cf. Zürn 1992 and 1998 in Beisheim 2001: 116). 
In other words, there is a lack of effectiveness, in terms of the ability to achieve pre-
established objectives, of national regulation regarding global problems (output 
legitimacy see below). 
 
Thus, when problems tend to globalise, also politics have to globalise. The isolated 
management of crisis is simply not enough; therefore new regulatory structures have 
to be developed in order to re-establish the dwindling control capability of national 
states. Within the concept of global governance different scholars have been 
discussing how governance beyond the national state could or should look like, 
which on the one hand enables to re-embed and politically shape the globalisation 
process and on the other hand facilitates handling global problems. Although there 
are differences regarding the suggestion how a new global political architecture 
could look like, all concepts to global governance are based on three main 
characteristics: multi- level policy, a diversity of actors and a variety of governance 
patterns. (cf. Messner/Nuscheler 2003:18) 
In the following I am going to point out the constitutive building blocks of this new 
global political architecture as formulated by Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler. 
 
In contrast to a couple of globalists, who envision a world state in order to shape 
globalisation and handle globalisation –related new economic, ecologic and social 
problems, the protagonists of global governance concept bet on the problem-oriented 
cooperation of state and non-state actors at all political levels. According to them the 
vision of a world state or world government, in which national sovereignty is limited 
to such a degree that global legal norms are directly enforceable against individuals 
and groups through a, the national governments, superordinate executive power, is 
neither a realistic nor a desirable option. Because such a bureaucratic super authority 
could hardly gain democratic legitimation and is far from the problems to be solved 
(cf. Messner/Nuscheler 2003:15; Nuscheler 2007: 196). Global governance rather 
means to govern the world, thus to formulate and enforce rules, in the absence of a 
world government in particular to rule without a ruler (cf. ibid). Thereby the concise 
formula “governance without government”, worked- out by Rosenau and Czempiel, 
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seems to be misleading because national states are and remain the most important 
governance actors. But they are supplemented by other actors namely institutions, 
especially intergovernmental institutions like the UN and non state actors like NGOs, 
associations, multinational business companies etc. (to the role of NGOs within 
global governance see chapter 3.3.). 
Also private global players can render governance services. Examples for this are the 
cooperation of non state actors among each other within private, transnational 
governance structures, like the SA 8000, and their cooperation with states, within 
global policy networks like the vaccination campaign GAVI or the global 
Commission on Dams, in order to jointly handle specific problems. Global 
governance is therefore composed of different forms of governance, thus governance 
by, with or without government.  
 
As global problems can just insufficiently be settled within the framework of the 
nation state, states should cooperate on the international or global level within 
international institutions9 in order to meet the actual range of global problems in an 
appropriate way. These international institutions10 include among others international 
organisations, which coordinate the cooperation of governments and contribute to the 
development of global perspectives, and international regimes. The latter translate 
the willingness of states to cooperate into binding regulations. Within such regimes 
national states commit themselves to handle common problems, which cannot be 
solved by national legislation, through contractual arrangements (cf. 
Messner/Nuscheler 2003:15; Nuscheler 2007: 197). 
Examples of such international regimes can be found in all political areas and have 
already been existing for a long time. In environmental policy states have 
increasingly agreed on multilateral treaties instead of acting unilaterally since the 
seventies (cf. Brühl 2002:373).  
 
                                                 
9 The term “international institutions denotes norms, rules, programmes and the appendant  network of 
actors, which are influencing the repertoire of action of state and none state actors, as they forbid, 
allow or demand something “(Zürn 2010: 15). 
 
10 Zürn mentions altogether eight types of institutions including constitutive principles, regimes, 
organisations and networks, which are either established by state (international) or non- state actors 
(transnational).Global governance is the sum of the regulations of all these institutions (cf. Zürn 
1998:175 in Beisheim 2001: 117).  
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Admittedly the jurisdiction of the international cooperation within international 
environmental regimes (like ozone, the climatic and the biodiversity regimes) can 
only do little if states, regions and local authorities do not ensure their 
implementation.  
Therefore, successful global governance needs to be based on sturdy substructures. 
On the regional level, the EU is an example for such a substructure (regional 
governance) (cf. Messner/Nuscheler 2003:16).  
 
So, within this concept a multi-level policy is conceived, in which all political levels 
from the local to the national, regional and international, are interacting with each 
other. Within such a multi-level system of governance the formulation of political 
regulation should be located, following the “subsidiary principle”, on the political 
level which is objectively and organisationally most appropriate for the problem and 
on which it can be treated as effectively and democratically as possible (cf. ibid.; 
Beisheim 2001: 118). 
Regarding cross- border problems, inter alia environmental issues, the formulation of 
proposals for regulations and political objectives would, ideally-typically, take place 
between the affected state and non state actors at the global level. The negotiated 
compromise would be fixed through the legitimate states within international 
agreements and implemented by national and sub-national entities. Finally, the 
implementation of and the compliance with international regulations would be 
monitored by state and non state actors, especially NGOs (cf. Beisheim 2001:118; 
Messner/Nuscheler  2003: 17). Particularly through the integration of NGOs at the 
different political levels, the exponents of the concept expect to achieve a 
comprehensive legitimation of the decided policy (cf. Beisheim 2001: 121; 
Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 39f).  
 
The cooperation between states and with non-state actors within international 
institutions becomes, due to globalisation processes, increasingly necessary in more 
and more policy areas and demands from nation states a partial surrender of their 
sovereign rights (cf. Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 15). The national sovereignty (i.e. the 
self-determined authority of states, both internally and externally) has already been 
undermined by globalisation processes. Within the concept of global governance 
national sovereignty should be re-divided between local, regional or global 
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organisations and non state actors through the delegation of decision-making and 
responsibility.  
The shared sovereignty could lead to an increased capacity to act and ability to solve 
problems, according to the exponent of the concept. This new principle of shared 
sovereignty is another central element of the concept on global governance (cf. ibid.; 
Brunnengräber/Stock 1999: 450). 
As already mentioned, although: 
“the nation states have lost autonomous room for manoeuvring through their 
involvement in international institutions, they still remain the key player in 
international politics or relations, as they alone can take authoritative decisions” 
(Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 17). 
 
Therefore they build the supporting pillar of all the different global governance 
architectures. Admittedly, the nation state no longer has the power and responsibility 
to solve all problems. In many policy areas it is dependent on the cooperation with 
social groups and has to take on new tasks which are arising through it’s involvement 
within multilateral cooperation- and decision- making mechanisms (cf. ibid.). The 
state’s role could be best defined as an interdependency manager, a moderator or a 
hinge, which connects the different political levels in order to solve the issue in 
question (cf. Brunnengräber/Stock 1999: 451). Beside this coordination function, 
states also have to represent the interests of their populations on the international 
level and protect them against negative influences. Furthermore they are the main 
actors to implement the internationally decided agreements on the national level (cf. 
Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 18).  
3.3. Expectations on NGOs within the global governance concept  
 
The inclusion of civil society actors, especially NGOs for policy making beyond the 
national state, forms a central element of all theoretical concepts of global 
governance.  
Already the CGG accentuated that governance at the global level “must now be 
understood as involving, beside governments, also non- governmental organisations 
(NGOs) citizens´ movements, multinational corporations and the global capital 
market” (CGG 1995: 2f). 
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Thereby the term “civil society” covers a multitude of institutions, networks and 
individuals reaching from NGOs in a narrow sense, trade unions, professional and 
trade associations, farming or housing co-operatives, religious based organisations, 
neighbourhood watch associations, enlightened elites from economics, science, 
politics, media and so on (cf. CGG 1995: 32; Brunnengräber/Stock 1999: 448, 453; 
Curbach 2003: 20). 
NGOs are not only part of civil society, but they are considered to be the main 
representatives of an emerging “global civil society” (cf. CGG 1995: 254). 
According to the global governance concept their main function is to contribute to 
the amelioration of the democratic deficits of the international political system.  
 
Excursus: democratic deficits  
The observation that the global community is increasingly facing global or 
transnational problems that cannot be effectively solved through national regulations 
but needed to be addressed to on the international level, is, as mentioned earlier, the 
starting point of the normative global governance concept. The problem is, however, 
that through the shifting of political decisions from national to the supranational or 
international levels there are certain democratic problems arising.  
 
According to Fritz Scharpf norms and rules, or generally governance at national or 
international levels are considered to be legitimate i.e. accepted by people, and are 
democratic if they show input- and output legitimacy. Output legitimacy is given 
when political decisions are effective, in the sense that they are able to solve the 
given problem, serve the common good and conform to criteria of distributive 
justice. Input legitimacy, on the other hand, is given, when collective binding 
decisions originate from the authentic expression of the preferences of the demos (cf. 
Scharpf 1998 in Brühl 2002.: 375, 2003: 219; Beisheim 2001:119f, 2005:243). 
Therefore the demos, or those who are affected by decisions, must have the 
possibility to express their preferences in particular to participate somehow in the 
political process (e.g. through election or de-selection of governments).  
As is pointed out by several scholars, the presently existing international governance 
systems, which were established by states in order to regulate common affairs and 
problems, face democratic deficits due to both a lack of input as well as output 
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legitimacy (cf. Brühl 2003: 219f; Brühl 2002.:376; Beisheim 2001:119f, 
Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 35ff; Klein/Walk/Brunnengräber 2005: 54f). 
 
It is quite obvious that international decisions and agreements have not proven 
effective enough in dealing with existing global problems, such as climatic change, 
and therefore have a lack of output legitimacy. There are several reasons for the 
ineffectiveness of international decisions. First of all it should be mentioned that 
within international negotiations each state pursue, obviously, their own national 
interests. Therefore international decisions always follow the principle of the lowest 
common denominator, at the expense of the problem-solving ability of decisions (cf. 
Brühl/Rosert 2007: 6). The effectiveness of international decisions is furthermore 
undermined by a so-called “jurisdictional gap”; which basically means that the 
political structures on the international level are too poorly developed in order to 
regulate transnational or global risks in an adequate way. Likewise, many policy 
makers and international institutions often lack relevant and necessary information in 
order to take optimal decisions and find suitable policy instruments to respond to the 
complexity of political issues. In literature this is referred to as the “operational gap”. 
Last but not least the output legitimacy of international decisions is undermined by 
an “incentive gap”, meaning that the already decided norms and rules are not at all or 
insufficiently implemented on the national level (cf. Brühl 2002: 376; 2003: 219f). 
 
Through the shifting of political decisions from the national to the international level 
the legitimacy chain becomes notably longer. In contrast to the national level, the 
citizens affected by international decisions, have little possibilities, if any, to 
participate, influence or control political process on the international level. One of 
the reasons being, that there are hardly any institutionalised “channels” for their 
interests. Exceptions can be found within international negotiations in soft policy 
areas where such channels are rudimentary existing. However, the legitimacy and 
democratic control of the institutions is hardly given (cf. Beisheim 2001:120, 
Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 37). 
Normally policy making within international institutions takes place between 
governmental representatives behind closed doors. The general public or individual 
stakeholders that are affected by the decisions are frequently excluded from these 
deliberations (cf. Brühl: 2002: 376). Beyond that, they often lack important 
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information in order to get actively involved in international political processes. For 
the national population it is often unclear how political processes are designed on the 
international level, how politicians have arrived at political decisions and why certain 
interests are asserted over others. Because of the lack of transparency of international 
decision making processes, decision makers cannot be called to account by the 
national population for their wrong decisions or for blocking decisions. Thus, 
citizens could not exercise their democratic controlling function in an adequate way; 
which is also referred to as “de-democratization” (Brühl 2003: 218). This lack of 
participation and representation (also referred to as “participatory gap”) as well as 
the lack of transparency and control undermines the input- legitimacy of international 
policy processes and its results (cf. Brühl 2003: 219f; Brühl 2002: 376; Beisheim 
2001: 120; Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 35ff.). 
 
According to the concept of global governance these democratic deficits of lacking 
input and output legitimacy can be narrowed through a greater participation of NGOs 
within international policy making processes. 
 
As civil society actors, NGOs are considered to be relatively independent from state 
and economic actors, and are able to bring a human perspective into international 
negotiations, as they represent common interest or interest of marginalised groups, 
who are not able to voice their concern. They fulfil, so to speak, a “corrective 
function” (Brunnengräber/Stock 1999: 460; Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 17) towards 
governmental and economic interests and therewith help to compensate the lack of 
participation and representation, thus input legitimation, within international 
negotiations. NGOs do not only bring “bottom up” the interest of people most 
affected by the “distant” decisions into the political process, but they also inform 
“top down” the (national) population on the background and details of the 
international negotiation process and its results. Through their informative activities 
NGOs contribute to make the political process more transparent for the population, 
and therewith also enhance the accountability and control of international decisions 
(cf. Curbach 2003:136; Brühl 2003:218). Admittedly the watchdog function of 
NGOs cannot replace the democratic control by elected parliaments, but they can 
push the elected representatives to carry out their duties and rights more effectively 
(Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 17; 39).  
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NGOs are also ascribed to contribute to improvement of the effectiveness of 
international decisions and therewith out-put legitimacy. As they are predominantly 
active within problem areas insufficiently dealt with or which have not been taken up 
by states. It is alleged that they have close contact with the local population and often 
have more knowledge on pressing policy issues and a better understanding of local 
needs and problems than governmental authorities have. According to the proponents 
of the global governance concept, this information and expertise of NGOs can be 
useful in order to reach more effective decisions. Especially in so-called “soft policy 
areas”, like environmental, development and human rights policy, governmental 
representatives willingly tap expertise of NGOs. Occasionally, they also integrate 
NGO representatives into their national delegation (cf. Messner/Nuscheler 2003: 17). 
Besides, providing information and expertise, NGOs are also ascribed to contribute 
to an enhancement of the effectiveness of international decisions/agreements through 
the supervision of the operational follow-up as well as through the implementation 
and monitoring of projects (cf. Brühl 2003: 220f). 
If states refuse, for example, to implement measures, which have been decided on the 
international level, NGOs can make this lack of implementation public, and 
therewith exert pressure on states to finally implement the already decided measures.  
 
In the following chapter I am going to briefly introduce the main concerns and points 
of criticism regarding the concept of global governance and the positive assessment 
of NGOs.  
 
3.4. Criticism on the concept of global governance 
 
From the very beginning the concept of global governance has been confronted with 
criticism (cf. Brand et al. 2000). Most critics object that the cooperation politics 
between the state, market and civil society actors, which is propagated within the 
concept of global governance, is founded on an unrealizable normative consensus on 
common interests of mankind. In fact, however, varyingly strong actors advocate 
divergent and plural interests and are struggling to push their position within the 
negotiation process. Because of the existing power- and exploitative relationships 
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and the divergent interests critics do not believe that a world wide global governance 
architecture could be established. For them, the vision of global governance is pure 
utopia (cf. Brunnengräber/Stock 1999: 454; Curbach 2003: 21).  
The concept is also blamed to favour technocratic, efficiency orientated and 
governmental “top down” reform efforts in order to solve global problems. Thereby 
NGOs should help to implement the international established programs in a cost-
effective way on the national and local levels, especially in the social and 
environmental areas (cf. Brunnengräber/Stock 1999: 456; Beisheim 2001:118). 
Admittedly the potential of the homogenously thought NGOs to meet the political 
challenges is overrated, because NGOs have different political viewpoints, values, 
goals, strategies and resources (cf. Curbach 2003: 22).  
Within the global governance concept not only state, market and civil society actors 
are indistinctively juxtaposed, as if they had the same power potential, but also 
within the group of civil society actors little difference is made between, for 
example, transnational business associations and environmental organisations or 
indigenous organisations. Those interests which are not well established and not 
institutionalised are not taken into consideration by the global governance concept  
The democratic potential of NGOs within international negotiations is therefore 
overestimated. Although they demand democratic principles like transparency, 
publicity and accountability through their activities, it would be misleading to deduce 
out of that a democratisation of the international system (Brand et al. 2000:142). 
Regarding their attributed potential to enhance input legitimacy of international 
negotiations and decision-making processes, it is important to bear in mind that 
NGOs are unequally equipped with resources and that their organisational ability of 
interests varies. Just like the other actors, also NGOs tend to build up dominance 
centres and to compete for resources (cf. Brand et al. 2000:141; Beisheim 2001: 
122). Moreover the willingness of governmental and international institutions to 
cooperate with the different NGOs is quite selective. This means, that governmental 
actors are just cooperating with a few well-chosen partners, out of the multi-coloured 
bunch of NGOs. So although NGOs basically have the ability to bring their interest 
into the political process, a lot of actors and interests are still being ignored (cf. 
Seifer 2009: 74). Critics also doubt whether NGOs could actually fulfil their function 
as an independent controlling body, as ascribed by the concept. These critics are 
concerned that through the further inclusion of NGOs within international 
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institutions, these NGOs could lose their autonomy and ability to take criticism and 
in the worst case become instruments for governmental interests (Brand et al 2000: 
138f, Beisheim 2001: 123). 
Furthermore the potential of NGOs to enhance the efficiency of international 
governance is viewed with reserve, as they also have not been able to secure 
international standards within the environmental and human right areas. 
Summarizing, it can be said that NGOs have certain weak points like their partial 
dependence on public financiers, no official power of self-assertion, partially 
ineffective working methods, lack of democratic legitimation and control, which 
challenge their qualifications for global governance.  
 
Keeping these points of criticism in mind, the following section concerns the central 
question of my thesis, namely, whether NGOs could actually fulfil their, by the 
global governance concept attributed, role as providers of input-legitimacy and 
output-legitimacy to international biodiversity politics, more precisely to the 
negotiations on access and benefit sharing (ABS) under the Convention on 
Biodiversity (CBD). 
 
4. The Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was signed together with the 
Convention on Climate Change at the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio Summit or Earth Summit, by 
154 states in June 1992 (cf. Simonis 2008: 566). The Convention, which is legally 
binding under international law, came into force in the subsequent year in December. 
Until today the CBD has been ratified, acceded, approved, or accepted11 by 193 
states. Only Andorra and the Unites States12, which had signed the Convention after 
 
                                                 
11 The legal implications of these are the same; the treaty becomes legally binding on the State or the 
regional economic integration organization. (CBD: Treaty  state description 
http://www.cbd.int/world/ratification.shtml) 
 
12  As the USA had signed the CBD, it has the allowance to participate in the negotiations without 
being contracted to the duties arising out of the CBD. In addition the US-American interest are 
underpinned in the negotiation process by the JUSCANZ- group (Japan, USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand ) (Brand/Görg 2003: 58).  
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long hesitation but did not ratify it, and the Holy See are not Parties of the CBD (cf. 
CBD n.d. a.) 
Article 1 of the CBD pursues three equal objectives: 
“the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and 
the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate 
transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources 
and to technologies, and by appropriate funding […]” (United Nations 1992: 3). 
 
Thus, the Convention does not only aim to conserve biodiversity but also to regulate 
the fair use of genetic ressources in order to inhibit the practice of biopiracy.  
The term biopiracy is interpreted differently within the debate on plant genetic 
ressources. Thereby two positions 13are especially important: a legalistic and a 
realistic one (Brand/Görg 2003: 85f, Ribeiro 2002: 118f). 
In the view of southern countries, which harbour a great biological diversity, and of 
most NGOs biopiracy is simply understood as the free and illegal appropriation of 
biological material. According to this legalistic perspective the practice of biopiracy 
could be prevented through legal regulations, especially through the abidance of the 
provisions on PIC (prior informed consent) and benefit sharing, as required by the 
CBD (see chapter 5).  
In the understanding of the Canadian NGO ETC group14, which established the term 
in 1994, biopiracy denounce the private appropriation of biological resources- which 
have always been public, collective and destined for the general welfare- and 
traditional knowledge related to these resources by transnational corporations and/or 
public institutions, which are mostly situated in the northern industrialized countries 
(cf. Ribeiro 2002: 119). 
This private appropriation happens with the help of intellectual property rights (IPR) 
which are granted upon application to individuals in order to protect an invention, a 
process or a product name. The patent holder receives so to say a kind of monopoly 
 
                                                 
13Beyond that a third interpretation can be distinguished, the one of transnational companies. In their 
understanding “biopiracy” (or product piracy) is the unauthorized utilisation or reproduction of their 
patented innovation, for example seeds (cf. Ribeiro 2002: 118) 
 
14 Action Group on Erosion,Technologie and Concentration, formerly RAFI Rual Advanced 
Foundation International  
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as he/she enjoys the exclusive right to dispose of the subject- matter of the patent 
over a period of maximum 20 years. The patent holders have the right to deny third 
parties access to their invention and to charge royalty payments for its use (cf. 
BUKO: 10, 54). 
According to this second position legal regulations alone are not enough in order stop 
biopiracy; as long as they do not remove existing power imbalances between 
different actors. The crucial factor is whether weaker actors, like indigenous people 
and local communities, who take a central role in this process of biodiversity, are 
actually able to enforce their rights toward more powerful (economical) interests.  
 
Excurse: Examples of Biopiracy 
 
Enola- the yellow bean from Mexico 
The American Larry Proctor owner of the seed company POD-NERES, L.L.C was 
granted a patent on a yellow bean, which initially originated from Mexico, by the US 
Patent Office (USPTO) in April 1999. Therewith Proctor obtained an exclusive right 
over an actually ancient type of bean which he named “Enola” (cf. Jo Wetter 2009; 
Meienberg  2002: 54f) In Mexico this type of bean, already known for centuries 
under the name “Mayocoba”, “Canario” or “Peruano”, is a popular and actively 
consumed nutrition which is also exported to the United States. But, although this 
bean is regarded as generally accessible seed, thousands’ of dollars, massive protests 
and five court decisions were needed until the US PTO finally revoked the patent in 
July 2009 (cf. Jo Wetter 2009).  
The story began in 1994 as Larry Proctor bought a bag of yellow beans in Mexico. 
According to his statement, in the following two years he planted the beans and 
selected each with a specific shade of colour and replanted it (cf. Meienberg 2002: 
54). With the 1999 granted patent Proctor was securing his monopolistic claims for 
all beans with this specific shade of colour. This basically meant that in the U.S. the 
buying, selling, importing as well as the production of “Enola” was strictly 
prohibited without Larry´s approval (cf. Jo Wetter 2009). 
It did not take long till Proctor exercised his patent right. Already in 1999 Proctor 
took legal actions against two seed importers, one of them Rebecca Gilliland, for 
infringing his patent right. As Mrs. Gilliland, owner of the company Tutuli Produce 
in Arizona, has been importing “Peruano” and Mayocoba from Mexico for many 
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years, the claim of Mr. Proctor took her by surprise (cf. Meienberg 2002: 54). The 
Enola patent also had far-reaching consequences for the Mexican farmer, who, as 
mentioned above, exported these beans and whose ancestors had in fact been the 
original breeders of the yellow bean. It was not only licence fees, which add up to six 
cent per pound of alleged “Enola” beans, but also the intensified control of each 
import of Mexican beans by the American customs authorities which caused higher 
costs for the importers (cf. ibid.: 55). “As a result around 22.000 Mexican farmers 
and their families lost 90 per cent of their export earnings within the first year” (Jo 
Wetter 2009). In January 2000 ETC group raised the first objection to the Enola 
patent. They pointed out that Mr. Proctor´s “invention” lacked innovation, which is 
one of three main criteria that the patented subject has to fulfil. As “Peruano” had 
been the result of age long collective breeding work and of the ingenuity of Mexican 
farmers as well as of the indigenous population. Furthermore the bean has already 
been part of the publicly accessible seed stocks oft the national research institute for 
agriculture in Mexico (INIFAP). Consequently the NGO ETC group asked US PTO 
to revoke the patent. As mentioned the objection was finally met in 2009 (ibid.9). 
 
Hoodia- the fantastic slimming cactus 
Hoodia is a cactus like plant which growths in the Kalahari Desert in southern 
Africa. This plant is especially valuable because of its appetite-suppressing effect. 
The knowledge about this effect of Hoodia has been passed on from generation to 
generation by the San people (living in Namibia, South Africa, Angola and 
Botswana) for hundreds of years and is part of their traditional knowledge (cf. 
Tjaronda 2006; BUKO 2005: 107). Traditionally, the San uses Hoodia in order to 
suppress their sensation of hunger during hunting. In course of time the habits of the 
San were also noticed by research institutes and pharmaceutical companies.  
Initially the appetite- suppressing active ingredient of Hoodia was patented by the 
South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), which later 
granted a license for its further development to the British company Phytopharm. 
Phytopharm in turn sold additional licenses to drug company Pfizer, and later to 
Unilever (cf. Tjaronda 2006). All this happened at first without the information and 
the consent of the real discoverers of the active ingredient of Hoodia, the San people. 
Rather by accident they got to know that their traditional knowledge was used in 
order to create new diet pills. Soon after the case went public, massive criticism 
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followed. Thereupon the CSIR finally establish a benefit sharing agreement15 with 
the San Council, according to which the San are entitled to 6% of the royalties, 
which the CSIR is receiving from Phytopharm. In turn the San are prohibited from 
utilising their knowledge for any other commercial use (cf. BUKO 2005: 108).  
Three years later, the Council signed a second benefit sharing agreement with the 
South African Hoodia Growers Pty Ltd. (cf. Tjaronda 2006).  
Whether the agreement between the San and CSIR is fair or not is open to 
interpretation. However some things have to be considered. First of all the claiming 
of ownership rights in respect of plants and knowledge are completely contradictory 
with the traditions of the San (and other indigenous people), who not only believe in 
the sacredness of life but also understand their knowledge to be common knowledge, 
which has been handed down from generation to generation and does not belong to 
anybody. Hence no individual can claim the right to sell this knowledge, for itself 
(cf. BUKO 2005: 109). Secondly although the agreement acknowledges the San as 
the rightful holders of traditional knowledge associated with the Hoodia- plant, their 
right over the plant itself is not acknowledged (cf. ibid.108). Thirdly the San only 
signed an agreement with the CSIR and Hoodia Growers Pty Ltd.. Through the CSIR 
agreement, only the license holders, Phytopharm UK and Unilever have legitimate 
access to the knowledge and generic resource, although currently, the license holders 
are not selling any Hoodia products; however others do. There are many Hoodia 
products that are being sold in Germany, Switzerland, France, the UK and the US, as 
Hoodia, Hoodia Kapsel, Hoodia Plus and Hoodia L10. Where by almost all sellers 
market their products with reference to the knowledge of the San. The San people 
however have not received any benefits form that trade (cf. Tjaronda 2006). 
 
4.1. Early Conflicts concerning Biological diversity 
 
The term biological diversity or biodiversity, which originates from the Greek word 
bios meaning life and the Latin word diversitas meaning variety or diversity, refers to 
the whole diversity of life on our planet. This includes genetic diversity, meaning the 
 
                                                 
15 The agreement determines that the payments flow into a “San-Hoodia fund”, with which health 
care, infrastructure and social protection measures should be financed (cf. BUKO 2005: 108). 
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variability within species, thus its characteristics: size, taste, disease resistance etc., 
which is especially important for the breeding of new plants and animals as well as 
for pharmaceutical research, the diversity of species and of ecosystems. At present 
all three levels of biodiversity are threatened by loss. Today species are dying out 
1000 times faster than the natural rate (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005: 3).  
Generally a high rate of biodiversity can be found “in- situ” in tropical and 
subtropical areas, due to the high temperatures, the humidity and the relative stable 
climate. Another important condition for a high level of biodiversity is the cultural 
diversity of a country (cf. GTZ n.d. a.; Riberio 2002: 120).  
Because of these environmental conditions we find most of the centres of 
biodiversity in the so-called “developing countries”. As pointed out by GTZ, scientist 
estimate that 90 percent of the world wide known species are situated in those 
countries (cf. GTZ n.d. a.).  
The World Conservation Monitoring Centre, an agency of the United Nations 
Environment Programme, has identified 17 mega diverse countries, most of them 
situated in the tropics, which harbour the majority of Earth’s species and are 
therefore considered extremely bio-divers (cf. Williams 2001). Some of these 
countries are part of the group of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries (LMMC), 
which was founded in 2002 as a cooperation platform in order to promote the 
interests of the LMMC countries regarding biological diversity, including the 
protection of traditional knowledge, access to genetic resources and the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits derived from their use. A huge part of the flora and 
fauna in these countries, are existing exclusively in those areas and are described as 
endemic.  
 
It might be less surprising that also the major part of agricultural diversity, which 
represents just a fractional amount of the world’s biodiversity, can be found in situ in 
the southern hemisphere, in the so-called Vavilov Center of Diversity16 which 
 
                                                 
16 The Russian botanist Nikolai Iwanowitsch Vavilov differed between 8 centres of origin of 
cultivated plants: China; India, with a related center in Indo-Malaya; Central Asia; the Near East; the 
Mediterranean; Abyssinia (Ethopia); southern Mexico and Central America; and South America 
(Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia), with two lesser centers--the island of Chiloe off the coast of southern 
Chile, and an eastern secondary center in Brazil and Paraguay (cf.  Fowler/ Moony 1990).   
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harbours a high diversity of wild crop relatives (cf. GTZ n.d. b.). Through breeding 
this genetic diversity in agricultural crops and companion animals has been created 
by people over centuries and is extremely important for food security. The traditional 
species, which have been cultivated in these centres, are not only the basis for 
traditional plant breeding and farming but also for the modern, industrialised 
agriculture in the northern hemisphere. “For instance, 98 percent of the cultivated 
cereals in the United States originated from other world regions” (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2002: 345).  
As biological diversity is not equally distributed across the world, this leads to 
potential conflicts. On the one hand industrialized countries, thoroughly influenced 
by their pharmaceutical-, agricultural and cosmetic companies, have an interest in 
unrestricted access to the centres of biodiversity, in order to be able to use these 
biological resources commercially. While on the other hand developing- and 
emerging-countries have an interest in using their own naturally-occurring resources 
for their own profit. However, they often lack the necessary technologies. 
Industrialised countries, on the contrary, dispose of these biotechnological processes 
and techniques (cf. Brühl 2005: 279; Brand/Görg 2003: 63ff, Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 
15). 
 
The conflict regarding the access to genetic or biological resources and the sharing of 
the benefits arising from the use of the resources was firstly held within the United 
Nations Organisation for Food and Agriculture (FAO). Already during the 1960ies 
specialists within the FAO warned against a too narrow genetic basis for modern 
plant breeding. The reason for the discussion was the ongoing Green Revolution, in 
which newly cultivate and genetically uniformed high-yield varieties were planted 
and harvested mechanically on a grand scale in developing- and emerging countries 
(cf. Brand 2000: 179, 184f; Brühl 2003: 238f; Görg 2002:22). Southern countries 
met this process with criticism. The agricultural modernisation was not only 
implemented under certain constrains in those countries, but they led to an intensified 
dependence on the northern countries, as the modern high-yield varieties needed 
pesticides and fungicide in order to attain a high yield. Beyond that only the first 
generation of the modern seed delivered high yields. This meant that when planting 
farmers were not able to use, as usual, the seeds from their last harvest, but where 
forced to buy new seeds (cf. Brand 2000:179f; Brühl 2003: 238f). 
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The modern seeds however were prone to illnesses; so new seeds needed a great 
variability in traditional plant varieties this required new modes of storing and 
collecting plant genetic resources, ex-situ, in private and public gene banks. 
At the End of the 1970ies there were the so-called “seed wars” (Görg 2002: 22). The 
southern countries no longer accept that they had to pay for  modern seeds while at 
big international seed companies had free access to the traditional varieties, which 
were the basis of their products (cf. Brand 2000:192).   
The biodiversity provider countries defended themselves against the guidelines of the 
International Union for the Protection of new Varieties of Plants (UPOV) agreement. 
The first efforts to manage this conflict between biodiversity user and provider 
countries were started within the FAO. The Commission on Plant Genetic Resource 
(today: Commission on Genetic Resource for Food and Agriculture CGRFA) was set 
up to work out a non- binding agreement, under international law, which took them 
until 1983. Within this international agreement “the International Undertaking of 
Plant Genetic Resources” (IU-PGR) the industrialised-, developing and emerging 
countries agreed that the plant genetic resources are a common heritage of humanity, 
to which the unrestricted access is important (cf. ibid). According to the biodiversity 
providers this free access should also be valid for newly bred cultivar. However, due 
to the pressure of industrialised countries an exception was made for commercial 
products. In 1989 the IU-PGR was extended to include the so-called “farmers 
rights”, which had previously been developed by the NGO RAFI/ETC group in the 
mid- eighties. The farmer’s rights envisioned a kind of compensation for the 
centuries long breeding work of traditional farmers regarding the improvement of 
plant genetic resources (cf. Brand: 2000: 193; BUKO 2005: 68f.). 
 
By the end of the seventies and the beginning of eighties this conflict on access to 
plant genetic resources was complemented by another conflict on nature 
conservation.  
It became clear that the already existing conservation agreements, which tended to 
protect single endangered animals, species or eco-systems, were insufficient to stop 
the erosion of biodiversity (cf. Brühl 2003: 238; 240).  
Until 1992 there wasn’t any agreement existing within international environmental 
policy which was aimed to protect biodiversity as a whole. The “Washington 
Agreement on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora” 
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as well as the 1975 signed “Ramsar Convention on the Protection of Wetlands”, were 
merely agreements to protect specific species or habitats. 
Beyond that a set of regional agreements existed, like the Berne Convention on the 
Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, which aimed to improve 
the regional protection and conservation of nature (cf. Brühl 2003: 241).  
Despite numerous international-law agreements, the destruction of habitats 
accompanied by the extinction of species continued. Among others, this was due to 
the fact that the already existing agreements were not far-reaching enough and they 
lacked financial and technical resources (cf. Simonis 2008: 568).  
Because of the advancing destruction of eco-systems and the increasing erosion of 
biological diversity industrialised countries demanded that developing-and emerging 
countries should implement comprehensive conservation measures within their 
territories.  
The southern countries basically shared the worries of the industrialised countries 
regarding the increasing loss of biodiversity but they suspected that with reference to 
environmental protection, the northern countries wanted to suppress economic 
competition. After all such countries as Brazil, China, Mexico and South Africa, 
which belong to the emerging economies, are rated among the ten richest 
biodiversity countries.  
These two developments led to the emergence of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD).  
 
4.2. NGOs and the pre-negotiations of the Convention on 
Biodiversity  
 
Due to the unsolved conflict regarding the access to plant genetic resources within 
the FAO and the lack of already existing effective international environmental 
agreements, some experts pushed for the establishment of a broad convention to 
protect biodiversity. The World Charta of Nature of 1982 as well as the 1987 
published Brundtland report already accentuated that greater efforts have to be made 
regarding the preservation of biodiversity (cf. Brühl 2003: 241). 
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In 1982 the hybrid international environmental NGO IUCN17 summoned the states to 
expedite the protection of biodiversity. During the eighties environmental lawyers 
and experts were drafting a submittal for a convention on nature conservation under 
the umbrella of IUCN. This draft was finalized in 1989, and contained three main 
principles for the preservation of biodiversity (cf. Görg 2002: 21). According to the 
draft each county should protect their biological diversity and ensure access to their 
genetic resources. The arising costs of conservation were supposed to be settled up 
by a conservation fund, in which all contracting states had to pay contributions (cf. 
Brühl 2003: 242). Beside IUCN also other environmental NGOs, like WWF18, which 
has a particular interest in the loss of exotic animals and plants, and Greenpeace 
warned governments against the drastic loss of biodiversity (cf. Brühl 2005: 281).  
The draft agreement presented by IUCN, represented clearly the idea of nature 
conservation, with focus on in-situ conservation. Distributional conflicts and their 
regulation, which included technology transfer and the sharing of the benefits arising 
out of the use of genetic resources, did not play a role (Brand 2000: 207; Görg 2002: 
21).  
The draft agreement of IUCN fell, so to say on fertile soil, since the United Nations 
Environmental Program (UNEP) had shortly before installed an international 
negotiating body for the protection of biodiversity, in order to check whether an 
international convention should be elaborated.  
The ad-hoc working group of experts on biological diversity met altogether three 
times, the first time in November 1989. By that time only 25 states sent their experts 
to the conference which was attended by a handful of primarily environmental NGOs 
like IUCN and WWF as well as by several agents of the FAO. The US delegation, 
was one of the strongest supporters of an comprehensive convention on nature 
conservation and during the second meeting of the working group they brought in the 
draft of IUCN (cf. Brühl 2003:242).  
In 1990 the working group presented its final report to the administrative council of 
UNEP, in which they express that an new international convention for the protection 
of biodiversity is needed. At this time UNEP setup another ad- hoc working group of  
legal and technical experts which was renamed “International negotiation 
 
                                                 
17 International Union for Nature and the Conservation of Natural Resources 
18 World Wide Fund For Nature 
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Committee” in June 1991. After seven more negotiation rounds the draft for the 
Biodiversity Convention was submitted and accepted in May 1992 (cf. Brühl 2003: 
245; Brand/Görg 2003:58).  
During the negotiations the Convention developed from a conservation oriented 
umbrella convention, as planed by the US and IUCN, to an all-embracing convention 
which tried to regulate beside the ecological problem also economical and social 
problems (cf. Brand/Görg 2003: 52, Görg 2002:21).  
 
This (further) development of the Convention from a nature conservation agreement 
to a comprehensive agreement that also included trade related aspects and 
development policy issues, did not proceed without conflicts. As indicated above, the 
negotiations were characterized by a polarisation between industrialised and 
developing countries.  
On the one hand, the industrialise countries had a strong interest to bind developing 
countries under international law to protect and conserve their biological diversity 
and to secure free access to genetic resources, which they understood to be “common 
heritage of humankind” as determined by the FAO. The developing countries, on the 
other hand, considered the on their territory located biodiversity, including genetic 
resources, to be national resources, over which they could dispose freely. Beyond 
that they did not understand why they should protect the world´s remaining 
biodiversity, at the expense of their own development (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 7).  
It was their view that industrialised countries were, due to the agrarian and industrial 
revolution, mainly responsible for the loss of biodiversity within the last hundred 
years, so they should provide developing countries with the necessary budgetary 
means for the conservation of the remaining biodiversity. Aside from their 
requirement for financial resources for the direct conservation of biodiversity, 
developing countries also call for a compensation for their  missing out of 
industrialisation, thus of catch-up development, which would have meant further loss 
of biodiversity as the example of industrialised countries has shown. On the contrary. 
industrialised refused to put more money on the table for the biodiversity protection. 
In order to solve this problem the architects of the Convention elaborated a kind of 
magical formula named “fair and equitable benefit sharing”. Through the inclusion 
of benefit sharing within the objectives of the Convention a win-win situation was 
seemingly established. On the one hand developing countries could enforce their 
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right to participate in the profit, which arose out of the utilisation of their genetic 
resources; on the other hand industrialised countries were able to commit developing 
countries to engage more strongly in environmental protection, without being 
directly requested to pay (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 8). 
 
4.3. The Biodiversity Agreement 
 
With regard to natural resources, the Convention on Biological Diversity made a 
crucial modification by replacing the until then applicable principle of the FAO 
which understood plant genetic resources as “common heritage of humankind” with 
the principle of national sovereign over natural (not only genetic) resources within 
the preamble as well as in Article 3 and 15 (cf. United Nations1992: 1, 4, 9). 
Therewith the Convention replaced the, until then, applicable principle of the FAO 
which understood plant genetic resources as “common heritage of humankind” with 
free access. Within the preamble of the CBD the conservation of biodiversity is 
identified as a “common concern of humankind” (United Nations1992:1;  Simonis 
2008: 567; Brand 2000: 196, 2008: 13).  
The complete 42 articles of the CBD determine, on the one hand, how the three 
objectives should be transform into concrete actions (see Article 6 to 20) and on the 
other hand identifies different institutions which should help to attain the objectives 
of the Convention (see Article 21 to 42). 
According to Article 6 the contracting Parties should elaborate general measures like, 
for example, national strategies, plans and programmes for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity (cf. United Nations1992: 5). They should identify and 
monitor the components of biodiversity (Article 7) and take appropriate measures to 
conserve biological diversity in-situ (Article 8) as well as ex-situ (cf. Article 9) and 
make sure that that these components are used in a sustainable way (cf. ibid.: 5ff). 
Thereby Article 10 (c) determines that Parties should protect and encourage 
customary use of biodiversity (cf. United Nations1992: 8). Article 11 and 13 
furthermore determine that states should also elaborate social and political incentive 
measures for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and promote 
public education and awareness (cf. ibid.: 8f).  
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The Convention emphasises the importance of indigenous knowledge and indigenous 
and local communities. However, the term “indigenous people” is avoided in official 
documents, in order not to strengthen eventual sovereignty claims. Article 8(j) 
demands from the contracting Parties to respect, preserve and maintain biodiversity 
relevant knowledge and practices of indigenous and local communities and to 
involve them in benefit sharing mechanisms (cf. United Nations1992 : 6). 
This “revaluation” of the role of indigenous people is overshadowed by the principle 
of national sovereignty, which grants national governments, and not indigenous 
people, the right of disposing over their biological diversity. Although Article 8(j) 
acknowledges, albeit only weakly, the rights of indigenous and local communities on 
their traditional knowledge related to biological resources, and also envisions benefit 
sharing when this knowledge is used, these vaguely formulated rights, are subject to 
national legislation (cf. ibid.). Although the participation of indigenous people and 
rural communities in international and national policy processes and the negotiations 
of bio prospecting agreements is generally welcomed, the CBD does not formulate 
any legally enforceable rights (cf. Brand 2008: 19). 
Within Article 20.2 the contracting Parties agreed that the industrialised countries 
should provide new and additional financial resources for the developing countries to 
enable them to meet the obligations of the Convention (cf. United Nations 1992: 13). 
Moreover Article 12 determines that industrialised countries should promote the 
research and the scientific and technical education and training in developing 
countries (cf. United Nations1992: 8). According to Article 16, they should also 
facilitate the access to and transfer of technologies, including biotechnologies, 
without violating existing patents or intellectual property rights (cf. United Nations 
1992: 10f.). Conversely Article 15.2 of the CBD demands that Parties (particularly 
southern biodiversity rich countries) should facilitate the access to genetic resources 
within their territories (cf. ibid.). In order to exchange experiences and information 
and to facilitate technical and scientific cooperation, the contracting Parties agreed 
with Article 18.3 to install a clearing house mechanism (cf. ibid.: 12). 
Since the CBD is an umbrella convention, it has to be incorporated into national 
legislation, and its further design, on the international level, is component of 
continuing negotiations. In order to meet the obligations of the CBD and to push the 
Convention ahead, the CBD has installed different institutions. The most important 
being the biennial Conference of the Parties (COP), established by Article 23, on 
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which the implementation of the CBD is constantly reviewed and further 
modifications and new protocols are decided (cf. ibid.: 15).. 
Beside the contracting states also representatives of the different UN organisations as 
well as non-Parties, like the United States, and NGOs are allowed to participate at 
the different COPs. As it is comparatively easy for civil society actors, like NGOs to 
gain access to the COPs, it may not be surprising that the number of participating 
NGOs has increased constantly over the years19. While at the beginning of the CBD 
process primarily nature conservation NGOs, like the World Conservation Union 
(IUCN), the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) and the World Resource 
Institute (WRI) (an environmental think tank), were present at the first COPs, this 
changed over time. Nowadays a huge variety of NGOs, with quite different interests, 
are participating in the negotiations. These can be differentiate according to their 
focal area in: environmental NGOs, development policy NGOs, seed- NGOs, 
indigenous organisations and last but not least industrial/business organisations, 
called grey -in contrast to green- NGOs (cf. Brand 2000: 205 ;Brühl 2005: 267; 
285f).  
In contrast to other international fora, NGO are enjoying relatively extensive 
“participation rights” within the CBD. Among others, they are allowed to make 
statements on their own behalf, and not just group statements, at a self- chose point 
in time (cf. Brühl 2005: 287). While NGOs are allowed to take part and raise their 
voices in the plenum, the two main working groups and the smaller contact groups, 
they are not allowed to participate in the “friends of the chair” group as well as 
within expert panels, unless by invitation (cf. Brand/Görg 2003: 59). 
The conferences are prepared by a small Secretariat (see Article 24), which is 
situated in Montreal, Canada. This secretariat also coordinates the collaboration with 
other international organisations and decides on the admission of the different NGOs 
to the conference (cf. United Nations 1992: 16). According to Article 25 the 
Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA) is 
jointly responsible for the contentional preparation of the COPs. Here, single 
questions are pre- discussed and recommendations are elaborated, which are then 
submitted to the contracting Parties (cf. United Nations 1992: 17).  
 
 
                                                 
19 See the quantitative analyse of Tanja Brühl 2003: 114ff  
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Typically, the negotiations during the COPs take place within two working groups 
and if necessary (i.e. by lack of consensus) in small contact groups. If the 
negotiations grind to a halt smaller friends of the chair groups are formed to develop 
a compromise between the conflicting stats.  
In addition there are also specific fora which are installed for the clarification and 
development of compromise proposals, like workshops, expert panels, so-called ad-
hoc working groups and ad-hoc open ended working groups. The main difference 
between working groups and expert panels exists in the fact that only hand-picked 
participants are allowed to participate in the latter (cf. Brand/Görg 2003:59). 
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) is not only the financing mechanism for the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) but also for a number of other 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The GEF, which has been 
established by the World Bank, the UNDP and UNEP, helps to fund initiatives to 
assist developing countries in meeting the objectives of the Conventions. Its funds 
are contributed by donor countries. For the fifth funding period, which started in July 
2010 and will pass out in June 2014 the GEF Trust Fund disposes over 4.34 billion 
dollars (cf. GEF n.d.).  
After this general introduction to the CBD I will concentrate on the regulation on. 
access and benefit sharing in the Convention. This is followed by a discussion of the 
“Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resource and Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
the Benefits Arising out of their utilization”, which had been adopted, with Decision 
VI/24, at the sixth COP in Den Haag in 2002 (cf. CBD 2002). 
 
4.4. Access and Benefit Sharing 
 
Ass mentioned above, the handling of biological diversity in the range of 
agriculturally useful plants was firstly regulated under the aegis of the FAO within 
the IU-PGR in 1983. This treaty set out that the agricultural biological resources are 
to be considered as common heritage of humankind, whose use is open to everyone.  
This principle was heavily criticised by southern countries and many NGOs, because 
it automatically conceded advantages to those actors who have the financial and 
technical means to make plant genetic resources commercially useful. The 
installation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the strengthening of 
 58 
 
intellectual property rights, through patents, led finally to the fact that formal 
publicly available biological resources were transferred, with the help of 
international patent rights, into the private property of a hand full of pharmaceutical, 
agricultural and cosmetic companies and research institutes. As noted above, this 
unjust and illegal appropriation of genetic resources (and traditional knowledge) is 
stigmatized as biopiracy. 
In order to inhibit this practice of  unregulated and free appropriation of genetic 
resources, the CBD stipulates that states have, due to their sovereign rights over their 
natural resources, the authority to determine access to these resources, and that 
benefits which arise out of the utilisation of the genetic resource should be shared in 
a fair and equitable way with the respective provider country (mostly southern 
countries). However, it is not only the in-situ existing genetic resources, which are 
covered by the ABS-provisions, but also ex-situ stored resources. The latter had 
already been collected before the Convention came into force in 1993.  
Regarding access to genetic resources and benefit sharing, the CBD gives a first 
framework within Article 15 and 19. 
Article 15.1 first of all determines irrefutably and clearly the state’s absolute rights 
over their genetic resources. The formulation of precise conditions for the access to 
genetic resources remains in the national legislation. Thereby the access to genetic 
resources for environmentally sound use should be facilitated and not 
disproportionally aggravated (cf. United Nations 1992: 9f). In general the CBD 
attaches three conditions regarding the access to genetic resources. Firstly, the access 
to genetic resources is dependent on prior informed consent (PIC), based on full 
knowledge of the circumstances of the contracting Party which provides the resource 
(cf. United Nations 1992: 10). This means that the potential user (mostly 
pharmaceutical and agricultural corporations or scientific institutes of industrialised 
countries) of the genetic resource has to inform the provider country which resource 
is used for which purpose. The information alone is not enough; genetic resources 
may be accessed only with the expressed permission of the provider country (cf. 
Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 15). Thereby the providing country could be the country of 
origin, which harbours the genetic resource in-situ, or any other Party that has 
acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the Convention (cf. United Nations 
1992: 10). Secondly, the conditions for access and use of genetic resources should be 
mutually negotiated among the contracting Parties (on mutually agreed terms) (cf. 
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ibid.). Thirdly, the access to biological resources should be accompanied by a fair 
and equitable benefit sharing. According to Article 15.7 the contracting Parties are 
urged to share “the results of research and development and the benefits arising from 
the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting Party 
providing such resources, [in a fair and equitable way]” (United Nations 1992: 10). 
This means that the providing country are entitled to participate in the results of the 
research, by receiving, for example, preferential conditions (including the necessary 
technologies) for the licensed production of medicines or cosmetics. Beyond that the 
providing country should also be involved in the profits, which result from the 
product marketing. The question relating to how much technical, financial means and 
other benefits the providing country should obtain is a matter of further negotiations 
between the contracting Parties. 
So, regarding the regulations to access and benefit sharing, the CBD first of all 
privileges a bilateral approach; the formally unregulated and free appropriation of 
genetic resources should be replaced by bilateral agreements between provider and 
user countries. Fundamentally, the idea is that the contracting parties sit together 
around the same table and negotiate the conditions for access and benefit sharing. 
However, in order to meet the demand of an “equitable and fair benefit sharing”, the 
power relations between the contracting parties must of course be balanced to some 
extent (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 15). With regard to existing ABS-contracts, which 
were mainly concluded in the pharmaceutical sector, critical voices have repeatedly 
emphasized that, in most cases, bilateral agreements give advantage to the already 
stronger party. So, in order not to benefit the stronger party and not to increase the 
chance for  users to play the providing countries off against each other, multilateral 
principles have to be formulated, as so to say minimum standards. This would make 
bilateral agreements more acceptable (cf. Brand/Görg 2003: 87). 
For all those cases where the genetic resource is not just sold but used for further 
research and development, the CBD stipulates in Article 19.2 that the providing 
countries should get “priority access […] to the results and benefits arising from 
biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provides by those […]” (United 
Nations 1992: 12). 
Under “access to technologies” (see Article 16), the CBD understands access to those 
biotechnologies, which are protected by intellectual property rights (i.e. patents or 
plant variety property rights) (cf. United Nations 1992: 10f.). Therewith article 19 on 
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“Handling Biodiversity and Distribution of its Benefits” (ibid.: 12) does not refer to 
the distribution of the profits, but to the promotion and facilitation of priority access 
for developing countries to the protected biotechnologies, which have their resources 
as a basis (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 a: 15).  
 
With Article 16, the CBD indeed encourages the contracting Parties to provide or 
facilitate the access and transfer of protected technologies, and consequently, to at 
least, theoretically create the possibility for biodiversity rich southern countries to 
participate in the biotechnological development. However, there are also certain 
constraints. Article 1 already expresses that the objectives of the Convention should 
be achieved in consideration of all rights over those resources and technologies (cf. 
United Nations 1992). Beyond that, in Article 16 paragraph 2 it is added that the 
access and transfer of technologies, which are subject to patents or other intellectual 
property rights, shall be provided on terms which recognize and are consistent with 
the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights (cf. ibid.). With 
regard to the by southern countries expected technology transfer, this means 
significant restrictions particularly through the TRIPS agreement of the WTO 
(Brand/Görg 2003: 60). 
 
With the enshrining of national sovereignty over genetic resources the respective 
states also have the right of disposal of those resources which are located on 
territories inhabited by indigenous people and local communities. Indigenous people 
and local communities have not only been using these resources for self-subsistence 
and health care over centuries, but they have also contributed to maintain 
biodiversity. Despite this fact, Article 15, which regulates the access to genetic 
resources, makes no mention of any right of indigenous people and local 
communities over genetic resources (cf. United Nations 1992: 9f.).  
As mentioned above and according to the CBD, the providing country is responsible 
to decide whether access to the respective genetic resources is granted or not.  
 
Although the special role of indigenous people and local communities is formally 
recognized in the preambles, in Article 8(j) as well in Article 10 (c) of the CBD, their 
rights are only strengthened in so far as they serve for conservation and sustainable 
use. Within the CBD the “rights” of indigenous people and local communities are not 
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adduce independently as an own article but as a sub-paragraph of the provision 
regarding the in- situ conservation. Beyond that their right are subject to national 
legislation, which tends to weaken them as the national governments are not obliges 
to implement those rights (cf. Brand 2008: 19). Article 8(j) reads: 
“Each contracting Party shall as far as possible and as appropriated, subject to its 
national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and 
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles 
relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote 
their wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such 
knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and practices” 
(United Nations 1992: 6).  
 
From a legal point of view, Article 8(j) is weak as it contains a number of exit 
clauses. By using such phrases like “shall as far as possible and as appropriated, 
subject to its national legislation” the contracting states weaken their obligations 
towards the rights of indigenous and local communities and limit any inroads into 
national sovereignty (cf. Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 41).  
Article 8(j) makes no mention of the mandatory nature of the “prior informed 
consent” (PIC) and benefit (BS) sharing when traditional knowledge, innovations or 
practices are used. However, these terms are required for the access to genetic 
resources (cf. ibid.: 10). 
 
4.5. The further development of the ABS provisions: from Bonn 
2001/02 to Nagoya 2010 
 
In order to finally fulfil the third objective of the CBD, the Bonn Guidelines (cf. 
CBD 2002) adopted on the 6th COP in Den Haag in 2002, constitute an important 
first step in responding to the unanswered questions regarding access and benefit 
sharing through a regulatory framework,  
The history of the Bonn Guidelines began with a survey among Swiss companies and 
research institutes in 1997/98. The results of the survey were translated into a first 
draft of voluntary guidelines regarding access and benefit sharing, known as the 
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“Swiss Draft Guidelines on ABS”. The Guidelines were introduced, discussed and 
modified during COP 4 in Bratislava 1998 and COP5 in Nairobi 2000 as well as on 
two expert panels, which were set up by the COPs. (cf. Brand/Görg 2003: 87ff; 
Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 20f) Furthermore COP5 also set up an “Ad Hoc Open- ended 
Working Group on Access and Benefit Sharing” (WG on ABS). The initial mandate 
of the WG on ABS was to develop guidelines and other approaches to assist Parties 
and stakeholders with the implementation of the access and benefit sharing 
provisions of the Convention (cf. CBD 2000). At their first meeting in Bonn in 
October 2001, on the basis of the Swiss draft, the ABS WG developed the “Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the 
Benefits Arising out of their Utilisation”. At the following COP6 in Den Haag 2002, 
the contracting Parties hold a final debate on the Bonn Guidelines and adopted them 
with Decision VI/24.  
 
Although the southern countries succeed in achieving some point scoring, among 
others, the recommendation to extend the scope of benefit sharing also on the 
utilization of biochemical components of the acquired genetic resources, or the 
implementation of the responsibility for user of genetic resources to seek new prior 
informed consent (PIC) and renegotiate the conditions for utilisations when the 
purpose of use is changing. They were, however, not able to persuade the northern 
governments to also discuss binding minimum standards for access and benefit 
sharing (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 21).  
The Bonn Guidelines are as the name already suggests, just guidelines. They are 
voluntary and should help the contracting states to develop national ABS legislation. 
Furthermore they should be regarded as a guiding principle when contractual 
agreements are being negotiated with pharmaceutical enterprise or research institutes 
etc. (cf. CBD 2002). The Guidelines are considered to be “a useful first step of an 
evolutionary process in the implementation of relevant provisions […] related to 
access to genetic resources and benefit sharing” (CBD 2002) and their 
implementation should be kept under review (cf. ibid.). 
The Guidelines are presented in the Annex of the Decision VI/24. At the very 
beginning the key features of the Guidelines, like their voluntary nature, easiness of 
use, practicality, acceptability, their complementary to other international 
instruments, flexibility and transparency, are explicitly outlined (cf. ibid.). Several 
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parts of the Guidelines describe in great detail how national ABS strategies could be 
developed. They point out what roles and responsibilities genetic resources providers 
and users have and how relevant stakeholders, such as IPLC, could be involved as 
well as which basic principles and elements of a prior informed consent (PIC) system 
may be include. Beyond that the Guidelines include also proposals which basic 
requirements could be considered when establishing national provision on mutually 
agreed terms (MAT) (cf. CBD 2002). Furthermore the Guidelines lay down in 
Appendix I how contracts with the purpose of transferring biomaterials for research, 
“Material Transfer Agreement” (MTA), could look like and in Appendix II what 
kind of benefits are conceivable (cf. ibid.). Furthermore the subject of the 
development of an action plan for capacity building for access and benefit sharing is 
given a central place in the Guidelines.  
The roles and rights of indigenous people and local communities are referred to in a 
couple of passages of the guidelines. Under the heading “basic principles of a prior 
informed consent system” the Bonn Guidelines provide that in addition to the 
consent of the competent national authorities of the genetic resource providing 
country, the consent of relevant stakeholders, such as IPLC should also be obtained, 
when accessing genetic resources. This is of course subject to domestic law (cf. CBD 
2002). According to the Bonn Guidelines the prior informed consent of indigenous 
and local communities or the approval of the holder of traditional knowledge, should 
be obtained when their traditional knowledge, and where they have established legal 
rights, their genetic resources are being accessed. Such access needs to be in 
accordance with their traditional practices, national access policies and is subject to 
domestic law (cf. CBD 2002). Furthermore the guidelines demand that: 
“benefits should be shared fairly and equitably with all those who have been 
identified as having contributed to the resources management, scientific and/or 
commercial process. [This] may include governmental, non-governmental or 
academic institutions and indigenous and local communities […]” (CBD 2002). 
 
The establishment and utilisation of the Bonn Guidelines led to the fact that PIC and 
BS requirements have gradually become an established norm when traditional 
knowledge, innovations and practices are used (cf. Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 41). 
However, they had a big weakness namely their voluntary nature. From the very 
beginning the voluntary nature of the Guidelines, through which dominant actors, 
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like biotechnology companies and northern research institutes, were strengthened, 
was criticised by the African Group, the Group of Like Minded Megadiverse 
Countries (LMMC) as well as by different NGOs. Instead of voluntary guide lines 
these actors pleaded for legally binding ABS regulations (cf. ENB 2002, BUKO 
2005: 98; Brand/Görg 2003: 90). 
Indigenous representatives criticised the Bonn Guidelines:  
“as too weak and as providing insufficient protection for the knowledge and natural 
wealth of local people. […] national governments rather than indigenous peoples 
would benefit from the commercial exploitation of [traditional knowledge]” (ICTSD 
2002: 8).  
 
Indeed, the Bonn Guidelines encourage Parties to obtain PIC from indigenous and 
local communities, when genetic resources situated in their territories are accessed or 
their traditional knowledge is used. However, this only applies if the respective 
countries have anchored these rights into national legislation. Indigenous 
representatives continually emphasise that they are not just stakeholders, like NGOs 
or research institutes, but holders of certain rights, and therefore “right-holder”. 
These rights have to be taken into mandatory account. The majority of indigenous 
organisations, which observed the 6th COP, refused to participate actively on the 
development of the Bonn Guidelines, as those would just enable biopiracy of their 
resources and knowledge (cf. BUKO 2005: 104).  
 
In order to review the implementation of the Guidelines and further examine 
outstanding issues, including, use of terms, other approaches, measures to support 
compliance with PIC and MAT, and capacity building needs, the Ad Hoc Open- 
ended Working Group on ABS was reconvened by Decision VI/24 (cf. CBD 2002). 
 
The southern countries missed their original aim to entrench a legally binding 
international ABS Protocol within the CBD. In the first instance this would have 
obligated the user countries to take effective measures in order to meet the 
Convention’s third objective the “fair and equitable benefit sharing” and to penalise 
infringements of ABS regulations through national legislation. So, in order to 
achieve their aim they pressed for further negotiations. 
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The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), which took place in 
Johannesburg from the 26th August until 4th September 2002, was used by the Like-
Minded Megadiversity Countries (LMMC)20, which had jointed together a couple of 
months before, as a platform to call attention to their concern regarding a legally 
binding international instrument for fair benefit sharing (cf. BUKO 2005: 98; ICTSD 
2005: 6; Brand/Görg 2003: 89f).  
At the WSSD, the heads of state and government finally met the desire of the 
LMMC. They called the international community for action to: 
“negotiate, within the framework of the [Convention], and bearing in mind the Bonn 
Guidelines, on an international regime to promote and safeguard the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” 
(Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 22). 
 
The decision of the WSSD had been prepared at the second meeting of the WG on 
ABS in Montreal, Canada 2003 and made confirmed on the next COP 7 in Kuala 
Lumpur 2004. 
At the 7th COP, it became clear that the implementation process of BG lagged 
behind. The voluntary regulations foster the fact that the misappropriation of genetic 
resources (biopiracy) went on without a legal framework, or rather with one which 
was unsatisfactory with regard to the third objective of the CBD (cf. Brand/Görg 
2003: 89). 
Due to pressure of the LMMC and following the call for action by governments at 
the WSSD, the contracting Parties decide, within Decision VII/19, at the 7th 
Conference  
“[…] to elaborate and negotiate an international regime on access to genetic 
resources and benefit sharing with the aim of adopting an instrument/instruments to 
effectively implement the provisions in Article 15 and 8(j) of the Convention and the 
three objectives of the Convention”(CBD 2004 b.). 
 
 
                                                 
20 Initially the LMMC negotiating group consisted of 15 countries, now 19 countries, including: 
Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa and Venezuela. 
These countries harbour about  70% of the world’s biodiversity (cf. BUKO 2005: 98; ICTSD 2005: 
6). 
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Parties also agreed on the terms of reference for the Working Group, including the 
process, nature, scope and elements for consideration in the elaboration of an 
international regime on ABS. Decision VII/19 also included a list of 23 possible 
elements of an international regime on ABS. Under the heading “nature”, the 
decision stipulated that the international regime could be composed of legally 
binding and non-binding elements (cf. CBD 2004 b.). 
One of the few positive elements of the mandate was the commitment to also 
incorporate the access to traditional knowledge and the fair sharing of benefits 
arising of the utilization of this knowledge into a future ABS regime. Since the 
Convention itself leaves the regulations on access and usage of traditional knowledge 
open to national legislation, this was seen as a chance to also expand the mandatory 
principles of PIC, MAT, and BS on traditional knowledge (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 
24). 
The 3rd meeting of the WG on ABS in Bangkok 2005 heralded the start of a long 
period of debating, as there was very little agreement amongst Parties on even the 
primary elements of an international regime on ABS. During the 3rd meeting of the 
WG on ABS, Parties managed to translate the 23 possible elements, formulated at 
COP 7 in Kula Lumpur, into a table like matrix, which was then translated into text 
format at the 4th meeting of the WG on ABS in Granada in 2006. The Granada text 
did not only include a lot of brackets but was itself placed in brackets, which was 
actually a sign for the extreme controversy on the status of the text. While the 
southern countries understood the Granada text as a first draft for an international 
regime, most of the northern countries saw it just as text with outstanding function 
(cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 26). 
 
A compromise on this controversy was finally reached at the 8th COP in Curitiba, 
Brazil in 2006, when Parties agreed that the Granada text was one basis, but not the 
only basis, for further negotiations (cf. ibid). 
At the 5th meeting of the WG on ABS in Montreal 2007, the negotiations were at first 
hampered by the Australian delegation, backed by the industry and non-Party USA 
as well as Canada, Japan and New Zealand. This was because they refused to 
negotiate on any legally binding international instrument on ABS, especially on the 
basis of the Granada text (cf. Frein/ Meyer 2010 a.: 27). The European Union, 
Switzerland and Norway, on the other hand, were more open towards serious 
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negotiation and expressed themselves in favour of an international regime on access 
and benefit sharing. However, they refused to discuss patent issues within the 
framework of the CBD. The southern countries jointly called for the beginning of 
serious negotiations based on the Granada text (cf. ibid.). 
 
At the 6th meeting of the WG on ABS held in Geneva in January 2008, the 
JUSCANZ group acted more moderately, although they repeatedly expressed 
concerns, they did not hampered the negotiations. A real breakthrough was achieved 
by indigenous people’s organisations (IPOs), supported by Haiti and the Philippines 
they managed to introduce some text, at least in brackets, referring to the right of 
IPLC over genetic resources, into the objectives of the draft text of the ABS protocol. 
It states: “[...] [taking into account all rights over those resources, including the rights 
of indigenous and local communities, and ensuring compliance with PIC]” (WG on 
ABS 2008: 14). 
The main reason for this sudden consideration of indigenous people and local 
community’s interests was the adoption of United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous People by the General Assembly some months before. With this 
declaration  the UN incorporated into the catalogue of human rights, the rights of 
indigenous people over their genetic resources and over their traditional knowledge 
associated with these resources. 21 
During the Geneva meeting Parties could also agree to extend the matrix of 23 
possible ABS by some more elements and divide them into a group of “bricks” and a 
group of “bullets”. The former included elements that Parties aimed to incorporate 
into the international regime, but which still needed further elaboration. The latter 
included possible elements which required further consideration (cf. Frein/Meyer 
2010 a.: 28).  
 
                                                 
21 Article 31 of the UNDRIP determines that: 1. “Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, 
control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural 
expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including 
human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral 
traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also 
have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural 
heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions” (UN 2008: 11f). 
 2. In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States shall take effective measures to recognize and 
protect the exercise of these rights” (UN 2008: 12f). 
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With regard to the development of an international regime on ABS, a real 
breakthrough was reached by the 9th Conference of the Parties in Bonn Germany in 
May 2008. With the Decision IX/12, the CBD Parties agreed on four significant 
points (cf. Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 42).  
First of all, the Parties agreed that Annex I, which provided the framework and main 
elements of an ABS regime, was the basis for further elaboration and negotiations of 
the international regime (cf. CBD 2008 a.). 
Secondly, the COP agreed to begin text based negotiations by inviting Parties and 
other governments, inter-governmental organisations, IPLC, and relevant 
stakeholders to submit their views and proposals, including operational text in 
respect to the elements listed in Annex I (cf. ibid.).  
Thirdly, the COP reiterated its instruction to the Working Group on ABS to complete 
the elaboration and negotiation of the international regime at the earliest possible 
time. Furthermore they decided that WG should meet three times, for an extended 
period of seven days, prior to COP10 in Nagoya (cf. ibid.). Thereby, the three 
meeting should serve exclusively for negotiations. The mandate for the WG sessions 
was made clear by the COP within paragraph 7(a) to (c) and 8. The COP advised the 
WG on ABS to finalize the international regime and to submit, for further 
consideration and adoption by the COP 10, an instrument to effectively implement 
the provisions in Article 15 and 8(j) of the Convention and its three objectives. In 
order to secure that the further negotiations within the WG on ABS were not 
hampered by the disagreements amongst Parties on the legal character of the 
international regime, the WG was instructed to not prejudge or preclude any outcome 
regarding the nature of the regime. (cf. ibid.).  
Fourthly, in order to assist the WG on ABS, the COP decided to establish three 
distinct Groups of Technical and Legal Experts (GTLE) to further examine the issues 
of (i) compliance, (ii) concepts, terms, working definition and sectorial approaches, 
and (iii) traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources (cf. ibid.).  
In Annex II, the COP laid down in detail which open questions the expert groups 
should address and how the three groups should be composed (cf. ibid.: Annex II).  
The installation of the three expert groups nearly broke down the negotiations, when 
the LMMC threat to leave the room. The group of LMMC stressed that the setting up 
of expert groups were just a time wasting tactic by the developed countries. 
However, the African Group accepted the establishment of the expert groups, on the 
 69 
 
condition that expert views would be sought on the issues that were deadlocked (cf. 
Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 42). 
The agreement on a concrete plan form Bonn to Nagoya was interpreted by many 
delegates as a real breakthrough and was also one of the main results of COP 9 in 
Bonn, Germany.  
 
4.6. Heading to Nagoya 
 
The negotiation marathon on the way to Nagoya began with the meeting of the 
“Group of Technical and Legal Experts (GLTE) on Concepts, Terms, Working 
Definition and Sectorial Approaches” held in Windhoek Namibia in September 2008. 
As laid down by the Annex II of DecisionIX/12, the GLTE should have been 
regionally balanced and composed of thirty experts, nominated by the Parties, and 
fifteen observers from industry, research institutes/academia, botanical gardens and 
other ex-situ collection holders. Additionally, it should have also included 
representatives from international organisations and NGOs and three representatives 
from indigenous people and local communities, nominated by them (cf. CBD 2008 
a.: Annex II B). In fact, however, out of the thirty nominated experts eight, mainly 
from Africa and Asia, could not attend the meeting. The same was true for the three 
representatives of indigenous people and one of the two nominated NGO- 
observers22 (cf. Meyer 2009:1).  
Few months later, by the end of January 2009, the second expert group came 
together in Tokyo, Japan. As mentioned before the second Group of Legal and 
Technical Experts had been set up by the 9th COP in order to further examine the 
issue of compliance, and through that assist the WG on ABS. In comparison to the 
other expert meetings, the second meeting had a smaller number of participants. 
Beside the thirty experts, only ten observers were allowed to attend the meeting, and 
at least three of them had to be nominated by indigenous people (CBD 2008 a.: 
Annex II A).  
 
                                                 
22 The two NGO- observers, one form EED Germany and the other from Friend of the Earth Togo 
who missed the meeting, were nominated by the NGO Network CBD Alliance (cf. Meyer 2009:1). 
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The negotiations on an international regime continued on the 7th meeting of the WG 
on ABS, which took place in Paris in April 2009. 
On this 7th meeting, the European Union, supported by industry and non-Party USA, 
set a new hurdle on the way to complete a draft protocol till COP 10 in Nagoya, 
called “pathogens”. While northern countries argued that pathogens should not be 
part of the international regime, the southern countries emphasised, with reference to 
Indonesia’s experience with the avian influenza, that pathogens must be included.  
Regarding the issues of indigenous peoples and local communities rights, most of the 
southern countries were in favour to take the right of indigenous people over genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge into the objectives of the ABS regime. Even 
Canada, which had not agreed on the UNDRIP, opened their position. Solely India 
and Indonesia argued that there were no indigenous people living on their territories. 
With regard to the issues of compliance, access and benefit sharing, the WG on ABS 
failed to take the discussion forward (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 32). 
 
The next stop on the way to Nagoya was the meeting of the “Group of Technical and 
Legal Experts (GLTE) on Traditional Knowledge associated with Genetic 
Resources”, which took place in Hyderabad in July 2009. In comparison to the other 
two expert meetings, IPLC were allowed to nominate seven observers. Parties were 
also encouraged to nominate experts from indigenous and local communities (cf. 
CBD 2008 a.: Annex II C).  
 
The WG on ABS convened its eighth meeting in Montreal Canada in November 
2009. During the meeting it was possible to observe that, with regard to the nature of 
the ABS regime, the EU, Australia and Japan slowly drew closer to the position of 
the southern countries. The latter were calling for a legally binding protocol. Only 
Canada, Great Britain and the USA expressed their reservations on an internationally 
binding protocol.  
With regard to the rights of indigenous people and local communities, Parties 
disagreed whether their rights should be subject to national law or apply 
irrespectively of national legislation. With reference to the UNDRIP, representatives 
of the indigenous people and local communities argued, that it was the duty of states 
to facilitate the rights of indigenous people, because these rights are human rights. 
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Furthermore they demanded to adopt the provisions on PIC and BS for accessing 
genetic resources, likewise for traditional knowledge (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 33). 
 
On the ninth meeting of the WG on ABS in Cali, Columbia in March 2010, the co-
chairs Fernando Casas (Colombia) and Tim Hodges (Canada) provided the Parties 
with a “co-chairs´ text” that balanced the interest of the different Parties. The WG 
accepted the draft protocol tabled by the co-chair as the basis for further negotiations. 
Regarding the rights of indigenous people, the text was quite minimalist. Although it 
ensured PIC and BS provisions towards communities when their knowledge is used, 
and also required Parties to ensure that such consent and benefit sharing is in 
accordance with community’s customary law and protocols. However, the text was 
completely silent on compliance provisions, which would have obligated Parties to 
prevent the misappropriation of traditional knowledge. Furthermore it did not say a 
word on the rights of communities over genetic resources, which had been written 
down in Article 31paragraph 1of the UNDRIP (cf. Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 44). 
Since the Working Group could not finalize the negotiations on the draft protocol at 
this session, Parties decided to resume the 9th meeting of the WG. 
The 1st session of the resumed 9th meeting of the WG on ABS took place in Montreal 
Canada in July 2010. During the meeting, Parties were able to agree on three out of 
the 32 articles of the co-chairs´ text. These were the articles on the objectives of the 
ABS Protocol, on contribution to conservation and sustainable use and on trans-
boundary cooperation. Regarding the objectives of the draft protocol, it is striking 
that the passage referring to the protection and enforcement of indigenous people 
rights, which had been one of the few positive results of the 7th and 8th meeting of the 
WG on ABS, was removed (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 a.: 32, 34). 
The main contents of the ABS Protocol remained contentious. The EU, Australia and 
Canada underlined that they would not agree on any passages of the co-chairs´ text 
that impose explicit duties on them. Other contentious issues were the temporal as 
well as the substantial scope of Protocol. Regarding the inclusion of pathogenic 
genetic resources into the ABS Protocol, the positions of the northern and southern 
countries were irreconcilable (cf. ibid. 34). 
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As the WG was once more unable to finalize the text the co-chairs proposed to 
reconvene the Interregional Negotiation Group (ING)23 . They did so, in order to 
continue negotiations and be able to meet the working groups‘ objective to submit a 
draft protocol for adoption by the 10th COP in Nagoya. The WG agreed on this 
proposal and decided to resume its 9th meeting once again prior to COP 10 in order to 
endorse the work of the ING and forward recommendations to Parties (cf. CBD n.d. 
b.) 
The ING met from 18 to 21 September 2010 in Montreal, Canada, and one month 
later from the 13th to 15th October in Nagoya. During the ING meeting, the co-chairs´ 
text was fiercely negotiated. One of the controversies was whether the country of 
origin or the providing country of genetic resources should be considered as 
addressee of the benefits which arise out of the utilization of genetic resources. The 
biodiversity rich countries (mostly “developing countries” and emerging economies) 
feared that the industrial countries would be rewarded in the end with the benefits 
which arise out of the utilisation of the genetic resources, which originally derived 
from southern countries. Since they had been collecting genetic resources from 
southern countries and “stored” these resources in zoological and botanical gardens 
as well as in gene banks for quite some time (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 a.:35). 
Another contentious issue was whether the access to genetic resources should be 
facilitated for those cases where the resources are not commercially used. With 
regard to this, Brazil and Malaysia pointed out that facilitated access did not mean 
free access (cf. ibidi.). During the September meeting of the ING in 2010, two 
smaller negotiation groups were also set up to address the open question on access 
and benefit sharing when using traditional knowledge, and on compliance. 
Regarding the issue of traditional knowledge China and India emphasized that in 
their countries traditional knowledge is held in the state’s hand. They succeeded in 
reintroducing the term “subject to national law” into the provisions, which require 
PIC of indigenous people and local communities before accessing traditional 
knowledge. Furthermore, the references to customary law and community protocols 
 
                                                 
23 The ING comprised of five representatives from each UN region as well as of two representatives 
of indigenous and local communities, civil society, industry and public research. Furthermore the ING 
also comprised representatives of the current and upcoming COP Presidencies, which were Germany 
and Japan. Within the ING the spokespersons and representatives could change freely, and discussions 
were opened to the attendance of all WG participants. Like the WG on ABS, the ING was co-chaired 
by Timothy Hodges and Fernando Casas (cf. IISD 2010). 
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were bracketed by the EU acting on behalf of France (Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 44). 
During the ING, representatives of indigenous people, backed by the Philippines, 
tried to reintroduces references to the UNDRIP into the preambles of the Protocol, 
which was admittedly bracketed by Canada. Moreover they also introduced a 
provision on the rights of IPLC over genetic resources, which were transformed by 
the Parties into three possible text options and immediately bracketed by other 
Parties. Because of the extreme controversy on the provisions regarding the rights of 
indigenous people over genetic resources, Parties suggested to drop all three options. 
This resulted in a walk out by the IIFB, who is the main representation mechanism 
for indigenous people and local communities within the CBD. For the IIFB the rights 
of local communities and indigenous people over their genetic resources were a red 
light issue. As this was the only possible option, in the seemingly inevitable face of 
continuing privatisation of biodiversity, to resist the dominant state and corporate 
control, which had led to so many cases of biopiracy (cf. Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 
44).  
The WG on ABS held its second session of its resumed 9th meeting, in-between the 
second meeting of the ING and the COP 10 in Nagoya, on 16th of October 2010. 
During this last meeting, the WG on ABS endorsed the work of the NIG and 
forwarded a draft protocol on ABS for the consideration of the Parties at COP 10. At 
the 10th COP in Nagoya, Japan, which was held from 18th to 29th of October, Parties 
finally adopted, with the Decision X/1, the “Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefit arising from their 
Utilization” (cf. CBD n.d. b.).  
 
5. NGOs and IPOs within the CBD- positions and activities 
 
As mentioned in chapter 3.3., according to Fritz Scharpf the formulation of norms 
and rules, or more general governance on the national and international level is 
deemed to be legitimate, i.e. accepted, by the population, and democratic if it shows 
input and output legitimacy. Output legitimacy is given when political decisions are 
effective, serve the community and contribute to distributive justice. Input 
legitimacy, on the other hand, is given when collectively binding decisions reflect the 
preferences of the demos (cf. Zürn in Brühl 2002.: 375, 2003: 219). This means, that 
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those who govern must take the interest of the governed, especially of those who are 
most affected by the decisions, adequately into account. On the international level 
this demos24 is not territorially fixed, but evolve in issue areas, like biodiversity, and 
comprise all those affected by, or with a stake in the decision (stakeholders) 
(Beisheim 2004: 28). So in order to have input legitimacy, international decision 
must reflect the preferences of this sectoral demo. Therefore, all the different 
stakeholders must be enabled to participate (directly or indirectly) in the negotiation 
process, in order to have their views reflected in the outcome of the process.  
 
Scholars often ascertained that policy making on the international level suffer under 
legitimacy deficits (cf. Brühl 2002.: 376; Beisheim 2001:119). Since there is a lack 
of participation, especially of those groups which are directly affected by decisions, 
and interest intermediation, international decision making processes are suffering 
under a deficit of input legitimacy. Beyond that, since international regulation have 
proven, in most of the cases, as ineffective, they are also suffering on a deficit of 
output legitimacy. 
Within the concept of global governance, researchers and policy makers tried to 
solve this problem by promoting a greater participation of non-state actors, especially 
NGOs, within international policy making processes. They assume that a broad 
participation of NGOs will contribute to the democratisation of international 
negotiations and enhance the legitimacy of the resulting decisions. Since NGOs bring 
a variety of different perspectives and interests into the negotiations and increase the 
transparency of the process to non-participants, and therewith also advance the 
accountability of governments to the public. 
 
In this chapter I am going to address the questions whether and how NGOs can 
actually fulfil their adjudicated role as providers of input and output legitimacy to 
international policy processes.  
In order to be able to make accurate statements on the NGOs potential to increase 
input legitimacy, I will evaluate whether NGOs could successfully bring their 
 
                                                 
24Although most scholars agree that on the international there is currently no common we-identity and 
therewith no transnational respectively global demos existing, they disagree on its future emergence. 
Optimistic scholars, argue that either such a transnational demos is evolving (Zürn) or several sectoral 
demoi come into existence (Abromeit, Schmidt, Breitmeier/ Wolf) (Beisheim 2004: 28; Brühl 2002: 
376). 
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interests/demands25 into the final outcome of the ABS negotiations, the Nagoya 
Protocol.  
Therefore I will first outline which interests the within the CBD active NGOs 
generally advocate and which demands they have toward the international ABS 
regime. Subsequently, I will point out different activities, taken by NGOs, which 
potentially led to an amelioration of the input and output legitimacy of the ABS 
regulations. 
Accordingly, the analysis is based on different kinds of documents, among others: 
official policy documents (the Nagoya Protocol on ABS), official civil society policy 
documents (position papers), secondary sources, including research works of Ulrich 
Brand, Tanja Brühl and a common research work of Alexandra König, Matthias 
Galan and myself, and on interviews with NGO and IPO participants, taken at COP 9 
in Bonn 2008. 
 
5.1. Positions of NGOs and IPOs on the Access and Benefit Sharing 
Protocol 
 
As mentioned earlier, beside “grey NGOs”, which were mainly established by 
pharmaceutical, agrarian or cosmetics companies or their associations, also “green 
NGOs” are engaging within the CBD and participating on the biennial Conferences 
of the Parties, as well as on the meetings of the different Working Groups26.  
Within the group of green NGOs we can further distinguish, according to their 
working field, between nature conservation NGOs, development NGOs, seed NGOs 
and indigenous people’s organisations (IPOs) (cf. Brand 2000:205). 
The various NGOs, which had been following the ABS negotiations since the first 
meeting of the WG in Bonn 2001, have developed quite different positions regarding 
the question, whether the international ABS regime will actually serve the aim to 
prevent biopiracy. Depending on their definition of biopiracy, two groups can be 
roughly distinguished. More critical NGOs (i.e. Grain, ETC-group, La Via 
 
                                                 
25, Or rather, the demands and interest of their constituency/clientele, particularly of those who are 
underrepresented or marginalised and especially affected by the decisions taken.  
26 Until the 10 COP in Nagoya there were four Working Groups one on the Review of 
Implementation, a second on Article 8(j), a third on Protected Areas and a fourth on Access and 
Benefit Sharing 
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Campesina, BUKO) which understand biopiracy as privatisation and monopolisation 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. According to them, an international 
binding ABS regime will not prevent biopiracy but offer a legal framework for the 
access to genetic resources, and therewith simply legalise it (realistic understanding 
of biopiracy). The second group (i.e. environmental, development and most of the 
indigenous NGOs) understands biopiracy, primarily, as unlawful appropriation of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge without fulfilling requirements of PIC 
(or F-PIC) and without benefit sharing (legalistic understanding of biopiracy) (cf. 
Brand/Görg 2003: 86). The latter expect that an international binding and stringent 
ABS regime will prevent or at least hamper biopiracy. 
 
5.1.1. Critical NGOs: realistic understanding of Biopiracy 
 
The “seed NGOs” Grain and ETC- Group27 as well as the international peasant 
movement La Via Campesina and the German umbrella organisation BUKO28 
belong to the group of critical civil society actors (cf. BUKO 2005: 135; Brand 2008: 
37).Within the CBD negotiation they generally attempt to bring social and ecological 
questions together and are primary representing the interests of local people, 
especially indigenous people and peasant communities, in biodiversity rich countries 
(cf. Brand 2000:210f.). They point out that there is a close correlation between 
biological and cultural diversity, and stress that the erosion of the one will inevitably 
lead to the erosion of the other and vice versa (cf. Ribeiro 2002:120; 
Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 159). According to them, indigenous people and rural 
communities do not only play an eminent role for the preservation and evolution of 
biodiversity, but are also the original custodians and owners of most of the world’s 
biodiversity and the therewith associated traditional knowledge (cf. Ribeiro 2002: 
120f). Consequently critical NGOs question the principle of national sovereignty 
over genetic resources (established by the CBD) and advocate the rights of 
indigenous people and local peasants, to effectively control and freely dispose over 
their ancestral land, the (plant) genetic resources (including seeds) in their territories 
 
                                                 
27 Both NGOs have been initially active within the FAO, before they get involved within the CBD (cf. 
Brand 2000: 209). 
28 Federal coordination of internationalism 
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and their traditional knowledge. Accordingly, they are strictly against patents on life 
and genetic resources, especially seeds, as well as the privatisation of traditional 
knowledge through any kind of intellectual property rights. (cf. Brand 2000:210; 
Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 159). As after their logic resources, which have been 
part of the common heritage of communities and people, and have always been 
public, collective and designated to the general welfare, are turned into private 
property, become alienable and solely serve the profit of a hand full of companies 
and institutions (cf. Ribeiro 2002:119). Furthermore through the patenting of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge, indigenous people are hindered to freely 
dispose over and control their own resources and knowledge. In the eyes of critical 
NGOs as well as critical indigenous organisations, this private appropriation and 
monopolisation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge is nothing else than 
biopiracy. According to critical actors the biggest weakness of the CBD is, that 
nowhere in its articles, it pronounced itself against patents on components of 
biodiversity and on associated traditional knowledge (cf. Galan/König/Moldovan 
2010: 160). On the contrary, the CBD, and the ABS Protocol respectively, 
formulates requirements for the access to genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge, which are then protected by intellectual property rights. Due to this 
perspective, the ABS Protocol will just offer a legal framework for biopiracy 
(Interview ETC group; BUKO, Gen-ethic Network).  
As the substantial framework of the ABS negotiations is not changeable, critical 
NGOs wonder if their participation would be wise, as this would only provide 
additional legitimacy to the negotiation process and its outcome. Therefore critical 
actors like ETC group avoid getting involved within the ABS negotiations: “[…] we 
are not involved […] because we have given priority to other things and we feel that 
even if we were inside the negotiations we cannot change the framework and cannot 
achieve point things that are good […]” (Interview ETC group). 
They are rather critically accompanying the negotiation in order to prevent the worst 
(cf. Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 160).  
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5.1.2. Environmental, development- and indigenous NGOs: legalistic understanding 
of biopiracy 
 
Environmental NGOs 
The positions of the environmental NGOs, active within the CBD, are stretching 
from “conservative hard liners” like CI and TNC, rather sensitised organisations like 
WWF and IUCN, to progressive civil society actors like Green Peace or Friends of 
the Earth (cf. Interview German NGO Forum on Environment and Development 
(FED); Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 156; Brand 2008: 37). The main interest of 
conservative environmental NGOs is the conservation respectively maintenance of 
nature, especially through the designation of protected areas, which is often 
accompanied by the displacement of people living there (cf. BUKO: 132; Brand 
2008: 37; Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 156). As a result conflicts have been 
continually arising between indigenous people, local communities and nature 
conservation NGOs, on the local level (cf. Interview Forum on Environment and 
Development, FPP; EED; Tebtebba). Especially CI has often been blamed to actively 
promote biopiracy by supporting bio-prospecting projects within the areas protected 
by them, without involving local groups29 (cf. Brand 2008:37). In comparison to the 
local level, on the international level most of the environmental NGOs have been 
opening up towards the concerns of indigenous people (cf. Interview IUCN; FED). 
For example, WWF as well as IUCN underline, even though to different degrees, the 
importance of the “Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People” for the ABS 
regime (cf. IUCN 2008, 2010; WWF 2008, 2010). 
In contrast to critical NGOs, environmental organisations are accepting the premise 
of national sovereignty over genetic resources and they are generally not opposed to 
the patenting of life (forms), especially genetic resources (exceptions are Green 
Peace and Friends of the Earth). On the contrary they see the economic value of plant 
genetic resources, especially in the pharmaceutical field, as important stimulus for 
the further protection of biodiversity (cf. Brand 2000:208; Galan/König/Moldovan 
 
                                                 
29 Under the guise of biodiversity protection, CI provided multinational companies with unrestricted 
access to the biological resources of the nature reserve Monte Azules, in Mexico, which is managed 
by CI. Thereby, the local population was not involved in the bio-prospecting agreements between CI 
and various multinational pharmaceutical companies. Neither was their PIC sought, nor did they 
receive any benefits (cf. Berne Declaration 2004). 
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2010: 156). Thereby the monetary benefits, arising out of the utilisation of genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge, could be used for the further 
conservation of biodiversity (cf. Interview WWF, IUNC 2010). As the ABS issue is 
not seen as typical environmental issue, but rather as classical distribution problem 
between northern and southern countries, environmental organisation are less active 
within the negotiation. They rather try to keep in step with, and support the position 
of NGOs working intensively on the ABS issue, and of developing countries (cf. 
Interview WWF; Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 156). 
 
Development NGOs  
NGOs working on development issues primarily support the concerns of local people 
living in the geopolitical South, but also of southern governments. A prominent 
development NGO is the Third World Network, which is based in Malaysia and does 
not only work on biodiversity policy, but also on development, world trade and 
financial policy. The TWN is a rather scientifically working NGOs and its members 
are mostly intellectuals from the Asian region30, which are also active in other NGOs 
(cf. Brühl 2005: 285). Besides TWN also the British Intermediate Technology 
Development Group (now Practical Action), the Swiss Berne Declaration, the 
German Church Development Service EED31 and the catholic organisation 
MISEREOR have been active within the CBD for quite some time (cf. Brand 2008: 
37; BUKO 2005: 133). Similarly to critical NGOs, also development NGOs point out 
the eminent role of indigenous people and peasants for the maintenance and further 
development of biodiversity. Furthermore they underline the importance of 
biological diversity, especially plants, as source of livelihood for the indigenous 
people and local communities. Therefore they generally promote the strengthening of 
the rights of peasants and indigenous people over their resources. Development 
NGOs are basically also critical towards patents on life and therewith also towards 
the patenting and privatisation of genetic resources (cf. BUKO 2005: 134; Interview 
MISEREOR, EED). However, as mentioned above, they follow a more legalistic 
understanding of biopiracy, according to which biopiracy is not generally the 
privatisation and monopolisation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
 
                                                 
30 Vandana Shiva, for instance, has been long time working on biodiversity policy within the TWN 
(cf. Brand 2000: 212; Brühl 2005: 285). 
31 Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst 
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through IPRs, but the unlawful appropriation of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge; which basically means accessing those resources without the consent of 
the country of origin or of indigenous people (PIC or F-PIC) and without the 
conclusion of a contract, that includes beside the conditions of usage, also benefit 
sharing arrangements (cf. Meienberg 2002: 53). So according to the view of 
development NGOs, a legally binding and stringent ABS regime, which meets 
certain minimum requirements (see below), can at least hamper and mitigate the 
praxis of biopiracy (cf. cf. Galan/König/Moldovan 2010:158; Interview EED; Forrest 
Peoples Programme (FPP); MISEREOR). The question is, whether these 
requirements can be implemented into the final ABS Protocol. Although 
development NGOs are sceptical towards the actual outcome of the ABS 
negotiations, they are, in contrast to critical NGOs, actively participating and trying 
to fully exploit the existing scopes of flexibility within the negotiations, in order to 
improve its outcome (cf. Galan/König/Moldovan 2010:157). They try to counteract 
and complicate the further patenting of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
by calling for binding regulations, which enable indigenous people to effectively 
control the access to genetic resources on their territories and on related traditional 
knowledge, also including the right to forbid the access to these resources and 
knowledge (cf. Interview FPP; MISEREOR, EED; Forum Umwelt und 
Entwicklung/DNR 2010; Galan/König/Moldovan 2010:158). 
 
The different NGOs working on CBD issues network and coordinate on the 
international level mainly through the CBD Alliance, which was established in 2002 
as an informal alliance of civil society actors.  
Over the years the environmental and development NGOs, active within the CBD 
Alliance, especially those groups with a legalistic understanding of bio-piracy, have 
approached their positions and developed quite similar demands with regard to the 
ABS Protocol. The “Top 10 for Cop 10”32 briefing papers produced by the CBD 
Alliance provide, among others, a summary of the main viewpoints and demands of 
civil society organisations with regard to the Nagoya Protocol. Thereby the demands 
 
                                                 
32 The “Top 10 for Cop 10” briefing papers were developed by more than 30 civil society and 
indigenous peoples organisations and reviewed through the CBD Alliance list servers - which reaches 
more than 300 members - , before they were published (cf. CBD Alliance/ Kalpavriksh 2010:5).  
 
 81 
 
are not at all new, but have already been posed in previous statements33. All in all, 
the CBD Alliance had following nine key demands towards Parties regarding the 
ABS Protocol: 
First, given the fact that the voluntary Bonn Guidelines from 2002 have proven 
ineffective to stop biopiracy, the NGO community demanded that the Nagoya 
Protocol has to be legally binding (cf. CBD Alliance 2010 a.).  
Secondly, the ABS Protocol must recognise the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People from 2007 and protect the rights of indigenous people and local 
communities, especially their rights: 
“to maintain, control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, traditional 
knowledge and traditional cultural expression, as well as the manifestation of their 
sciences, technologies and culture, including human and genetic resources, seeds, 
medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora” (CBD Alliance 2010a.). 
 
Thirdly, against the background of the UNDRIP, the right of indigenous peoples and 
local communities, to determine over access to and use of their genetic resources and 
associated traditional knowledge, must be recognised in the ABS Protocol (i.e. 
international law) and not entirely left subject to national legislation (cf. CBD 
Alliance 2010 b.). Therefore the Protocol should require the (free and) prior 
informed consent (F-PIC) of indigenous people and local communities, to access 
their traditional knowledge and related genetic resources, and equitable benefit-
sharing with these communities.  
Fourthly, in order to ensure that the utilisation of associated traditional knowledge 
does not occur without the (free and) prior informed consent (F-PIC) of IPLC and the 
arrangement of mutually agreed terms (MAT), including provision on benefit 
sharing, Parties need to include traditional knowledge into the sections of the 
Protocol referring to compliance, tracking and monitoring (cf. CBD Alliance 2010 a., 
2010 b.).  
 
                                                 
33 see NGO statement on International ABS Regime, Montreal, 8th October 2007 supported by African 
Center for Biosafety (South Africa), Erklärung von Bern (CH), EED (D), Ecoropa, Edmonds Institute 
(USA), Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung (D), Global Forest Coalition, Global Justice Ecology Project 
(USA), Misereor (D), Research & Action in Natural Wealth Administration (Indien), Sobre Vivencia 
(Paraguay), Third World Network (Malaysia), World Wide Fund for Nature (cf. Bern Declaration 
2007). 
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Fifthly, with regard to the technical scope of the ABS Protocol, NGOs demanded 
that it must be broad enough to include all those cases, which are regarded by a 
majority as typical ABS-relevant utilisation forms of genetic resources and 
associated traditional knowledge. This means, that beside the direct utilisation of the 
genetic material (DNA) of the genetic resource34, for instance for the breeding of 
new plant varieties or extraction of DNA etc., also the utilisation of plant extracts or 
of other organisms, for the production of nutraceuticals, and biochemical 
components (derivatives) of the genetic resources for the development of new drugs 
and cosmetics, need to be covered by the Protocol. Beyond that also pathogens, for 
the development of vaccines, which are a subset of genetic resources, need to be 
included in the scope of the Protocol. Thereby the Protocol might allow for specific 
access rules in emergency situations, for instance when human live is endangered 
through epidemics or pandemics (e.g. avian influenza), but must at the same time 
secure the benefit sharing obligation (cf. CBD Alliance 2010a.). 
Sixthly, taking into account that the commitment to implement rules for access and 
fair benefit sharing had already been anchored within the text of the CBD, which is 
in force since 1993 and binding under international law, NGOs demanded that the 
ABS Protocol has to enter into force retrospectively. This means that any new use of 
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, which had been accessed 
since the entry into force of the CBD in 1993, need to be in accordance with the PIC 
and benefit sharing provisions of the Protocol (cf. CBD Alliance 2010a.). The 
problem is, that any restriction of the temporal scope of the Protocol to the date of 
the 50th ratification, as stipulated by northern countries, will allow bio piracy to 
continue for many more years and also act as incentive to carry as much resources as 
possible out of the country of origin till D-Day (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010c:25). 
Seventhly, “the geographical scope of the Protocol must cover all territories of its 
Parties” (Alliance 2010a.). ABS rules for genetic resources from extra- territorial 
 
                                                 
34  
According to Article 2 of the CBD genetic resources means genetic material- in terms of any material 
of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity- of actual or 
potential value.   
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areas, like the high sea or the Antarctica, need to be in accordance with the ABS 
Protocol (cf. ibid.).35 
Eighthly, with regard to the compliance mechanisms, NGOs called for clear and 
binding rules that make it possible for countries of origin and other right holders of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge, to enforce their rights in the user 
countries. In this respect they ask for two main things: a comprehensive certificate of 
compliance, which proves the using Party has acquired the genetic resources and 
associated traditional knowledge in accordance with the regulations of the Protocol, 
and a list of mandatory checkpoints, including intellectual property examination 
offices, plant variety offices, authorities dealing with product registration and 
approval etc., where the certificate of compliance must be presented (cf. CBD 
Alliance 2010 a.). The underlying idea is that without the submission of such a 
certificate the further research, patenting, market admission or any other use should 
not be allowed. Thereby the certificate shall include information on the origin of the 
genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, on the existing benefit 
sharing agreements and on the mutually agreed conditions for the further utilisation 
of the resource (MAT) (cf. Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung/DNR 2010). 
And last but not least, the NGO community asked Parties to ensure that the ABS 
activities and transactions between CBD Parties and non-Parties, such as the United 
States which is one of the biggest users of genetic resources, including the users and 
providers in territory of non-Parties, are consistent with ABS Protocol (cf. CBD 
Alliance 2010 a.). 
 
Indigenous People Organisations 
The CBD is especially important for indigenous people and local communities, as 
these actors are directly affected by the decision taken within the different COPs. 
Since the mid- nineties indigenous people from all over the world participate in the 
CBD negotiations. Beside “southern” indigenous organisations, like Tebtebba36, 
 
                                                 
35 The German NGO Forum on Environment and Development (FED), for example, recommended to 
establish a  multilateral fund to distribute the benefits that arise out of the utilisation of genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge that stem from more than one country or from outside 
of national territories (cf. Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung/ DNR 2010).    
36Indigenous Peoples’ International Centre for Policy Research and Education  
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FPCI37, YPA38, AIPP39 etc., also indigenous organisations from Canada, like 
NAHO40, and the United States, like IPCB41, are engaging within the CBD. 
Indigenous people representatives have constantly emphasised that biological 
diversity and cultural diversity are dependent on each other. The richest ecosystems 
and the largest biological respectively genetic diversity are usually located on 
indigenous territories. Indigenous people and local communities are reliant on this 
richness and on intact ecosystem as basis of their existence. Therefore the 
maintenance of biological diversity is inseparably linked with the protection of 
indigenous people’s rights (cf. Brand 2000:212). According to this, representatives of 
indigenous people have stressed out again and again, that the Parties of the 
Convention must accept and respect that indigenous people have sovereign right over 
their land and resources. Unfortunately Parties have failed to recognise these rights 
by determining in Article 15 that the right to grant access to and determine 
appropriate utilisation of genetic resources rests with the national governments (cf. 
Harry/Kanehe 2005: 81f.; Kanehe 2008: 3). Although the CBD provides that the 
approval of indigenous people and local communities is needed when their 
traditional knowledge is used and that benefits which arise out of the utilisation of 
such knowledge should be shared with them, this is subject to national legislation 
and therefore implemented quite cautiously.  
Just like critical and development NGOs also IPOs are strongly opposed to the 
patenting and co-modification of life, as this is against their fundamental values and 
beliefs regarding the sacredness of life and life processes and the reciprocal 
relationship which they maintain with all creation (cf. IPCB 2007, BUKO 2005: 
100ff.). 
Accordingly, they are also against patents on traditional knowledge related to the use 
of genetic resources. However, as indigenous people often belonged to the most 
marginalized and impoverished groups, IPOs can fully understand that some 
indigenous communities, attracted by benefit sharing, make their traditional 
knowledge available to the biotechnology industry. Nevertheless they ask indigenous 
people to consider, that once they agreed on benefit sharing agreement they must 
 
                                                 
37 Fundaciòn para la Promociòn del Conocimiento Indìgena 
38 Yiaku People's Association 
39Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact  
40 The National Aboriginal Health Organization 
41 Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism  
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accept, that patent law will govern the ownership of the products derived from their 
genetic resources and their ancestral knowledge (cf. Harry/Kanehe 2005: 89; IPCB 
2007).  
With regard to the international ABS regime indigenous people fear that if their 
rights to own, control access to and determine appropriate utilisation of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge, is not recognised in the ABS regime than 
biopiracy respectively bio colonialism would simply go on (cf. Kanehe 2008: 3). As 
it is unclear whether these minimum standards will be implemented in the future 
ABS Protocol, IPOs have reserved commitment to support either a binding or non 
binding protocol. The dilemma is that a non binding protocol, like the Bonn 
Guideline, would favour the illegal appropriation of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge. While a binding one with poor content would simply legalise the 
expropriation of the original owner of genetic resources. In both cases biopiracy 
would simply continue (cf. Harry/Kanehe 2005: 86). 
Despite this difficult initial situation, indigenous people engage within the ABS 
negotiations in order to exploit the existing space for contestation, although there are 
also critical voices within the indigenous community which call for boycotting of the 
negotiations (cf. IPCB 2007). In order to synchronize their actions, exchange ideas 
and develop common positions and so give a strong voice to the concerns of 
indigenous peoples within the international negotiations, IPOs have developed 
different networks like the Indigenous Peoples´ Biodiversity Network (IPBN) or the 
Indigenous Women´s Biodiversity Network (IWBN). Since its establishment at the 
3rd COP in 1996, the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity (IIFB) is the 
key forum for indigenous lobbying of the CBD. During the 5th COP in Nairobi the 
forum was officially acknowledged with decision V/16 to be a formal advisory body 
to the CBD (cf. Oldham/Stout/Hardison n.d.). 
With regard to the ABS Protocol the IIFB had elaborated five minimum and 
necessary requirements in order to have a satisfactory outcome that actually prevents 
biopiracy and not legalizes it. 
First of all, the future ABS Protocol shall state in its preambles that the right of 
indigenous people and local communities, as formulated by the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous People in 2007, are respected (cf. IIFB 2010; 
Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 45). 
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Secondly, when traditional knowledge and genetic resources on indigenous 
territories are being accessed, then the (free) prior and informed 42consent of 
indigenous people and local communities must be obtained, and this shall not be 
subject to national legislation (cf. IIFB 2010; Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 44).  
Thirdly, in order to secure the rights of indigenous people and local communities 
over the genetic resources in their territories, the IIFB demands that the preamble of 
the ABS Protocol shall recognise this right (cf. IIFB 2010; Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 
45). 
Fourthly, “[t]he importance and relevance of traditional knowledge shall be fully 
integrated through out the [P]rotocol, especially in the Compliance section” (IIFB 
2010). 
And Last but not least, the Protocol should include references to compliance with 
customary law and community protocols of indigenous peoples in order to ensure 
that States are committed to respect community systems of governance (cf. 
Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 45; IIFB 2010). 
 
5.2. NGO- Input Activities 
 
As mentioned earlier, a central assumption of the global governance concept is that 
NGOs can contribute to mitigate democratic deficits which arise from governance at 
the international level (lack of input- and output legitimacy). The participation of 
NGOs shall led to an amelioration of the input legitimacy of international 
negotiations, as these actors bring different societal interest into the political process, 
which otherwise would remain unnoticed and therewith widen the basis for decision 
making.  
 
                                                 
42F-PIC means that all members of the communities affected consent to the decision and that the 
consent is determined in accordance with customary laws, rights and practices. Furthermore the 
consent must happen in  
freedom from external manipulation, interference or coercion and the intent and scope of the activity 
must be fully disclosed. The decisions must be made in a language and process understandable to the 
communities and  
indigenous peoples, customary institutions and representative organizations must be involved at all 
stages of the consent process. Last but not least the right of Indigenous Peoples to say NO, must be 
respected (BUKO 2005 106; FFP n.d.). 
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After having shown the central interests and viewpoints of NGOs and IPOs with 
regard to the ABS Protocol above; I want to point out in the following, how (i.e. 
through which activities) NGOs brought their demands into the CBD negotiation 
process.  
 
5.2.1. Alliances 
 
In order to effectively advocate their interests towards more powerful actors, like 
nation states and business representatives, it is essential for NGOs to build up 
networks. The above mentioned CBD Alliance, as well as the IIFB, are the main 
networks for NGOs and indigenous representatives to coordinate, share information, 
exchange positions and aggregate various interests, in order to speak with one strong 
common voice on the international stage. 
The CBD Alliance basically pursues the aim to bring the different views, concerns 
and demands of civil society into the CBD process, especially of those who are most 
impacted by the policies themselves (cf. CBD Alliance/Kalpavriksh 2010: 1f). 
Therefore the Alliance supports, among others, indigenous representatives as well 
southern NGOs and community based organisations financially, in order to facilitate 
their participation in CBD meetings and therewith enable them to represent their 
interests by themselves (cf. ibid.:12ff). Although the Alliance endeavours to enhance 
the participation and involvement of southern NGOs and indigenous representatives 
in the negotiations, the process is unsurprisingly dominated by northern NGOs, as 
they have more financial resources at their disposal. This dominance was also 
evident at the NGO pre-meeting to the ninth COP in Bonn, which was organised by 
the CBD Alliance and the German NGO Forum on Environment and Development. 
Apart form the fact that the attendance of northern NGOs was higher than the one of 
southern NGOs, individual actors of the hosting forum claimed a leading role within 
the NGO pre-meeting for themselves; which triggered a heated debate on the 
legitimate representation of civil society towards the public and the Parties at the 
conference. Some southern and also northern development NGOs perceived this 
proceeding as paternalistic (cf. Interview ETC group, BUKO, EED; 
Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 171). 
Just like the CBD Alliance also the IIFB uses the weekend prior to the conferences to 
clarify and exchange positions, write out common opening statements, and generally 
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prepare for the conferences. These capacity building and strategy sessions prior to 
the COP are especially important for CBD rookies in order to get relevant 
information on the CBD process. During the COPs, and other important CBD 
meetings, such as Working Groups and SBSTTA meetings, the Alliance, as well as 
the IIFB, also hold daily briefing sessions to facilitate the coordination of the 
different position of NGOs and IPOs and the planning of interventions on specific 
agenda items.  
In the periods between the CBD sessions, the communication among NGOs is 
maintained through the CBD Alliance’s general and ABS specific list servers, which 
reach more than 300 respectively 92 subscribers (cf. CBD Alliance/Kalpavriksh 
2010: 8).  
 
The CBD Alliance also works closely together with the IIFB, they hold, for example, 
joint meetings; collaborate on statements (e.g. TOP 10 for COP10) and press work 
etc. 
As described by an indigenous representative, the NGO forum and the IIFB usually 
develop their position on a certain issue independently from each other. Then they 
try to have matching notes, to see where it is possible to support and generally try to 
make sure that nothing they are doing is contradictory (cf. Interview NAHO). But the 
coordination of the positions, statements and interventions of IPO and NGOs are not 
always easy or possible and basically dependent on the thematic area (cf. 
Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 172). With regard to the issue of protected areas, the 
positions of bigger nature conservation NGOs which promote the expansion of 
protected areas, and IPOs, seem to be unbridgeable. The latter are strictly against a 
further expansion of protected areas, especially in their territories (cf. Interview 
Tebtebba, FPP; Galan/König/Moldovan 2010:171f.). 
 
5.2.2. Statements and Interventions 
 
As the negotiations of the Convention are generally open for civil society groups and 
representatives of indigenous people, these actors have the possibility to call 
attention to their concerns from “inside”, by sitting directly at the negotiation table 
with the contracting states, and from “outside”, in the sense of outside the negotiation 
rooms by organising e.g. demonstrations. 
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Like mentioned in chapter 4.3 the negotiations within the COP take place in 
differently sized negotiation groups which are opened for NGO and IPO participation 
to various degrees. Typically, the COP starts with a plenary, which is then 
transformed into a committee of the whole and reconvenes at the end to adopt the 
decisions. In the opening and closing plenary, NGOs and IPOs normally have the 
possibility to read out a common statement. Admittedly this opportunity was denied 
to them in the opening, as well as in the closing plenary of the COP10 in Nagoya (cf. 
CBD Alliance 2010 d.; UKabc 2010). During the twelve days lasting conference, the 
different agenda items are, first of all, discussed within two parallel running Working 
Groups, where also NGOs and IPOs are allowed to participate and to speak out 
interventions, either in their own name or on behalf of a specific group (cf. 
Brand/Görg 2003: 59; Brühl 2005: 287). Admittedly, observer organisations are not 
always allowed to speak on agenda items and their speaking time is strictly limited to 
one-minute interventions. But, at least they can submit written comments (cf. 
Peterman 2010). Due to the complexity of subjects, antagonistic interests and the 
large number of participants, it is very difficult to reach a consensus within the “big” 
working groups. Therefore smaller negotiation groups, like contact groups and 
“friends of the chair” groups, are built up to discuss contentious issues. While NGOs 
and IPOs are allowed to observe contact group meetings and sometimes also give 
statement, they are not allowed to attend “friend of the chair” meetings (cf. 
Brand/Görg 2003: 59).  
At the COP 10 in Nagoya, form 18 to 29 October 2010, the ABS Protocol was 
further negotiated within the open-ended Informal Consultative Group (ICG), which 
was working in parallel with working group I and II. In general, NGOs and IPOs 
were allowed to participate within the ICG and to make proposals towards the 
Protocol, but as non-Party, they needed the explicit support of a Party for any text 
that they wanted to introduce or retain. Due to the high controversy on key issues of 
the Protocol, the ICG set up several “small groups” and later in the course of 
negotiation “closed groups” and a “facilitating group” in order to reach consensus. 
(cf. ENB 2010b.) The observation of the negotiations within these groups was not 
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allowed for non-Parties, which was viewed with a great deal of suspicion by IPOs 
and NGOs43.  
So although NGOs and IPOs generally have the possibility to participate and raise 
their voice in the negotiations, they are facing certain restrictions (cf. 
Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 165ff). As the CBD is first of all an intergovernmental 
process, IPOs and NGOs on the one hand, and governments on the other, are not 
equal in terms of negotiations. Even if IPOs and NGOs put in their views, those will 
be negotiated by Parties (cf. Interview Tebtebba).  
As pointed out by a representative of IUCN: “the dialogue, is taking place 
fundamentally among the holders of the power in each part of the world, the 
governments […]while NGOs and IPOs do not have any decision making power” 
(Interview IUCN). 
Critical observers even assess the involvement of NGOs and IPOs just as a formality, 
with little political weight. According to an indigenous representative, “[…] the 
countries are absolute rigid about keeping control of the process and not letting civil 
society, whether the indigenous people, whether the local communities or the NGOs, 
have any real saying” (Interview PIPEC44). 
Another considerable hurdle that undermines especially the active participation of 
non-anglophone NGO and IPO representatives (and delegations) is the official 
negotiation language English. During the COP, translation services are basically 
available, but these services decrease in relation to shrinking negotiation groups. As 
pointed out by a NGO representative: “sometimes documents of contact groups or 
friends of the chair groups […] are either not available in other languages than 
English or they come very late” (Interview Forest People Program). This 
circumstances lead to the fact, that those people with another mother tongue than 
English are put under disadvantage in terms of negotiations (cf. Interview FPP). So 
in order to actively play a part in CBD negotiations and also influence them, it is 
important for NGOs and IPOs to have certain English skills, technical knowledge on 
CBD issues (expertise), as well as knowledge on the political process, which is 
basically gained through experience (cf. Interview EED; Galan/König/Moldovan 
2010: 168). 
 
                                                 
43 At the ICG meeting on Wednesday 27 of October 2010, the IIFB expressed their concern regarding 
their exclusion from the negotiations on traditional knowledge (cf. ENB2010a.: 3). 
44 Pacific Indigenous Peoples Environmental Coalition 
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“Clearly, the less knowledgeable and less experienced you are, then the whole thing 
is completely un-penetrable” (Interview Tebtebba). 
 
5.2.3. Lobbying 
 
Another way to bring their viewpoints into the CBD negotiations is lobbing. Outside 
the negotiation rooms NGOs and IPOs try to establish contacts to governmental 
representatives, talk to them on specific issues and convince them to reconsider and 
change their positions. As the contacting and the subsequent conversations usually 
take place on the corridors, in cafeterias or in the hotel lobbies, the term “lobbying” 
has become established (cf. Brühl 2005: 269). Thereby NGOs and IPOs not only 
attempt to talk to their own national delegation, but also to governments with similar 
and opposing perspectives. Especially with regard to those Parties with similar 
perspectives, lobbying is, according to a representative of the FPP “a very good 
strategy for getting text into the official documents, because governments usually 
accept government text more widely than text coming from civil society or 
indigenous and local communities” (Interview FPP). 
Deeply founded knowledge as well as political knowledge, such as the knowledge 
about the positions of Parties and the right argument to influence them, are important 
prerequisites for effective lobbying work. Personal contacts to delegation members 
are also quite helpful, but not of central importance as delegations need to be 
continually contacted and convinced, due to personnel rotations (cf. Interview EED; 
Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 168). Those NGOs with good personal relations to 
their national delegations, like MISEREOR and EED, uses these relations to 
establish contacts between their partner organisations and delegates (cf. Interview 
EED; MISEREOR). In preparation for and during the COP10, also the CBD Alliance 
initiated meetings between civil society representatives and officials, like various 
CBD co-chairs, the SBSTTA Bureau, and between (blocks of) governments, like the 
European Union and the Japanese government (cf. CBD Alliance/Kalpavriksh 2010: 
3, 6f).  
Beside corridors and cafeterias, numerous events on the fringes of the Conference are 
typical places for lobbying. Side Events are used by NGOs and IPOs to generally 
disseminate information and to outline their viewpoints and claims on certain issues 
and therewith, so the hope, make Parties to change their positions. In most of the 
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cases, side events are visited by sympathizers of the organizers. They are also 
attended by delegation members in order to obtain/acquire relevant information, but 
this basically depends on their time availability (cf. Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 
169). During the COP10 more than three hundred side events were held, most of 
them organised by business representatives and international organisations, but some 
also by NGOs and IPOs (cf. CBD 2010 b.). From civil society perspective, one of the 
most relevant side events was the “Top 10 for Cop 10”, organised by the CBD 
alliance. This event was held on the opening day of the Conference and crucially 
important for NGOs, in order to make their positions on the major issues for the 10th 
COP clear to the attending Parties and media representatives from the very 
beginning.  
The circumstance, that more and more business actors are actively involved within 
the CBD process and use side events in order to promote their interest, is viewed 
very critically by NGOs and IPOs. As companies and their associations usually have 
a large amount of resources, “they are able to put on any number of side events that 
they want to put out their position” (Interview NAHO). Due to that, business 
representatives have a considerable advantage over NGOs/IPOs, whose financial 
resources are limited, within the battle for attention of states. Beyond that they also 
face favourable conditions with regard to the awarding of rooms for side events. 
During the ninth Conference in Bonn, for example, the plenary hall was given for the 
first time to an multinational food company the “Charoen Pokphand Group” to hold 
their side event (cf. interview FPP; Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 169; CBD 2008 
b.). 
NGOs and IPOs do not only lobby for their interest at the international, but also at 
the national level they try to get into conversation with their governments. The 
interviews show that not every NGO and IPO has the same opportunity to get in 
contact or to discuss with its government at the national level (see 
Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 170). German NGOs, for example, that coordinate 
within the Forum on Environment and Development, maintain good contact to their 
national delegation and are also invited to round table discussions with the Ministry 
of Environment prior to Conferences (cf. Interview EED, MISEREOR, FED). An 
indigenous representative, on the other hand, notices that he gets more time and 
advertency from his national delegation at the conference, than at home (cf. 
Interview NAHO). 
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The effectiveness and relevance of lobbying work is assessed quite differently by 
NGOs and IPO (see Galan/König/Moldovan 2010: 169). While some actors suppose 
that, due to the compromise character of international negotiations, it is quite 
difficult to introduce wide-ranging agendas into the political process by lobbying (cf. 
Interview BUKO); others believe that lobbying is one of the most effective strategies 
to get involved in the process (cf. Interview Tebtebba; NAHO). 
 
 5.2.4. Public awareness 
 
With regard to input legitimacy, it is also important that NGOs and IPOs are not only 
addressing their concerns to the negotiating Parties, but also to a broader public.  
As pointed out by an NGO representative, in order to generate political pressure on 
the Conference, it is important to gain somehow public attention, which is basically 
done through media (cf. Interview FED).  
NGOs and IPOs can exert public pressure on decision makers by generally informing 
the public on the problems of biodiversity loss or of biopiracy and the need for 
regulation, as well as by disclosing that certain problems are not processed in terms 
of public interest, or in the interest of the people affected within the negotiations. 
Therewith NGOs and IPOs try to make Parties to consider civil society, indigenous 
people and local communities’ concerns respectively to change their positions.  
The high media presence at the COP 10 was first of all used by NGOs to conduct 
daily press conferences, while IPOs organised only few media meetings (cf. CBD 
2010 c.). On the opening day of the COP the CBD Alliances held a press conference 
on the “TOP10 for COP10”, in order to convey the main concerns of the NGO 
community to a broad public. After the first half of the Conference, the CBD 
Alliance together with the Japan Civil Network for Convention on Biological 
Diversity (JCN-CBD) were able to attract media’s attention by presenting the first 
“Dodo” Awards. This is an inglorious prize, awarded to Parties who were “leading 
the world to extinction” by blocking progress at Cop10 (CBD Alliance/Kalpavriksh 
2010: 6). The “winners” of the Dodo Awards 2010 were the European Union and 
Canada, mostly because of their blocking attitude during ABS negotiations. Canada 
was chosen especially because it was the only country that blocked references to the 
UNDRIP within the Protocol (cf. ibid.; CBD Alliance 2010 c.). Later on the same 
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day also a press conference on the status of the ABS negotiations were held by the 
EED, ECOROPA, Tebtebba and Third World Network (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 d.). 
During COPs, the CBD Alliance is also editing and distributing the ECO, a 
newsletter for civil society, where different groups, organisations or individuals can 
put forward their reports on the negotiation process and their analyses on substantive 
issues under negotiation. Beyond that, the CBD Alliance also produces, together with 
the CBD Secretariat, the newsletter “[square brackets]”, which is meant as a tool to 
facilitate and enhance the dialogue between NGOs and CBD Parties on key 
biodiversity issues. A similar newsletter “Pachamama” is also produced by the IIFB 
in co-operation with the CBD Secretariat.  
The mentioned newsletters, as well as other relevant information on CBD meetings, 
are posed on the CBD Alliance´s respectively the IIFB´s website. In order to 
disseminate information and analysis of the negotiations, the Alliance also created 
the Undercover COP website and set up a face book and twitter account (cf. CBD 
Alliance/Kalpavriksh 2010: 8). 
By reporting on the conferences, NGOs and IPOs can potentially contribute to make 
the negotiation process more transparent for the national population and therewith 
also enable them, respectively their parliaments, to keep a closer eye on their national 
delegation when taking international decisions. 
During conferences, NGOs and IPOs also try to draw media’s and state’s attention to 
specific problems by eye catching actions and protests.  
Similarly to meetings of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the 
WTO, also CBD meetings have been accompanied, even if in a lesser degree, by 
protest activities and counter summits in the past.  
With regard to the COP 9 in Bonn, a couple of events, protest actions and 
demonstrations were organised by a coalition of social movements and activist45. 
The aim of these protest and counter evens was to spread general criticism on the 
predominantly economic orientation of the CBD, as well as the increasing 
commercialisation and privatisation of biological diversity and nature. Under the 
motto “Nature for people, not for business!”, activist groups organised, among 
 
                                                 
45 Including La Via Campesina, BUKO Kampagne gegen Biopiraterie, A SEED Europe, 
Aktionsnetzwerk Globale Landwirtschaft, Bonner AK gegen Gentechnologie, Corporate Europe 
Observatory, Grüne Jugend, Netzwerk freies Wissen (cf. Schweigler/ Riekeberg 2008; Activism 
Network COP9 2008).  
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others, a discussion forum, film evenings, a demonstration against gen modified 
organisms (GMO), 'terminator technology' and patents, and a second one against 
biopiracy and the privatisation of seeds, a campaign on agrofuels and street theatres 
on traditional knowledge etc.(cf. BUKO 2008).  
With regard to the COP 10 in Nagoya, the final negotiations on the ABS Protocol 
against biopiracy took place without noticeable resistance (cf. Schattenblick 2010). 
There was only one “small demonstration” held at the opening-day of the 10th 
Conference.  Right at the entrance of the conference centre some members of the 
CBD Alliance46 were protesting under the motto: “mother nature is not for sale!” 
against the commodification of life and the marked based conservation of 
biodiversity (cf. Global Justice Ecology Project 2010). 
 
5.3. NGO- Output Activities 
 
Within global governance concepts, NGOs are not only ascribed to contribute to an 
improvement of the input legitimacy of international governance, but also to an 
enhancement of the effectiveness of international decisions, and therewith to output 
legitimacy.  
Also within the scope of the Convention on Biological Diversity NGOs and IPOs 
provide different “resources” that could help to improve the effectiveness of the 
decisions itself, meaning that  regulations are formulated in such a way as to actually 
solve the given problem, as well as the implementation of the decisions.  
 
5.3.1. Expertise 
 
As NGOs and IPOs have been specialising on certain CBD issues over years, 
partially conduct their own scientific research or reprocess scientific knowledge, and 
also have good contact to and experience in the cooperation with the local 
 
                                                 
46 Amongst others the ETC- group, Global Forrest Coalition, Ecorop, EcoNexus etc.  
 
 
 96 
 
population, they have a more comprehensive knowledge on specific problems, their 
causes and appropriate ways to solve them, than state representative do. This 
expertise is also appreciated by CBD Parties (cf. et al. interview Malaysian delegate), 
as they often lack policy relevant and necessary information (and even more often 
the intention), in order to take effective decisions. So by providing expertise, NGOs 
and IPOs can potentially contribute to reduce this information deficit and therewith 
help Parties to take measures that actually solve the problem. 
Their expertise is one of the main reasons why NGO and IPOs are accepted as 
observers within international negotiation and also invited to discussion rounds and 
seminars on national level, prior to the conference (cf. Müller 2008: 293). Due to 
their high expertise, they are sometimes also taken into the national delegation. A 
representative of the development NGO “Berne Declaration”, for example, was 
member of the Swiss delegation at COP9 as well as at COP10 (cf. Interview Berne 
Declaration; Banz 2010). Also southern countries, as for example Brazil, include 
representatives of NGOs and IPOs into their delegation. But as pointed out by a 
representative of the Brazilian NGO “Terra de Direitos”, whose organisation was 
part of the Brazilian Delegation at MOP 447, the inclusion of NGO/IPO 
representatives is more appearance than substance, as there is no real dialog (cf. 
Interview Terra de Direitos).  
 
 5.3.2. Implementation and Monitoring  
 
Besides providing information on the interests of the people affected and high 
expertise, which could potentially led to an improvement of the quality of the 
decisions, NGOs and IPOs also assist Parties to implement the different provisions of 
the CBD on the national level. Moreover their monitoring activities help 
governments to better meet CBD commitments.  
Environmental NGOs, for example, provide different data sets and biodiversity 
indicators, which can be useful for CBD Parties when developing their National 
Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) to implement the Convention on 
the national level, or when elaborating their national or thematic reports, to report to 
 
                                                 
47 4th Meetings of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Bio-safety 
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the COP on the status and trends of the national biodiversity, on the measures taken 
within the NBSAP and their effectiveness in achieving the objectives of the 
Convention. The WWF, for example, has developed, as part of his “Living Planet 
Report”, the “living planet index” which shows the state of the world’s natural 
ecosystems (cf. CBD n.d. c.). The annually published report also provides, in 
contrast to national reports, so to say an independent assessment on the state of 
biodiversity.  
NGOs and IPOs also help to implement the objectives and provisions of the 
Convention by running their own projects. Especially environmental NGOs, like 
Bird Life International, Conservation International, Nature Conservancy, WWF etc. 
are supporting governments to implement the program of work on protected areas by 
providing funds for the establishment of protected areas, or by initiating and 
managing conservation programs and projects (cf. ibid.).  
Within the framework of ABS capacity building projects, NGOs/IPOs especially 
support authorities of southern countries in developing relevant measures on ABS 
and traditional knowledge and to implement them. The NGO LI-BIRD48, for 
example, is running an ABS project in Nepal, with the aim to contribute to the 
institutionalization of mechanisms, in order to effectively implement fair access to 
and benefit sharing from the sustainable use of genetic resources and associated 
knowledge (cf. CBD n.d. d.). The Philippine NGO SEARICE49 launched anti-
biopiracy programmes in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, where it worked 
closely together with indigenous peoples and local communities in order to spread 
information on the issue of biopiracy, prevent illegal bio prospecting (biopiracy) and 
elaborate balanced and fair access and benefit sharing agreements (cf. CBD n.d. e.).  
Especially development NGOs, like the EED or Berne Declaration, and critical 
NGOs, such as ETC group and GRAIN, contribute to monitor compliance with CBD 
provisions on ABS by investigating biopiracy cases, making them public and taking, 
within the scope of possibilities, legal actions. The ETC- group, for example, uses 
the high media presence at the COP to award the “Captain Hook Awards” and 
therewith make the shadiest biopiracy cases globally public (cf. ETC group n.d.). 
Furthermore, NGOs also try to topple patent applications based on biological 
 
                                                 
48 Local Initiatives for Biodiversity Research and Development 
49 South East Asia Regional Institute for Community Education 
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resources and associated traditional knowledge, when those resource were accessed 
without fulfilling ABS provisions.  
The difficulty here is, that compliance with ABS provisions is no prerequisite for the 
granting of patents, so in order to raise an objection against biopiracy at the European 
Patent Office, one has to demonstrate that the patent contravenes public order and 
morality, or that the requirement of novelty, the inventive step, is not met (cf. 
Frein/Meyer 2010 b.: 14; BUKO 2005: 127). Therefore, one of the main claims of 
NGOs was to include patent offices as mandatory check point, where the certificate 
of compliance needs to be presented.  
 
 
6. The impact of NGOs and IPOs on the Nagoya Protocol on 
Access and Benefit sharing  
 
In the following it will be shown whether NGOs and IPOs could ultimately bring 
their concerns, and therewith also their expertise, into the Nagoya Protocol on ABS. 
Therefore the main demands of NGOs and IPOs with regard to the ABS Protocol 
(see chapter 5) will be compared with the actual outcome in Nagoya.  
 
At the end of the two weeks lasting COP 10 in Nagoya the 193 contracting states 
agreed on more than 40 decisions, whereby three of them were especially important 
and treated as an all-or nothing package. These were the decisions on the new 
strategic plan and the 20 Aichi targets to stem biodiversity loss, the decision on the 
scheme to increase the mobilisation of financial resources to support the achievement 
of the CBD objectives and the decision on the ABS Protocol to combat biopiracy (cf. 
TWN 2010).  
 
The final adoption of the “Nagoya Protocol on access to genetic resources and the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from their utilisation” took years of 
preparation, two and a half weeks of intense, partially post-midnight negotiations and 
long lasting deliberations at the final plenary session which ended at past 2 am in the 
morning of 30th of October 2010 (cf. Normile 2010: 742). 
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As mentioned, during the COP10 the negotiations of the ABS Protocol took place 
within the Informal Consultative Group (ICG) which was established on behalf of 
Fernando Casas and Timothy Hodges (who co-chaired the WG on ABS) in order to 
negotiate and finalize the ABS Protocol by 22nd of October 2010. The dead-line was 
extended to the 28th of October 2010, but negotiations reached a deadlock. 
Thereupon, the COP 10 presidency, Japan set up a “facilitating group”, which 
consisted of the European Union, Namibia (for the African Group), Brazil (on behalf 
of the LMMC) and Norway (representing a bridging viewpoint), to prepare a 
compromise text on the unresolved issues. A key negotiator of the Asian- Pacific 
region was not invited to this negotiation group (cf. TWN 2010). During the 
penultimate day of the COP, negotiations took place behind closed doors. Informal 
consultations were held between the head of delegations and a compromise text was 
suggested but no agreement was reached. In order to conclude the negotiations on 
ABS Protocol successfully, the host country Japan took over the negotiations and 
elaborated with guidance of the co-chairs Hodges and Casas a compromise text on 
scope and compliance during the night. On the morning of 29th of October 2010 
Japan’s draft was distributed and regional groups met with the Japanese 
Environmental Minister Ryu Masumoto, who basically persuaded all Parties to 
accept this text (cf. ibid.). 
The fact that northern and southern countries could finally agree on a legally binding 
ABS Protocol, that seeks an equitable share of the benefits which arise out of the 
utilisation of generic resources, was basically estimated as success. However, caution 
was mingled with the celebration.  
Most delegates and observers assessed the Protocol as a starting point, a useful basis 
for future work. Whereby it’s effectiveness will basically depend on its 
implementation by the Parties, especially of user countries (cf. EED 2010a.; ICTSD 
2010). 
Doubts towards the new Protocol prevail on the part of the African group, which 
called the protocol imperfect but stated that they could live with it, and of the 
ALBA50 group, which heavily criticized the Nagoya Protocol and stated that they 
 
                                                 
50 The “Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América” consists of, among others, Bolivia, 
Cuba, Equator, Venezuela etc. 
 100 
 
could not accept it but will not stand in the way of all the Parties that agreed to adopt 
it (cf. TWN 2010). 
 
6.1. Scope 
 
With regard to the scope of the ABS Protocol NGOs wanted to achieve several 
things (see Chapter 5.1.2).  
As most of the known biopiracy cases do not relate to the direct utilisation of the 
genetic information of the genetic material itself but rather to its biochemical 
compounds (for example for screening medically active compounds to develop new 
drugs), NGOs and especially southern countries were keen to ensure that the access 
and benefit sharing provisions do not only apply to genetic resources but also to the 
direct products of the genes themselves, for example proteins, metabolites and other 
so-called derivatives of genetic resources.  
The problem is that a literal interpretation of the CBD´s definition of genetic 
resources, as “genetic material [i.e. any material of plant, animal, microbial or other 
origin containing functional units of heredity] of actual or potential value” (United 
Nations 1992: 3), would in effect exclude biochemical compounds, which do not 
contain functional units of heredity (i.e. genes, DNA– segments), from the scope of 
the Protocol (cf. Bavikatte/Tobin 2010: 3; Nijar 2011: 13).  
 
Within the Nagoya Protocol this problem was solved by the definition of “utilisation 
of genetic resources” in Article 2(c), as “to conduct research and development on the 
genetic and/ or biochemical composition of genetic resources, including through the 
application of biotechnology51” (Secretariat of the CBD 2011:4). Article 2(e), as well 
gives a definition of derivatives of genetic resources that also refers to biochemical 
compounds, which could be seen to complete the definition of “utilisation of genetic 
resources”. They are defined as “a naturally occurring biochemical compound 
resulting from the genetic expression or metabolism of biological or genetic 
 
                                                 
51  Biotechnology is defined in Article 2 (d) as: “any technological application that uses biological 
systems, living organisms or derivatives thereof to make or modify products or processes for specific 
use” (Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 4). 
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resources, even if it does not contain functional units of heredity” (Secretariat of the 
CBD 2011: 5). 
Biochemical derivatives were not explicitly included within the scope of the Nagoya 
Protocol, which is set out by Article 3 and refers to: 
“genetic resources within the scope of the Article 15 of the Convention and to the 
benefits arising from the utilisation of such resources”, as well as to, “[…] traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources within the scope of the Convention and 
to the benefits arising from the utilisation of such knowledge” (Secretariat of the 
CBD 2011: 5). 
  
But they were implicitly included within the scope of the Protocol by the term 
‘utilisation of genetic resources’, which is defined, see above, in such a way as to 
include biochemical composition of genetic resources. This makes ABS rules 
applicable to the utilisation of the genes, as well as the biochemicals contained in the 
genetic resources. Accordingly, the main source of benefits, i.e. the utilisation of 
biochemical compounds for the development of drugs or cosmetics, is covered by the 
ABS Protocol (cf. Frein/Meyer 2011: 11). In order to have a strong Protocol against 
biopiracy, NGOs also request Parties to take pathogens, i.e. viruses which are used to 
develop vaccines, into the scope of the Protocol. They pointed out, that in emergency 
situations Parties could indeed allowed for specific and appropriated access, but 
benefit sharing obligations must be secured. 
This demand was especially supported by southern countries while northern 
countries to various degrees wanted all these to be excluded from the Protocol (cf. 
Ling 2011: 8).  
Although Article 3 on the scope of the Protocol does not directly refer to pathogens, 
they are, according to TWN, covered by the Protocol “as evidenced by a specific 
reference in preamble 16 […]” (TWN 2011). According to the TWN a cumulative 
reading of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 4, on the relationship with other 
international agreements and instruments, and Article 8(b), on special considerations, 
suggests that Parties can develop national legislation that deals with pathogens as a 
genetic resource and subject it to ABS requirements (cf. ibid.). Article 8(b) stipulates 
that Parties shall pay due regards to emergency situations, when for instance human, 
animal or plant health are threatened or damaged, when developing and 
implementing their national access and benefit sharing legislation. In those cases, 
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they may take into consideration the need for expeditious access to genetic resources. 
However, if access to viruses is to be expeditious then also the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of these viruses52, needs to be 
expeditious (cf. Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 8).  
With regard to the temporal scope the main interest of NGOs and southern countries 
was to secure that the provisions of the ABS Protocol not only apply to genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge acquired after the entry into force of the 
Protocol, but also to any on-going and new use of resources and knowledge that have 
already been collected, and stored ex-situ in gene banks or botanical gardens, since 
the entry into force of the CBD in 1993. (cf. Ling 2011: 8; Meienberg/Weizsäcker 
2011: 12; Frein/Meyer 2010c.: 24f) 
In the final version of the agreement the issue on temporal scope is left open to 
interpretation. As mentioned, Article 3 on the scope of the Protocol states that the 
Protocol applies to genetic resources and to traditional knowledge associated with 
these resources within the scope of the CBD (cf. Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 5). 
This could mean that any new use of genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge that have been collected since the entry into force of the CBD in 1993, 
falls within the provision of the Protocol (cf. Swiderska 2010). Article 33 on the 
entry into force of the agreement, on the other hand, states that the Protocol shall 
enter into force on the 90th day of the date of the 50th signature of a CBD Party (cf. 
Nagoya Protocol 2010 Article 33 paragraph 1). This could be interpreted to mean 
that the provisions of the Protocol apply to new collections. In other words the 
temporal scope of the Protocol is far from clear. According to the interpretation of 
Christine von Weizsäcker and Francois Meineberg, any new utilisation of genetic 
resources held ex-situ are covered by the Protocol, as all wordings, which would 
have restricted the scope of the agreement to genetic resources and associated 
knowledge acquired after the entry of the Protocol, have fortunately been deleted in 
the final version (cf. Meienberg/Weizsäcker 2011: 12). 
 
With regard to the geographical scope of the ABS-Protocol, the CBD Alliance 
stressed that the Protocol generally needs to cover all territories of its Parties and that 
 
                                                 
52 This includes access to affordable treatments by those most in need, especially in developing 
countries. 
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the utilisation of genetic resources collected from extra-territorial areas has to be in 
accordance with the ABS Protocol. In addition, the German NGO Forum suggested 
to establish a multilateral solution for the fair sharing of the benefits that arise from 
the utilisation of genetic resources from extra-territorial areas or from the utilisation 
of resources and traditional knowledge of more than one country or indigenous 
community (cf. Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung/DNR 2010). 
Such a multilateral solution was also suggested by the African Group, which 
proposed to establish a multilateral fund, under the CBD, for the benefits that cannot 
be linked to a specific country of origin or providing country (cf. Ling 2011: 8) .  
 
In the final version of the Nagoya Protocol the geographical scope is clarified by 
Article 3 which stipulates that the Protocol applies to genetic resources within the 
scope of CBD Article 15, which covers the area under national jurisdiction of the 
Parties (cf. United Nations 1992: 9f.). In addition the proposal of the African group 
was also considered, so that the Protocol now includes a provision to set up a 
mechanism to share the benefits of genetic resources that occur in trans-boundary 
situations or for which it is not possible to grant or obtain a PIC.  
Article 10 states that: 
“Parties shall consider the need for and modalities of a global multilateral benefit-
sharing mechanism to address the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from 
the utilization of genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources that occur in transboundary situations or for which it is not possible to 
grant or obtain prior informed consent. The benefits shared by users of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources through this 
mechanism shall be used to support the conservation of biological diversity and the 
sustainable use of its components globally” (Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 8). 
 
As was pointed out by François Meienberg and Christine von Weizsäcker the 
provisions of Article 10 could also be applicable in those cases where genetic 
resources are used that had left the country of origin (hundreds of) years ago and 
have been kept ex-situ, e.g. in botanical gardens, so that the country of origin is not 
identifiable any more (cf. Meienberg/Weizsäcker 2011: 12). However, Article 10 
remains quite vague, as no time frame is given to establish this mechanism, and is 
potentially illusionary (cf. Ling 2011: 8).  
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With regard to the utilisation of genetic resources and associated traditional 
knowledge within the territories of countries that are not Parties of the CBD, such as 
the USA, the CBD alliance wanted to achieve that the Protocols ensure that ABS 
activities and transactions between CBD Parties and non-Parties are consistent with 
the Protocol. Finally Article 24 which deals with non-Parties remained quite vague. 
It states that: “[…] Parties shall encourage non-Parties to adhere to [the] Protocol and 
to contribute appropriate information to the Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-
House” (Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 18).  
 
6.2. Rights of Indigenous People 
 
With regard to the rights of indigenous people and local communities, NGOs and 
IPOs basically wanted to ensure that the ABS Protocol recognise and protect their 
right to dispose of their traditional knowledge and of genetic resources located in 
their territories, as had been stipulated by the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People (UNDRIP) in 2007. 
According to that especially IPOs but also NGOs called for clear references to the 
UNDRIP in the preamble of the ABS Protocol. At the resumed ninth meeting of the 
WG on ABS in July 2010, the IIFB had made the following text proposal for the 
preambles of the Protocol: “[n]oting the significance of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People as regards this Protocol”( CBD 2010 a.: 3).  
During the negotiations at COP10 Canada ended up in being the only Party that 
refused to accept any references to the UNDRIP in the preambular text (cf. 
Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 47). In order to make Canada agree to this provision, 
Canadian IPOs published a flood of media release, held press conferences and 
undertook fierce lobbing. In addition the preambular text was made more agreeable 
by phrasing it as follows: “[n]oting the United Nation Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People” (Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 4). 
The inclusion of references to the UNDRIP in the preamble of the Protocol was an 
important step, as it is the first time that an international treaty explicitly refers to the 
UNDRIP adopted in 2007 (cf. Koutouki 2011: 11), and even more important as it 
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gives the jurisprudential opportunity to interpret the provisions of the Protocol from 
the perspective of the UNDRIP (cf. Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 45). 
It should be noted that the IIFB also called on Parties to ensure that the preambles to 
the Protocol recognise the rights of indigenous people and local communities to 
genetic resources. Although the interrelationship between genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge and their inseparable nature for IPLC was referred to in the 
preamble 21 of the Protocol, the right of IPLC to genetic resources was not 
recognised, whereas the right of IPLC to traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources was.  
6.3. Access and Benefit Sharing 
 
With regard to access to traditional knowledge and related genetic resources, NGOs 
and IPOs demanded that the right of indigenous people and local communities to 
determine over access to and utilisation of their genetic resources and associated 
traditional knowledge should be recognised in the Protocol, and not just subjected to 
national law. The wording “subject to national law” means, that it lies within the 
discretion of governments whether they apply these rights or not (cf. Frein/Meyer 
2011: 13). Basically, access to such knowledge and resources and benefit sharing has 
to be dealt at the same level as access to genetic resources held by states (cf. CBD 
Alliance 2010a.). Therefore the Protocol should require the free and prior informed 
consent (F-PIC) of indigenous people and local communities for access to and 
utilisation of their resources and knowledge, as well as equitably benefit sharing with 
the providing community.  
In the final version of the Protocol these concerns were at least partially taken into 
account. First of all, it should be mentioned that the Nagoya Protocol deals separately 
with access to genetic resources and access to associated traditional knowledge in 
Article 6 and Article 7. Thereby the access provisions cover three cases: access to 
genetic resources of the providing Parties (Article 6.1), access to genetic resources of 
IPLC (Article 6.2) and access to traditional knowledge held by IPLC (Article 7) (cf. 
Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 6f). 
Article 6.1.basically reiterates the principle of the sovereign rights of states over their 
natural resources and states that: 
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“[…] access to genetic resources for their utilisation shall be subject to the [PIC] of 
the Party providing such resources that is the country of origin of such resources or a 
Party that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the Convention, 
unless otherwise determined […]” (Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 6). 
 
Furthermore Article 6.3 contains a set of international access standards and also 
provides suggestions for provisions in mutually agreed terms (MAT), among others, 
terms on subsequent third party use and terms on change of intent (cf. ibid.: 7). 
These provisions basically enable Parties to include also regulations, when 
establishing national rules and procedures for MAT, which require the initiation of 
new proceedings for PIC when the user or the intent of use is changed. The inclusion 
of provisions on change of user or intent, was also a main demand of the German 
NGO Forum on Environment and Development, which should have likewise also 
applied to traditional knowledge (cf. Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung/DNR 2010).  
However there is no evidence that such minimum provisions for MAT also apply to 
traditional knowledge jet. Article 12 of the Nagoya Protocol, which refers to the 
implementation of provisions on traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources, only stipulated in paragraph 3(b) that: 
“Parties shall endeavour to support, as appropriate, the development by indigenous 
and local communities […] of: [m]inimum requirements for mutually agreed terms to 
secure the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources” (Secretariat of the CBD 
2011: 9). 
 
As mentioned above, access to genetic resources of indigenous people and local 
communities is referred to in Article 6.2 of the Protocol. The main demand of IPOs 
and NGOs to include clear references to IPLC rights over genetic resources in the 
Protocol and therewith secure these rights in international law, could in the end not 
be reached, at least not to that extent. Especially northern countries argued that since 
there were no obligations in the CBD to recognise IPLC rights over genetic 
resources, the granting of these rights had to be strictly restricted to national 
discretion, which was rejected by IPOs and NGOs (cf. Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 
46). 
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In the end the Protocol only requires Parties to develop national measures for PIC 
and benefit sharing (see below) for the use of genetic resources held by indigenous 
people. Article 6.2 reads as follows:  
“In accordance with domestic law, each Party shall take measures, as appropriate, 
with the aim of ensuring that the prior informed consent or approval and involvement 
of indigenous and local communities is obtained for access to genetic resources 
where they have the established right to grant access to such resources” (Secretariat 
of the CBD 2011: 6f). 
 
The wording at the beginning of the paragraph “in accordance with domestic law”, 
which was introduced by the African group as a new legal term of art and used also 
in other parts of the Protocol, replaced the former phrase “subject to national law”, 
and basically affirms that the right of IPLC under this article are not dependent on 
the discretion of states, but rather that the states have the obligation to ensure that 
these rights are firmly established through national legislation (cf. 
Bavikatte/Robinson 2011:45). As the obligation in Article 6.2 is a shall-obligation, it 
is mandatory for states to implement it, but this will take however some time.  
Basically Article 6.2 provides that the PIC of IPLC are sought by users when 
accessing and using their genetic resources. However, this provision seems to apply 
only in those cases where IPLC have already been granted their ownership rights (cf.  
Frein/Meyer 2011: 12), as indicated by the phrase “where they have the established 
right to grant access to such resources” (Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 7). As the 
words “established rights” are not concretely specified, it leaves it open to 
interpretation whether these rights are established in national or international law (cf. 
Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 47). 
With regard to access to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, the 
respective Article 7, just as the afore mentioned Article 6.2, only requires countries 
to develop national measures to ensure the PIC of and MAT with IPLC for access to 
traditional knowledge. Article 7 only consists of one paragraph and states that: 
“[i]n accordance with domestic law, each Party shall take measures, as appropriate, 
with the aim of ensuring that traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
that is held by indigenous and local communities is accessed with the prior and 
informed consent or approval and involvement of these indigenous and local 
 108 
 
communities, and that mutually agreed terms have been established” (Secretariat of 
the CBD 2011: 7). 
 
As can be seen Article 6.2 as well as Article 7 do neither maintain the standard of F-
PIC nor a provision that allows IPLC or Parties to deny access to genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge when these resources are not used in a sustainable way, as 
demanded by IPOs and NGOs (cf. Forum Umwelt und Entwicklung/DNR 2010; 
CBD Alliance 2010 b.). Nevertheless these provisions under the Nagoya Protocol are 
a big step forward compared to the provisions of the CBD, as they establish at least 
the need for PIC and MAT with communities for the use of their traditional 
knowledge and related genetic resources. With Article 12, which refers to traditional 
knowledge, the Nagoya Protocol also stipulates that Parties shall take IPLC´s 
customary law, community protocols and procedures into account when 
implementing their obligations under the Protocol (cf. Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 
9). This was also a main demand of IPOs, whereby they also wanted to include 
references to “indigenous and local community laws”. During the negotiations at 
COP10 especially France, and thus also the rest of the EU which had to back 
France’s position, rejected at first any reference to “customary laws and community 
protocols” as well as to “indigenous and local community laws” (cf. 
Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 46). In the end a compromise was found between France, 
the African Group, which supported the position of IPOs, and the IIFB in the 
corridors. The deal was to retain references to customary law and community 
protocols, in exchange for the removal of “indigenous and local community laws” 
(cf. ibid: 17).   
 
In order to ensure that all benefits which arise out of the utilisation of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge are shared in a fair and equitable way, with the 
providing country or indigenous community, and can be covered by (bi-lateral) ABS 
agreements, NGOs and especially southern countries emphasised that the benefit 
sharing requirements of the Nagoya Protocol had to include any benefits which arise 
from the utilisation (research and development) and commercialisation of these 
resources and knowledge, derivatives and products utilising them (cf. EED 2010 b).  
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The Nagoya Protocol addresses the issue of fair and equitable benefit sharing in 
Article 5 and distinguishes, between benefit which arise out of the utilisation of 
genetic resources, benefits arising from genetic resources held by IPLC, and benefits 
which arise out of the utilisation of traditional knowledge. 
 
To begin with, Article 5.1. determines that: 
“[i]n accordance with Article 15, paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Convention, benefits 
arising from the utilization of genetic resources as well as subsequent applications 
and commercialization shall be shared in a fair and equitable way with the Party 
providing such resources that is the country of origin of such resources or a Party that 
has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the Convention” (Secretariat of 
the CBD 2011: 6). 
 
Reading Article 5.1 together with Article 2(c) of the Protocol, it is obvious that the 
benefits which arise out of the utilisation of biochemical compounds, which are 
derived from the accessed genetic resources, are also included in the benefit sharing 
provision, and therefore will also fall under (bi-lateral) ABS agreements. This 
provision basically reflects the demand of southern countries as well as of NGOs (cf. 
Frein/Meyer 2011: 12).  
It should be pointed out, that the provisions of 5.1 to share the benefits which arise 
from the commercialisation of genetic resources or biochemical compounds, as the 
most lucrative phase in the product development chain, are lacking in Article 5.2 and 
Article 5.5. The former deals with benefit arising form the utilisation of genetic 
resources held by IPLC, the latter with benefits arising from the utilisation of 
traditional knowledge. 
 
Article 5.2 only obliges Parties to: 
“[…] take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, with the aim 
of ensuring that benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources that are held 
by indigenous and local communities, in accordance with domestic legislation 
regarding the established rights of these indigenous and local communities over these 
genetic resources, are shared in a fair and equitable way with the communities 
concerned […]” (Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 6)  
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Similarly, Article 5.5 only stipulates that: 
“[e]ach Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as appropriate, 
in order that the benefits arising from the utilization of traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources are shared in a fair and equitable way with 
indigenous and local communities holding such knowledge[…]” (ibid.). 
 
The exclusion of benefits arising from the phase of commercialisation within Articles 
5.2 and 5.5 is obviously discriminating and need to be rectified in national ABS 
legislation (cf. Frein/Meyer 2011:12). The question is whether governments are 
willing to do that. 
In accordance with CBD all benefit sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms 
(MAT) and may include monetary and non-monetary benefits, as listed in the Annex 
of the Protocol, whereby the benefits are not limited to those listed (cf. Secretariat of 
the CBD 2011: 6, 24f.). 
 
6.4. Compliance 
 
Although the CBD, which has been in force since 1993, includes the objectives to 
equitable share the benefits which arise out of the utilisation of genetic resources (cf. 
United Nations 1992:3) and also requires obtaining PIC of, and establishing MAT 
with, the providing country53 when their genetic resources are accessed (ibid.:9f.). It 
is to be noted that there has been little benefit sharing with these countries (mostly 
“developing countries”) until today. The problem is that although the CBD is legally 
binding, it first of all requires Parties of the Convention to develop national 
legislation to implement it. While most of the biodiversity rich southern countries 
took great efforts to develop and implement national ABS legislation, northern 
countries, where the genetic resources are used in most of the cases, have done little. 
A positive exception in this respect is Norway (cf. IIED 2010). With the result that 
the actual users of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, i.e. 
research institutes and companies, have had no legal obligation to share any benefits. 
 
                                                 
53 This is the country of origin or any Party that has acquired the resources in accordance with the 
CBD. 
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Furthermore, providing countries have had no possibility to monitor  or control the 
compliance of foreign users with national ABS rules, and where necessary prosecute 
breaches, when the genetic resources and the associated traditional knowledge had 
left the providing country (cf. Frein/Meyer 2010 b.: 14). 
Against this background southern countries, as well as NGOs, wanted to achieve that 
especially northern countries were obliged to ensure that only legally acquired 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge are being used in their territories. In 
order to be able to monitor whether the genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
were acquired in accordance with ABS provisions, NGOs argued for the 
establishment of a comprehensive certificate of compliance that includes minimum 
information on PIC and MAT, and for the inclusion of mandatory checkpoints that 
capture any stage of research, development and commercialisation, (for example 
Intellectual property offices or authorities dealing with product registration and 
approvals etc.), where the mentioned certificate must be submitted. Without such a 
certificate any research, the granting of patents or the release of products, based on 
genetic resources or biochemical derivatives thereof, should not be allowed. NGOs 
also demanded that the protocol has to determine that a breach of ABS rules will be 
punished by the withdrawal of patents or marketing authorisation. (cf. Forum 
Umwelt und Entwicklung/DNR 2010; CBD Alliance 2010 a.)  
The issue of compliance was addressed to in the Articles 15, 16 and 18 of the 
Nagoya Protocol.  
Article 15 of the Protocol, dealing with compliance with domestic legislation or 
regulatory requirements on ABS, is almost identical with Article 16, dealing with 
compliance with domestic legislation or regulatory requirements on ABS  for 
traditional knowledge, and requires Parties to take: 
“[…] appropriate, effective and proportionate legislative, administrative or policy 
measures to provide that genetic resources [ and traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources ] utilized within its jurisdiction have been accessed in 
accordance with prior informed consent and that mutually agreed terms have been 
established, as required by the domestic access and benefit-sharing legislation or 
regulatory requirements of the other Party [where such IPLC are located]” ( 
Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 12). 
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In addition Articles 15 and 16, paragraph 2 and 3 also require Parties to take 
measures to address situations of non- compliance and to cooperate in cases of 
alleged violation of domestic ABS legislation or regulatory requirements (cf. ibid.).  
The wording of the both articles implies that the obligation to ensure that genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge are legally acquired, rests first of all on the side 
of industrialised countries. Furthermore the articles also provide that the genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge, which are used in national 
jurisdiction of Parties, needs to comply with the national legislation of provider 
countries (cf. Swiderska 2010).  
Article 18 of the Protocol, which deals with compliance with mutually agreed terms, 
also obliges Parties to ensure that disputes which arise out of private ABS 
agreements between users and providers can be brought to national court (cf. 
Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 14). 
 
With regard to the issue of monitoring the utilisation of genetic resources, the 
negotiating Parties could in the end agree to designate one or more checkpoints to 
monitor and to enhance transparency about the utilisation of genetic resources. 
Thereby the Protocol leaves it basically open to Parties to choose the right 
checkpoint/s, it only requires that: 
“Checkpoints must be effective and should have functions relevant to 
implementation of this subparagraph (a). They should be relevant to the utilization of 
genetic resources, or to the collection of relevant information at, inter alia, any stage 
of research, development, innovation, pre- commercialization or commercialization” 
(Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 13). 
 
The demand of southern countries and NGOs to include a concrete list of 
checkpoints in the Protocol, including patent and other intellectual property offices 
as minimum mandatory checkpoints, to control compliance with the provision of the 
Protocol regarding PIC and MAT, was highly resisted by northern countries, except 
of Norway (cf. Ling 2011: 8). Also the inclusion of an incentive list of possible 
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checkpoints54 was rejected by northern Countries. Furthermore the controlling 
function of checkpoints was reduced to monitoring and enhancing transparency (cf. 
Frein/Meyer 2010 e.: 36). 
With Article 17.3 the negotiating Parties agreed to establish an internationally 
recognized certificate of compliance to show that: 
“the genetic resource which it covers has been accessed in accordance with prior 
informed consent and that mutually agreed terms have been established, as required 
by the domestic [ABS] legislation or regulatory requirements of the Party providing 
prior informed consent” (Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 13). 
 
Furthermore they agreed on nine minimum information points that shall be 
mentioned in the compliance certificate, including: issuing authority and the date of 
issuance, the provider of the resource and the unique identifier of the certificate, the 
person or entity to whom PIC was granted, the subject-matter or the genetic 
resources covered by the certificate, a confirmation that MAT were established and 
that PIC was obtained, and finally information on the commercial and/or non-
commercial use (cf. Secretariat of the CBD 2011: 14). It is, however, worrying that 
all these mentioned points can also be kept confidential. Apart from that, another 
major deficit of the monitoring provisions is that they do not cover traditional 
knowledge related to genetic resources of indigenous people and local communities 
(cf. Frein/Meyer 2011: 14; Ling 2011: 8; Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 48). 
The following table 1 provides an overview of the main demands of the NGO- and 
IPO-community and of their impact with regard to the Nagoya Protocol on ABS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 The non- exhaustive list would have included following authorities: “competent national authorities 
in the user country; research institutions subject to public funding; entities publishing research results 
relation to the utilisation of genetic resource; intellectual property examination-, patent-, and plant 
variety-offices; authorities providing regulatory or marketing approval of products derived from 
genetic resources, resulting from the use of genetic resources or its derivatives; indigenous and local 
communities, including their relevant competent authorities, that may grant access to traditional 
knowledge” (TWN 2010). 
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  Demands Outcome/Impact 
CBD 
Alliance 
Adoption of a legally binding ABS 
Protocol under the CBD. 
Successful: Parties agreed on a legally binding 
treaty. 
Recognition of the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous People. 
Successful: The penultimate preamble of the 
Protocol clearly refers to the UN DRIP. 
Recognition of IPLC right to 
determine over access to and use of 
their genetic resources and associated 
traditional knowledge in 
international law. 
Not successful: The Protocol only requires Parties 
to develop, in accordance with domestic law, 
national measures to ensure that traditional 
knowledge and, where they have the established 
rights to grant access, genetic resources have been 
accessed with PIC of IPLC and the establishment 
of MAT, including provisions on benefit sharing.   
Access to traditional knowledge and 
benefit sharing must be dealt with at 
the same level as that related to 
genetic resources. 
Compliance with the provisions of 
the Protocol on associated traditional 
knowledge must be ensured. 
Not successful: Traditional knowledge and genetic 
resources were not treated in the same way. The 
provisions on benefit sharing for the utilisation of 
traditional knowledge, do not cover benefits 
which are arising form commercialisation. 
Article 16 only requires Parties to develop 
national measures to ensure that traditional 
knowledge utilized within their jurisdiction has 
been accessed in accordance with the PIC and 
MAT provisions of the Party where such 
indigenous people are located. The provisions of 
Article 17 regarding the monitoring of compliance 
do not refer to traditional knowledge.  
Inclusion of the utilisation of extracts 
and biochemical components of 
genetic resources (derivatives), as 
well as pathogens into the technical 
scope of the Protocol.  
Partially successful: Derivatives of genetic 
resources were not explicitly included in the scope 
of the Protocol. But they were defined as bio-
chemicals and referred to in the definition of 
“utilisation of genetic resources”, which extends 
the scope of the Protocol to biochemical 
components of genetic resources.   
A cumulative reading of paragraphs 3 and 4 of 
Article 4 and 8 (b) and the specific reference in 
preamble 16 suggests, that pathogens are covered 
by the Protocol. 
The Protocol should apply to any 
new use of genetic resources and 
associated traditional knowledge that 
have already been collected since the 
entry into force of the CBD 1993. 
Partially successful: The temporal scope of the 
Protocol is left open for interpretation. While 
Article 3 on scope could be interpreted to cover 
all resources collected since the entry into force of 
the CBD in 1993. Article 33 on the entry into 
force of the Protocol, however states, that the 
Protocol shall enter into force on the 90th day 
after the date of the 50th signature of a Party. 
Which means that only new collections are 
covered.  
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CBD 
Alliance 
The geographical scope of the 
Protocol must cover all territories of 
its Parties. Access and benefit 
sharing rules for genetic resources 
outside of national territories must be 
in accordance with the ABS 
Protocol. 
Successful: The Protocol basically covers all 
territories of its Parties. For those situations where 
it is not possible to grant or obtain PIC for the 
access to genetic resources (and traditional 
knowledge), this includes ressources from extra- 
territorial areas, Article 10 provides, that Parties 
shall consider the need for and modalities of a 
global multilateral benefit sharing mechanism.   
Establishment of a list of mandatory 
checkpoints where a certificate of 
compliance, to prove the legal 
appropriation of the genetic resource 
and associated traditional 
knowledge, and the existence of a 
benefit- sharing agreement, must be 
submitted.  
Not successful: The monitoring provisions of 
Article 17 only apply to the utilisation of genetic 
resources and exclude traditional knowledge. 
Parties could only agree to establish one or more 
unspecific check points. Furthermore, the nine 
minimum information points of the certificate of 
compliance can also be kept confidential.  
The Protocol needs to ensure that 
ABS activities and transactions of 
Parties and non-Parties, including the 
users and providers in the territory of 
the latter, are consistent with ABS 
Protocol. 
Not successful: Article 24 on non-Parties only 
provides, that CBD Parties shall encourage non-
Parties to adhere to the Protocol and provide 
information related to access and benefit-sharing 
to the ABS Clearing-House.  
IIFB 
The preambles of the Protocol shall 
respect the rights of IPLC as 
formulated by UN DRIP. 
Successful: See above. 
For the access to traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources 
within indigenous territories the 
(free) PIC of IPLC must be obtained 
and this should not be subject to 
national legislation. 
Not successful: See above. 
The preambles of the Protocol shall 
recognise the right of IPLC over the 
genetic resources within their 
territories. 
Not successful: The preambles notice the 
interrelationship between genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge and also recognize the 
diversity of circumstances where traditional 
knowledge is held by IPLC, but they do not refer 
to genetic resources held by IPLC.  
Integrate traditional knowledge fully 
into the compliance section. Not successful: See above.  
Ensure references to compliance with 
customary law and community 
protocols in the text of the Protocol. 
Successful: Article 12 on traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources states that 
Parties shall, in accordance with domestic law, 
take into consideration IPLC´ customary laws, 
community protocols and procedures, as 
applicable, with respect to traditional knowledge 
when implementing their obligation under the 
Protocol. 
Tab. 1: Demands of the CBD Alliance and the IIFB and their impact on the Nagoya 
Protocol on ABS. Source: CBD Alliance 2010 a.; CBD Alliance 2010 b.; IIFB 2010; 
Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 44f.)  
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7. Conclusion 
7.1. Democratisation of Biodiversity Policy through NGOs? 
 
As mentioned earlier, within the concept of global governance, NGOs and IPOs are 
ascribed to contribute to the democratisation of international governance structures, 
when they are included in international negotiations. As main representatives of 
“(global) civil society” they are supposed to bring, bottom-up, local interests or the 
interests of the most marginalised and affected groups, into the political process and 
therewith countervail the democratic deficits of lacking participation and 
representation in international negotiations (input legitimacy). Furthermore they are 
also ascribed to ameliorate, top-down, the accountability and control of international 
political decisions, by distributing information on the political process and therewith 
enhance the transparency of the process for the population. Finally NGOs are also 
supposed to ameliorate the effectiveness of international decisions (output 
legitimacy), by helping in the implementation through the realisation of projects or 
external monitoring etc. 
As shown in Chapter 5, also within the framework of the CBD, NGOs and IPOs have 
made some positive contributions to enhance the input and the output legitimacy of 
international negotiations. At the same time my research suggests that under present 
conditions there are several limits for NGOs and IPOs to contribute to the 
democratisation of the international biodiversity policy.   
7.1.1. Input–legitimacy 
 
Compared to other international fora, like for example the conference on climate 
change, the CBD is seen as relatively open toward the participation of NGOs and 
IPOs, with far-reaching “participation possibilities” (cf. Brühl 2005: 287). 
Thereby NGOs and IPOs are of course not the only non-state actors that try to 
influence the negotiation process. With regard to financial resources and political 
influence, industrial interest groups ( e.g. the international Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and 
Associations (IFPMA) are much more powerful than NGOs or IPOs.Within the 
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negotiations NGOs and IPOs compete with these BINGOs (Business NGOs) for 
political influence.  
 
Dominance of northern NGOs 
 
Interviews, observations and side talks, during the 9th COP in Bonn, have shown that 
diverse NGOs and IPOs can neither equally participate within the CBD nor do they 
have the same chances to bring their interest into the negotiation process. In 
comparison with northern NGOs it is much harder for southern organisations to get 
the necessary financial resources in order to attend the negotiations. Furthermore 
they cannot afford to line up a large delegation for the conference, as big northern 
environmental NGOs do.  
Although the CBD Alliance endeavours to bring the interest of the most marginalised 
and affected groups into the negotiation process and also financially supports 
southern NGO and IPO representatives to participate in the negotiations, it is obvious 
that the NGO-community within the CBD is dominated by northern NGOs. Beyond 
that many key actors like farmers or fishers are not at all or hardly represented at the 
COP, as was pointed out by a NGO representative (cf. Interview ETC- group). Also 
the fact that the dominant negotiation language during the COPs as well as NGO and 
IPO preparatory and strategy meetings is English, generally puts less experienced 
and less organised actors with another mother tongue under disadvantage in terms of 
effective participation (cf. Interview FPP similarly also Interview BD and Terra de 
Direitos). This is especially important since these preparatory meetings serve 
different organisations to elaborate common positions and demands, which are then 
represented vis-à-vis the Parties. As the discussions are mainly held in English it is 
much harder for non-English-speaking representatives of organisations to actively 
take part in the (co-)determination of these demands. The same is also true for CBD 
rookies, as they often lack the necessary experience and knowledge in order to be 
able to effectively participate in the discussion.  
As mentioned in chapter 5 some NGOs/IPOs even assess their involvement in 
intergovernmental negotiations just as a formality, without having a real saying (cf. 
Interview PIPEC, IUCN, ETC group, Tebtebba). Putting aside the fact that NGOs 
and IPOs are not allowed to raise their voice during decisive negotiation rounds, they 
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also need the support of CBD Parties in order to have their demands included in the 
outcome of the negotiation.   
As pointed out by several interview partners during the COP 9 the demands and 
proposals of NGOs and IPOs, not to mention BINGOs, are not taken equally into 
account by governmental representatives. 
The concerns and proposals of those NGOs and IPOs which are inline with the 
dominant perception of problems and with existing political interests are rather 
considered by CBD Parties than critical voices, which are strictly opposed to the 
economic appropriation of biological diversity and also critical towards the sovereign 
rights of states over genetic resources (cf. Interview BUKO, Interview ETC- group, 
Interview EED). This observation was also made by Ulrich Brand (cf. Brand 2008: 
39). 
However, as the analysis in chapter 6 shows, also rather moderate positions, which 
resign themselves with the economic appropriation of genetic resources, have little 
prospect of success to make it up into the final outcome. As indicated by Table 1 in 
chapter 6 the NGO and IPO communities were hardly able to get their demands 
entirely through the ABS negotiations. 
Most of their demands were either ignored or only partially taken into consideration, 
whereas their partial success was based upon the fact that the ABS Protocol has left 
core points, such as the scope, open for interpretation. Accordingly the joy of the 
NGO and IPO community regarding the adopted Nagoya Protocol was restrained. 
Despite remarkable achievements, for example the implementation of a “broad” 
definition of genetic resources, the inclusion of pathogens into the scope, or the 
extensions of IPLC rights in comparison to the Convention’s text from 1992, they 
could not push through their main demand for mandatory checkpoints and a 
certificate of compliance with which the effectiveness of the Protocol in the fight 
against biopiracy stands and falls.  
 
In summary, it can be said that although the political terrain of the CBD may seem 
open and neutral towards the participation and concerns of civil society organisations 
at first glace, in fact it is not. Because it only integrates certain actors and 
perspectives into the process, while it ignores or marginalises others. With regard to 
input legitimacy this means that although different NGOs and IPOs basically have 
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the ability to bring a variety of interest into the process, their potential to do so is 
undermined by the nature and selectivity of the process. 
However, the negative consequence of this selective involvement is that those civil 
society groups which are working within the framework of CBD therewith also 
concede authority to this political terrain. This is also critically reflected by the ETC 
group (cf. Brand 2008: 39). 
 
Transparency and control 
 
During CBD sessions the newsletter of civil society ECO as well as the information 
bulletin ENB (Earth Negotiation Bulletin), which has a more official character, are 
both important sources of information for governments, civil society groups as well 
as for interested outsiders. Thereby especially the ECO does not only review the 
course of negotiations but also critically analyses the process, gives important 
background information and “translates” complex issues into a language which is 
also understandable for non-experts. However, the ECO as well as the ENB are only 
available in English.  
In order to inform the interested public on the current status of, and the sticking 
points in, the negotiations as well as on the positions and arguments of NGOs and 
IPOs, these actors use different mediums. Beside social networks, like face book and 
twitter, the CBD Alliance as well as the IIFB also use the daily press conferences 
during the COPs to inform the various print media, TV and radio representatives on 
details and the course of the negotiations.   
Although NGOs and IPOs are basically able to make the negotiation process more 
transparent for non-participants and therewith also reassert control to the population, 
through their information and media work. Transparency is only possible to a certain 
degree, so caution is advisable. Since NGOs and IPOs are excluded from those 
negotiation rounds where the final compromise finding takes place, they are not able 
to report on these closed doors meetings. Furthermore, it is not possible to make any 
concrete statement regarding the question how many people were in fact reached by 
the information and media work of NGOs and IPOs. But it may be assumed that the 
first to receive the provided information is the national clientele of NGOs/IPOs and 
at best an innately interested public.  
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7.1.2. Output legitimacy 
 
As shown in chapter 5., NGOs and IPOs also provide certain resources (e.g. 
expertise, project realization, monitoring) that can potentially help to enhance the 
effectiveness of international decisions taken within the CBD. 
The expertise and advocacy of NGOs and IPOs may indeed help politicians to make 
decisions that better satisfy the expectations of affected people, but it depends, 
however, on Parties of the Convention, whether their expertise or their advocated 
interests are reflected in the decisions or not. Furthermore even if certain Parties, as 
for example the African Group, open towards the demands of NGOs and IPOs and 
support them to introduce text proposals into the negotiation text, this is no guarantee 
that their proposals make it up into the final decision. 
Since an international consensus is necessary in order to turn internationally binding 
multilateral agreements into applicable law and already a single veto of a Party is 
sufficient to skip proposals/demands of NGOs and IPOs. It is very likely that on the 
way to the final compromise, first of all the concerns of NGOs and IPOs get lost as 
collateral damage.  
The call of NGOs and southern biodiversity rich countries, for a strong compliance 
regime with mandatory checkpoints, such as patent offices, and a comprehensive 
certificate of compliance, with which the legal appropriation (adherence to PIC and 
MAT) of the genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge could have been 
proved, was highly resisted by northern countries, on behalf of their national 
pharmaceutical and agricultural industry. In the final Protocol the mention of patent 
offices as designated checkpoints could not be retained. This is especially 
disappointing, as such an inclusion would have helped to increase pressure to the 
WTO TRIPs Council toward the adoption of a mandatory requirement to disclose the 
origin of genetic resources for patent applications and helped to mitigate the many 
cases of patent-related biopiracy (cf. Bavikatte/Robinson 2011: 48). 
Moreover, although NGOs are able to contribute through the initiation and 
implementation of projects to a better implementation of internationally agreed 
measures and goals and therewith enhance the output legitimacy of international 
political decisions. This might not always be the case as the example of Conservation 
International shows. 
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The conservative environmental NGO Conservation International is beside the WWF 
and TNC one of “the big three” of the international environmental NGO scene, 
which has by far the most money available for nature conservation projects (cf. 
Brand 2008: 37). The problem is, that due to the within CI dominated understanding 
of nature conservation, indigenous people and local communities living in areas, 
which are considered to be worth protecting, are forced back. CI may pride itself on 
its homepage on broadly involving the rural population in nature conservation 
projects by creating new job opportunities, such as national park rangers, gardeners 
or tourist guides. But in fact it ignores the concerns and rights of indigenous people 
and local communities living in CI administrated districts and forces them to follow 
environmental protection methods that are opposed to their own needs. In the case of 
the bio- reserve Monte Azules CI was blamed of actively promoting biopiracy, by 
allowing pharmaceutical companies to carry out scientific studies on the biological 
diversity harboured in the by CI administrated territory and by arranging bio-
prospecting agreements without involving and equitably sharing the benefits with the 
local communities (cf. Berne Declaration 2004). Therewith CI clearly undermines 
the third objective of the Convention and does not contribute to enhance the 
effectiveness of internationally decided minimum standards on the utilisation of 
genetic resources but rather causes the opposite effect.  
 
In conclusion, the assumption of the global governance concept that mere 
participation of NGOs in international negotiations inevitably leads to a 
democratisation of these processes is not tenable. Although NGOs basically have the 
ability to contribute to an enhancement of the input- and output- legitimacy of 
international decisions, their potential to do so is diminished by the nature of the 
process. The political power of northern industrialised countries and economic actors 
is too strong so that NGOs and IPOs cannot act as an effective counterbalance to 
these powerful interests. This can also be seen in the poor results of the ABS 
negotiations.  
So, in order to make optimum use of the potential of NGOs and IPOs to enhance the 
legitimacy of CBD processes appropriate measures need to be adopted to encourage 
the active participation of weaker actors.  
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7.2. What could be done to overcome democratic deficits more 
effectively? 
 
Although the CBD, from a technical point of view, enables all actors likewise to 
formally participate and influence international negotiations, in fact the process is 
dominated by northern governments, well equipped research institutes, and big 
corporations and their interest groups, as these actors dispose over the most financial 
and informational resources and instruments of power (cf. Brand 2008: 35). 
Accordingly, the CBD process is dominated by the orientation towards the 
commercialisation of natural resources particularly of genetic resources. The 
concerns of weaker actors who stand against the commercialisation of biodiversity 
(i.e. critical NGOs, IPOs, some development NGOs and southern governments) or 
advocate the rights of indigenous people and farming communities to self-
determination are not at all or insufficiently considered. So in order to reach more 
balanced compromises, effective policies and consequently greater legitimacy of the 
CBD, the concerns of weaker actors must be more strongly taken into account. 
Therefore, it is first of all necessary to ensure that financially weaker southern NGOs 
and representatives of indigenous and local communities have the same chances to 
participate in and influence CBD relevant meetings like financially strong northern 
NGOs and business representatives. The establishment of a fund for travel expenses, 
for example, could encourage the participation of these disadvantaged actors. 
Although such a fund has already been created within the CBD55in 2004 up until 
now only a couple of indigenous representatives could be supported. As the fund is 
just voluntary and has only limited financial resources. At the 9th Conference in Bonn 
25 representatives of IPOs were granted financial support for their participation (cf. 
Djoghlaf 2008). At the 10th Conference in Nagoya there were 31 of them (cf. 
Djoghlaf 2010). 
Another important issue with regard to equal conditions for NGO and IPO 
participation is, as mentioned, language. In order to ensure that all participants are 
likewise able to follow and actively participate in the negotiations it is essential that 
 
                                                 
55 On the 7th Conference the Parties of the CBD decided to establish a voluntary fund to facilitate the 
participation of indigenous and local communities, especially of those from southern countries (cf. 
CBD 2004a.). At the following Conference the Parties adopted draft criteria for the operation of such 
a fond (cf. CBD 2006). 
 123 
 
simultaneous translation services are provided in all six UN languages - i.e. Arabic, 
Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish and English- during the whole negotiation 
processes and not only during Plenary and Working Group sessions. Likewise all 
relevant (draft) documents and compromise texts, that are emerging within smaller 
negotiation rounds, have to be translated in all six languages to make it easier for 
non-English speaking NGOs and IPOs to react and prepare proposals for alternative 
texts.  
Moreover, it is important that the participation opportunities for NGOs and IPOs are 
extended, in the sense that they are enabled to fully participate and raise their voice 
throughout the whole negotiation process. This means also within smaller negotiation 
groups, closed groups and facilitating groups. Where necessary, they should also 
have the possibility to enforce their right to participate and speak. In principle, it 
would also be conceivable that the IPOs and NGOs are granted the right to take part 
in the voting process. But, since non state actors are, unlike governmental 
representatives, not authorised by the demos (i.e. through elections) to take binding 
decisions, they should not be given any decision making power in order to not 
worsen democratic problems on the international level (cf. Beisheim 2001: 124). 
Admittedly the Parties of the Convention could, for example, bindingly commit 
themselves to consider the concerns of the NGO and IPO community in the final 
decision making process.  
 
7.3. What could be done better in future when evaluating NGOs and 
IPOs potential to enhance legitimacy of international negotiation?  
 
One of the main points of criticism regarding the assumption of the global 
governance concept that NGOs can serve as source of legitimacy for international 
political processes is that these actors suffer themselves from legitimacy deficits. 
Consequently it is also questionable whether they can enhance the legitimacy of 
international politics at all (cf. Eberlei 2001: 170). Critical voices have attested that 
NGOs are lacking an overall societal as well as an internal legitimation. The latter is 
seen in the fact, that the members of the NGOs, not to mention the NGO´s “clients”, 
have only in the fewest cases the possibility to co-determine the organisations policy 
on particular issues or elect the NGO board (cf. Beisheim 2001:122; 2005: 242, 
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Curbach 2003: 144). This lacking possibility to co-determine the organisation’s 
position on certain issues has of course negative consequences for the 
representativeness of the NGO and also undermines its potential to enhance the input 
legitimacy of international political processes. 
As the main focus of the thesis was to show to what extent the, within the CBD 
Alliance and IIFB cooperating, NGOs and IPOs could influence the ABS negotiation 
process and anchor their demands in the Nagoya Protocol. The question whether 
their demands actually reflected the concerns and viewpoints of their constituency 
was not addressed to. In order to examine whether the demands of the, within the 
CBD active, NGOs and IPOs were in line with the viewpoint of their member or 
clients one could for example carry out interviews with the organisation’s base.  
With regard to the potential of NGOs and IPOs to contribute to more transparency, it 
was not possible to determine how many people were actually reached by their 
information work and reporting. A possible way to measure the amount of people 
that were reached by information provided by NGOs or IPOs, is by carrying out a 
media resonance analysis. 
As the thesis primarily focuses on the final phase of the ABS negotiation process, 
from COP9 in Bonn 2008 to COP10 in Nagoya 2010, and the demands of NGOs and 
IPOs with regard to the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing the 
dynamics within their positions and demands were not addressed. In order to also 
show the dynamics within the positions and demands of these actors over the time 
the observation period needs to be extended. 
Within chapter 5.3 “NGOs Output activities” some examples were given how NGOs 
can increase the effectiveness of international decisions. In particular, it was shown 
to what extent the expertise of NGOs and IPOs, which is reflected in their demands, 
was included within the final decisions on the ABS Protocol. However the potential 
of NGOs or IPOs to contribute to the effectiveness on international decisions by 
providing technical support for national implementation has only been addressed to 
rudimentarily. In order to make comprehensive statements on NGO´s/IPO´s potential 
to enhance the effectiveness of international decisions by supporting states in 
national implementation a case study on a specific country could be carried out.  
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8. Sources 
8.1 Interviews 
Interview ETC group; 
Interview BUKO  
Interview Gen-ethic Network  
Interview German NGO Forum on Environment and Development (FED)  
Interview Forrest People Programme (FPP) 
Interview Evangelischer Entwicklungs Dienst (EED) 
Interview Berne Declaration (BD) 
Interview Indigenous Peoples’ International Centre for Policy Research and 
Education (Tebtebba) 
Interview Pacific Indigenous Peoples Environmental Coalition (PIPEC) 
Interview National Aboriginal Health Organization (NAHO) 
Interview International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 
Interview World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
Interview MISEREOR 
Interview Terra de Direitos  
Interview Delegation Malaysia  
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9. Appendix 1 
9.1. Abstract English 
 
The following paper seeks to answer the question whether, and to what extent, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) can contribute to the democratisation of 
international biodiversity politics. According to proponents of the global governance 
concept, NGOs do have the ability to contribute to the democratisation of global 
politics, as they strengthen the fragile legitimacy of international policy. The latter is 
seen in the lacking effectiveness of international decisions, the insufficient 
participation possibilities of the general public or particular stakeholders in 
international deliberations, and the poor transparency and control of international 
political processes. NGOs are ascribed to ameliorate the input legitimacy of 
international decisions, as they are not only enhancing the transparency of the 
process to non-participants, but also introducing a variety of interests in the 
negotiation process which would have otherwise been ignored by state 
representatives. Accordingly, the hope is that through the involvement of NGOs in 
international negotiation processes, presently existing imbalances regarding the 
representation of interests could be compensated. Beyond that, NGOs are ascribed to 
enhance the effectiveness of international decisions (i.e. out-put legitimacy) by 
providing, among others, expertise which is essential to take appropriate decisions, 
by realising projects or by monitoring the implementation of international decisions. 
Whether, and to what extent, the expectations regarding the democratising effects of 
NGOs prove right or not, is illustrated by the example of the international 
negotiations on the access and benefit sharing (ABS) agreement of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD).  
Thereby, the intention of the negotiations was to adopt a protocol that effectively 
prevents biopiracy, which is generally understood as the unlawful appropriation of 
plants, animals or their genes. After many years of negotiations the Parties of the 
Convention finally agreed to adopt a legally binding ABS Protocol under the CBD at 
their 10th meeting in October 2010 in Nagoya. 
With regard to the initial question, the result shows that although NGOs basically 
have the potential to improve the input and output quality of international decisions, 
and therewith contribute to a democratisation of the international biodiversity 
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politics, their potential to do so is undermined by the structures and selectivities of 
the process. 
 
9.2. Abstract German 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage ob und inwieweit Nicht-
Regierungs-Organisationen (NRO bzw. NGO)  zu einer Demokratisierung 
internationaler Biodiversitätspolitik beitragen können. Dass NGOs zu einer 
Demokratisierung zwischenstaatlicher Politik beitragen, wird insbesondere von 
VerfechterInnen des Global Governance  Konzepts angenommen. Ihre 
demokratisierende Wirkung wird vor allem darin gesehen, dass diese Akteure helfen 
bestehende Legitimationsdefizite internationaler Politik - u.a. mangelnde Effektivität 
internationaler Entscheidungen, ungenügende Teilhabe und Mitbestimmung der 
Bevölkerung bzw. betroffener „stakeholder“ sowie fehlende Transparenz und 
Kontrolle- auszugleichen. NGOs wird zugeschrieben zu einer Verbesserung der 
Input-Legitimität internationaler Beschlüsse beitragen zu können, da sie nicht nur die 
Transparenz internationaler Verhandlungen verbessern sondern auch eine Vielzahl 
unterschiedlicher Interessen und Meinungen in den Verhandlungsprozess 
hineintragen, die von staatlichen und privatwirtschaftlichen Akteuren nicht 
wahrgenommen werden, und sonst ausgeblendet blieben. Durch ihre Beleidigung 
können, so die Annahme, bestehende Asymmetrien in der Interessensvertretung 
behoben werden. Ebenso wird ihnen zugeschreiben, durch die Bereitstellung von 
Expertise, direkte Projektarbeit oder externes Monitoring zu  einer Verbesserung der 
Effektivität internationaler Beschlüsse (Output-Legitimität)  beitragen zu können. 
Ob bzw. in wieweit sich die Hoffnung auf die demokratisierenden Wirkung von 
NGOs erfüllt, wird  am Beispiel der internationalen Verhandlungen zum „Access and 
Benefit Sharing (ABS)“-Abkommen, die im Zuge  der Weiterentwicklung der 
Biodiversitätskonvention (CBD) stattfanden, aufgezeigt.  
Dabei war das angedachte Ziel der Verhandlungen ein Protokoll zu verabschieden, 
das die Praxis der Biopiraterie - also die unrechtmäßige Aneignung von Pflanzen, 
Tieren und deren Gene- effektiv verhindert. Nach mehrjährigen Verhandlungen 
wurde schließlich auf der zehnten Vertragsstaatenkonferenz in Nagoya im Oktober 
2010 ein verbindliches ABS-Protokoll verabschiedet.  
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Mit Blick auf die ursprüngliche Fragestellung zeigt sich, dass NGOs zwar das 
Potential haben die Input- und Output-Qualität internationaler Verhandlungen bzw. 
deren Ergebnisse zu verbessern und dadurch zu einer Demokratisierung der 
internationalen Biodiversitätspolitik beizutragen, dieses Potential aufgrund der 
vorhandenen Rahmenbedingungen allerdings geschwächt wird.  
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